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ABSTRACT
INSTRUMENTAL COMMUNICATIVE DISTORTIONS: THE 'HEGEMONIC
FUNCTIONS OF THE ELECTRONIC MEDIA
(September 1979)
Michael T. Martin, B.A., City College, CUNY; M.A.,
Columbia University, M.Ed., Columbia University; Ph.D.,
University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Dr. Howard Gadlin
The present inquiry is an attempt to bring relevant social theory
to the problematic of media functions in the modern industrial capital-
ist society; and to show how the electronic media serve to maintain and
legitimize the racial divisions, and therefore, the socioracial struc-
ture of the American social order. The evidence gathered in this study
point to the following:
1. There is a qualitative and empirical evidence to show
that the media, particularly television, shapes and alters
political reality; and that political attitudes and behaviors
are in part, formed by the political reality projected by the
electronic media.
2. The media are structurally linked to the power elite in
the American social order and the patterns of ownership and
control of the media channels are increasingly concentrated
in small elite stratum.
3. The images of the social world (race relations, social
life) presented by the media are largely consonant with the
interests of ruling elites in society.
4. Media systems systematically reproduce distortions of
social reality.
5. The electronic media, in reporting the news on race
related issues, present blacks as a problem and a threat to
vi
whites and the status quo in America. In doing so, the media
contributes to the maintenance of racial division in society.
6. Since the owners of the media in the United States have
encouraged the practice of stereotyping blacks through their
portrayal in entertainment and news shows, the author con-
cludes that the maintenance of racial antipathy is a necessary
and central dynamic for ruling elite hegemony.
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For us, a revolutionary people in a revolutionary process
tS^r'n^ffl
^^tistic creations is determined byheir usefulness for the people, by what they contribute to manby what they contribute to the liberation and happiness of man




When there are no longer slaves, there are no longer masters,
-Frantz Fanon
* * *
It is better to know where to go and not know how than to know






A civilization that proves incapable of solving the problems it
creates is a decadent civilization. A civilization that chooses to
close its eyes to its most crucial problems is a stricken civilization,




America's media managers create, process, refine, and preside over
the circulation of images and information which determine our beliefs
and attitudes and, ultimately, our behavior. When they deliberately
produce messages that do not correspond to the realities of social
existence, the media managers become mind managers. Messages that
intentionally create a false sense of reality and produce a conscious-
ness that cannot comprehend or willfully rejects the actual conditions
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One communications revolution has taken place in
our lifetime. The next revolution, perhaps the
final one, will be the result of satellites and
microelectronics, which will enable us to do lit-
erally anything we want to do in the field of
communications and information transfer--including.
ultimately, not only sound and vision but all sense
impressions.
-Arthur C. Clarke
Over the past wo and a half decades, the development of communica-
tion technology has progressed at an incredibly rapid pace. More re-
cently, the speed with which new communication technologies supplant
communication systems that have out-lived their usefulness has accele-
rated so rapidly that man is now witnessing what can best be described
a "communications revolution".
As a consequence of the recent advances in microelectronics and
space technology, and the development of advanced computer systems,
vast amounts of information can be stored and retrieved almost instant-
ly. Through the development of "information transfer networks", we
are approaching the point where anything that is spoken, observed or
written can be converted into an electrical impulse, transferred almost
anywhere, and reconstituted in any form desired.
Complex communication satellite systems begun as a spinoff of the
space program, are capable of transmitting simultaneously to every part
1
2
of the planet. Moreover, what was believed to be theoretically pos-
sible a decade ago is now technologically and practically operational.
Every home and every office in the world can be linked by telephone,
telegraph or facsimile through the recent technical refinement of new
and more sophisticated communication—direct broadcast-satellites.
These advanced satellite communication systems are capable of sending
signals direct to home antennas and, as such, are harbingers of a
future world where video telephones, television transmitters and "sense
impression" transfer systems will be as common as television and the
transistor radio are today.
The Problem: The Manipulation of Consciousness
At the technological level, the past 25 years can indeed be de-
scribed as a revolution in communications technology. Technical devel-
opment is not, however, the same as use. The "new society" envisaged
by the technocrats and optimists, who comment enthusiastically about
the social benefits which they assume will flow automatically from
developments in communications technology, is not altogether certain.
No doubt, a fundamental transformation is occurring in our perception
of the world; and our conception of space, distance and time has been
profoundly altered, in part, as a consequence of the communications
revolution. People separated by thousands of miles share simultaneous-
ly the same experience via satellite television. Action and reaction
bear, consequently, a much closer relationship as the world grows "com-
municatively" interconnected.
Tempered by economic and political realities, considerable specu-
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lation and concern has been raised in recent years over the "effects"
and uses of communications technology on Man and the society in which
he lives. Predictions of a "new" and purposeful social order, however,
appear, at best, problematic.
We now recognize, for example, that the electronic media provide
much of the material used to form images of the world, social groups,
and human conduct. As such, the various media channels present con-
flict, and where ideology is seldom if ever, absent. To argue that the
issues media present are not value-laden is to assume that values are
divorced from facts. In every society where the media exists for pub-
lic consumption, people are bombarded daily by political messages via
the news, commercials, televised debates, etc. Programming reflects,
in the very production, sponsorship and format of the materials, a host
of social values disguised as truths intended to inform and persuade
the public opinion. Even entertainment and information programming are
not exclusive of ideological content. They fail to distinguish between
the intentions of those who produce the materials for programming and
the 'effects' upon those who receive it. The media are informed by
ideology and inform ideologically those who are exposed to it.
In the past fifteen years the electronic media presented a visual
history of Vietnam, recorded the assassination of a president, the
killings of a presidential contender and a leading civil rights leader,
rioting in the major cities and at a national political convention,
etc., it is plausible to assume that the mass media, particularly tele-
vision, play a decisive role in the construction of political reality.
As such, the focus of recent attention and concern about the
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media, centers on the political context in which media operate, the
spurious and ideological uses of media technology by powerful interest
groups, the nature of the flow of information, the content of program-
ming, and the intended 'effects' of media use on the social and poli-
tical behaviors of the viewing audience.
These concerns point to a more fundamental problem that informs
this inquiry. Who manipulates the media, in what ways, and toward what
ends? It is with these questions in mind that the dissertation is
advanced. The general foundation of this disseration is the attempt
to understand the, as yet, little understood 'effects' of the electron-
ic media on the political attitudes (belief structures) and behaviors
of the audience.
, The thesis of the dissertation is that the electronic media, tele-
vision in particular, function, above all else, as 'hegemonic' instru-
ments for ruling groups in the United States. And that, with other
agencies of cultural manipulation and political socialization, the
electronic media maintain and advance an ideology that legitimize the
existence of structural inequality, privilege, and the political order
in society. Specifically, we will attempt to show how the electronic
media collude in the maintenance of racial divisions in the United
States, and , in doing so, legitimize the socio-racial structure of
the American society.
We shall argue that the institutional complex of the electronic
communications system in the United States are structurally linked to
the political order (Schiller, 1969; 1972). The political order pro-
duces, intentionally, patterned use of the media channels by the pub-
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lie, and, as such, grants the media spheres of influence within
society. By "intentionally" we mean that conspiracy provides the
dynamic force for ruling elites to maintain their hegemony and control
(Mills, 1956). As the media introduce the public to information con-
cerning issues related to the nature of social relations, electoral
politics, power relationships, etc., that information is created, pro-
cessed, and disseminated by a communications apparatus that is con-
trolled and manipulated by ruling elites. We will examine the struc-
tural relationship between each element in this process: the nature
and content of information/media manipulation/media control.
The Aims of the Dissertati on
The most general goal is to analyze the electronic media, specifi-
cally television , as a technology and as a cultural form. Specifical-
ly, to assess the relationship between technology, society and culture
as it shapes ideology. As such, questions of cause and effect, as be-
tween a culture and a technology, take form and cogency within an arena
of intention rather than accident.
Within this analysis we will establish the centrality of language and
its use in ' instrumental ' forms of communication wherein the fragmentation
and distortion of social reality occurs. Here we rely on the theoretical
work of Jurgen Habermas (1971 ) , the eminent representative of the
Frankfurt School of social theorists. We extend and link Habermas' communi-
cation theory of society to the electronic media analyzing the format and
*We tangential ly comment on the ideological uses of film throughout the
analyses of this inquiry.
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meaning of value ladened visual and linguistic messages for intended
communicative distortions concerning issues of power, social groups
and the political order.
To support this analysis we will bring to bear relevant empirical
research and theoretical approaches to the analysis of the electronic
media within the general parameters described above. We will examine
and critique the dominant research paradigms, and bring to bear on the
discussion, the orthodox Marxist and neo-Marxist (Frankfurt School)
conceptual approaches, as they relate to 'technological rationality'
and media use.
The critique will be developed through an application of the
Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation and Gramsci's conception of
'hegemony' to the problematic of race relations in the United States,
in order to determine whether the thesis of the dissertation has prac-
tical and theoretical value.
In addition we will bring to bear social theory on the questions
posed by previous research as they relate to the manipulatory aspects
of the media, and how they (the media) contribute to the maintenance
of racial inequality in the American social order.
The Design and Organization of the Dissertation
The present chapter introduces the subject of inquiry, states the
problem, establishes the aims of the enterprise, and delineates the
course of study.
The second chapter reviews and critiques the major research con-
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ducted on mass communications as it relates to the influence of the
media on political behavior. We examine the media's role in people's
acquisition of political beliefs and attitudes from childhood to adult
life. We then review the media's influence on the electoral process
and how the media create and are used in the construction and method-
ological approaches employed in political communication research. We
argue that the 'positivist' approaches in media study provide inade-
quate and false accounts of the relationship of media use to political
behavior. As an alternative to the 'positivist' framework, we employ
the Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation in the subsequent theore-
tical and empirical analyses of media uses and 'effects' on social and
political behavior.
Chapter three reviews and critiques television research in the
areas of audience, content, and effect studies.
Chapter four examines the relationship between technology, lan-
guage, and ideology to media use. We apply and extend Habermas' theory
of communication to the electronic media and examine how 'systematic
distortions' are reinforced and amplified by the media agency of tele-
vision. We locate the ideological uses of television within the frame-
work of the political economy of the giant private and governmental
communication systems. By doing so, we establish the relationship
between the media, manipulation, and the legitimization of the politi-
cal order.
Chapter five attempts to apply Habermas' concept of 'distorted
communication' via the electronic media to race relations in the United
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States. I argue that the stereotypical characterizations of blacks in
film and television reinforce systematic distortions already extant in
the social world. As such, I advance the argument that the electronic
media subtlely confirm and legitimize racial divisions in American
society by beguiling people into accepting images generalized to them-
selves and others as truths concerning their respective racial group's
personality traits, dispositions and behaviors. We establish the his-
torical setting 0915) wherein the distorted and stereotypic images of
blacks in cinema emanate to attain legitimacy. We then trace the elab-
oration of these 'one-dimensional' stereotypes of blacks that emerge
forty years later in television fare.
The final chapter summarizes the thesis and indicates areas for
further research.
CHAPTER II
A REVIEW OF POLITICAL COMMUNICATION RESEARCH
The corpus of communication research is voluminous through the
systematic study of mass communication, as a subject of intellectual
and practical inquiry, is comparatively new. Consequently, the varied
conceptual frameworks and methodological approaches applied in commun-
ication research relies largely on the theoretical developments
achieved in the major disciplines in the social and behavioral
sciences. Only recently has the study of mass communication emerged,
dependency on the other related fields notwithstanding, as a new
academic discipline in its own right.
The focus of our investigation in the dissertation is on the
"electronic" medium of television. In the present chapter, we shall
review and critique the major research conducted on the role of the
mass media on influencing political behavior.
Before, we review the various categories of political communica-
tion research, we must establish the fact that the primary impetus for
research on the mass media was politically and militarily motivated
(Kraus and Davis, 1976; Williams, 1975). The systematic study of mass
communication began fifty-two years ago with the publication of
Lasswell's (1927) classic study of Propaganda Technique in the World
War . Lasswell's (1927) study set forth the dominant paradigm of: "Who
In Chapter three, we review the major research 1 i terature--audience
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says what to whom, through what channels, with what effects?" Through
the collation of propaganda themes, Lasswell established the research
category known today as 'content analysis'. Moreover, through the use
of in-depth interviews and the differentiation of propaganda audiences,
Lasswell opened-up another area for communication research--
' audience
research'—where psychoanalysis was later to play a major role.
During the second world war, communications research, especially
in the United States, focused on how the media could be used more ef-
fectively against the Axis powers, especially Germany, who under the
direction of Geobbels had developed an extremely effective propaganda
apparatus. The then infant science was concerned almost entirely with
political persuasion and psychological warfare (Beltran, 1976; Kris and
Leites, 1947). Much of the research then was on an "against who"
basis. After the second world war, and during the 1950's and 60's
(the cold war period) communications research became strongly anti-
communist in scope and tone (Turnstall, 1970). Later, (as we shall
examine) new areas in communications and research opened up to include
electoral behavior, socialization, political information dissemination,
and media use in the electoral process.
Nonmedia Political Socialization Research
Greenstein (1968) has delineated the boundaries for political
socialization research to include:
...all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate
and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including
not only explicitly political learning which affects politi-
cal behavior, such as the learning of politically relevant
personality characteristics (p. 551).
In short, the study of political socialization includes how poli-
tics is learned, how we acquire values and attitudes concerning politi-
cal institutions, and how we behave politically.
When we examine the literature on mass media's influence on the
development of political attitudes and behavior, one is immediately
struck by the dearth of studies engaging the two variables. In the
past, the mass media and political socialization have been studied
separately by researchers in the related disciplines of political
science and sociology. More recently, however, a growing number of
researchers (Bryne, 1969; Seymour-Ure, 1974; Shostech, 1969), especial-
ly those in the fields of journalism, television, and radio, have com-
bined the two variables in order to test hypotheses concerning child-
ren's cognitive and affective political development as a consequence
of their exposure to media channels (magazines, story books, televi-
sion and film). Fewer academic researchers, however, have extended
their investigations beyond childhood and adolescence into the adult
audience of media consumers (Kraus and Davis, 1976).
Out of six comprehensive reviews (Dawson and Prewitt, 1969; Har-
vard Educational Review , 1968; Hyman, 1959; Patrick, 1967; Sigel, 1965,
1970), and four major studies (Easton and Dennis, 1969; Greenstein,
1968; Hess and Torney, 1967; Langton, 1969) published since 1959 on
political socialization, mass communication and television variables
were ignored, dismissed as irrelevant or barely noted. It is difficult
to comprehend that given the growing television audience, the increase
and diversification in television fare, and the amount of media expo-
sure children v/ere receiving, that researchers avoided studying tele-
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vision and other media as central sources of political socialization
before the nineteen-seventies.
Most studies on political socialization conducted prior to the
mid-1970's were nonmedia in content, and they centered on familial
influence (Bell, 1969; Blumenfeld, 1964; Braungart, 1971; Connell,
1972; Greenstein, 1965; Hyman, 1959; Searing, Schwartz, and Lind, 1973;
Wasby, 1966) as the primary agency of political socialization. Other
studies, conducted during this period, 1959-1974, focused on the im-
pact of peer groups (Greenstein, 1965; Langton, 1967; McCloskey and
Dahlgren, 1959), education (Greenberg, 1970; Hess and Easton, 1962;
Hess and Tourney, 1967), and on perceptions of authority (Adelson and
O'Neil, 1966; Froman, 1961; White, 1969) as they relate to socializa-
tion and social influence.
The nonmedia studies cited above point to the major thrusts in
political socialization research between 1950 and 1974. The family was
viewed by researchers as the foremost agency of political socialization
where parents functioned as the child's link between consciousness and
environment. From this perspective, parents transfer their political
attitudes to their children. The childs imitation of and association
with his parents was singled-out by researchers as a prime example of
the enduring power of parental influence. This perspective eclipsed
and/or relegated other agents of socialization to secondary importance,
or, as in the case of the media, were excluded almost entirely from
consideration. No doubt, the family persists as an important agency of
socialization, its primacy, however, especially in households where
both parents work, has in recent years been challenged by several
13
communication researchers (Chaney, 1970; Surlin and Dominick, 1970-71).
The family, it is argued, may be the initial agent of socialization, it
may not, however, have the greatest impact over time. The same doubts
CJennings, 1967; Jennings and Neimi, 1968) emerge for the relative in-
fluence of peer groups and the schools. How powerful are they today
in relation to other agencies of socialization (e.g. the media)? More
sophisticated conceptual and methodological research designs are re-
quired to determine and compare, in different social settings, the
relative capacity of each agency of political socialization.
The earlier studies, then, on political socialization report that
the family's influence, in comparison to other socializing agents, was
dominant in the formation of political attitudes in children and youth.
The absence of media variables in these major studies, several note-
worthy exceptions (Bailyn, 1959; Bryne, 1969; Kraus, 1964; Schramm,
Lyle and Parker, 1961) notwithstanding, suggest that researchers per-
ceived the media as too new to have any significant impact, or that
the media's capacity to influence was ancillary even to peer groups and
schooling. Kraus and Davis (1976) suggest that the reasons researchers
failed to seriously examine mass communication variables in political
socialization was threefold: (1) researchers, in conceptualizing
political socialization, excluded the mass media as possible indepen-
dent variables, (2) earlier studies of radio and newspaper exposure
concluded that the media reinforced existing attitudes and behaviors
rather than creating them, and (3) socialization researchers perceived
the mass media as little more than transmitters of information. As a
consequence of the three factors, the conclusions drawn from the non-
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media studies cited above, and the corresponding perceptions of the re-
searchers who conducted them, media variables until 1970 received only
minor consideration in the field of political socialization research.
Media Political Socialization Research
Children, unlike in the past, are immersed today in an electronic
"media environment". Communication researchers, Gerbner and Gross
(1976), have observed that television:
...penetrates nearly every home in the land. Unlike newpap-
ers and magazines, television does not require literacy. Un-
like the movies, it runs continuously, and once purchased,
costs almost nothing. Unlike radio, it can show as well as
tell. Unlike the theatre or movies, it does not require
leaving your home (p. 42).
Early studies by Schramm, Lyle and Parker (1961) and Bailyn (1959),
reported the growing use of media, particularly television, by youth to
support the contention that the mass media contribute to the acquisi-
tion of political attitudes. Schramm et al
. , (1961) noted that youth,
in their first sixteen years, spend as much time watching television as
they spend in school. Bailyn (1959) reported that the children sampled
in her study spent on the average twenty hours a week viewing televi-
sion. Bronfenbrenner (1970) in a later study concluded that:
By the time the average child is sixteen, he has watched from
12,000 to 15,000 hours of television. In other words, he has
spent the equivalent of 15 to 20 solid months, 24 hours a day,
before a television screen (p. 103).
Given the present sophistication of research designs, it is em-
pirically impossible to assess the impact of the time spent viewing
television and the formation of political attitudes. However, we can




social issues, and government, and that political behavior may be fo
ed, or, at least, influenced as a result of systematic television vi
ing (Kraus and Lee, 1973). Hollander (1971), studying the voting be-
havior of youth who grew-up with televisions in their homes, concludes
that the political war "stories" youth viewed on television influenced
the political choices they made at the polls.
Jennings and Niemi (1968), using a national sample of 1969 high
school seniors, conclude that:
If the eighteen-year-old is no simple carbon copy of his par-
ents--as the results clearly indicate--then it seems most
likely that other socializing agents have ample opportunity
to exert their impact Not the least of these are the
transformation in the content and form of the mass media and
communication channels, phenomena over which the family and
the schools have relatively little control (p. 183).
Johnson (1967) and Bryne (1969) report that adolescents in econom-
ically depressed rural and ghetto areas obtained most of their politi-
cal information from television. Chaffee, Ward, and Tipton (1970) in-
vestigated the variables of media use, political knowledge, and cam-
paigning activity among adolescents in five Wisconsin city schools in
1968. The three variables were measured by a self-administered ques-
tionnaire. The researchers, comparing the agents of political sociali-
zation (parents, teachers, peers, and mass media), concluded that the
relationships between media use and political knowledge "should be con-
sidered as an independent (or intervening) variable in the political
socialization process, not merely as one of many dependent variables,"
(p. 657).
In a later study, Hollander (1971) investigated how adolescents
viewed the Vietnam war. The major finding he reported in his study:
16
...IS the importance of mass media as a source of learningabout an important political object, war. This finding castsconsiderable doubt on the present utility of much of the pre-
^nSir.t'!f °"
°^ political socialization andi d ca es that researchers have, perhaps, been passing overthe major sources of political learning. The new 'parent' isthe mass media (p. 479).
A year later, Dominick (1972), using a sample of sixth and seventh
graders from New York city schools, concluded that for the age group
he studied "the mass media (specifically, television) are clearly the
sources of information about the government" (p. 51).
The following year, Kraus and Lee (1973), replicated several items
(church, mass media, family, school, peer groups) used in the Johnson
(1967), Chaffee et al . (1970), Hollander (1971), and Dominick (1972)
studies. The results of the study (Kraus and Lee, 1973) confirm the
above researchers' conclusions.
More recent research (Barnouw, 1975; Collins, 1976; Gerbner and
Gross, 1976; Nunez, 1979; Strouse, 1975) further substantiates the find-
ings reported in the studies cited above. Unlike the nonmedia research
reviewed earlier, these studies render evidence that point increasingly
to the media's particularly television's, primary role in the political
socialization process of children and adolescents.
Communication Research on Voting Behavior
In the previous section, we reported that until recently, politi-
cal socialization research upheld the view that the mass media have a
negligible influence upon children's political development. Research-
ers investigating the electoral process and voting behavior, during
this period (1950-1960' s) , however, have given considerable more atten-
17
tion to the influence of mass media in election campaigns.
The early 'classic' voting studies conducted by Lazarsfeld (1944),
Berelson, Lazarsfeld and McPhee (1954), Campbell, Gurin and Miller
(1954), Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960), and the later
contributions of Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955), Pool (1959), Key (1961,
1966), Kraus (1962), Rubin (1967), Lang and Lang (1968), and more re-
cently, Mendelsohn and Crespi (1970), MickKelson (1972), and DeVries
and Tarrance (1972), have rendered significant information on mass
media use and voting behavior.
In a later study, Prisuta (1973) examined the relationship between
newspaper exposure and voter turnout. He found that the use of news-
papers, as a source of information, among voters, correlated signifi-
cantly with voter attendance during elections. Moreover, seventy-five
percent of his sample indicated that television exposure provided them
with the most information, in relation to other media, about the elec-
tion campaign. Converse (1962) confirms this finding 11 years earlier:
A majority of those who do notice some political news in the
printed media nonetheless feel that they learned more about
what is going on politically from the spoken media (radio and
television). Given the sketchy coverage of politics in the
spoken media by contrast with the written (newspapers, maga-
zines and books), this is quite a commentary on the relative
"reach" impact of the newer spoken media (p. 592).
Moreover, a plethora of studies and reports conducted during the
50' s and 60' s further support the contention that, in politics and, in
particularly the electoral process, television's impact has been sig-
nificant (see Alexander, 1969; Bendiner, 1952; Blumler and McQuail,
1969; Goodman, 1955; Greenberg and Parker, 1965; Kelly, 1962; Kraus,
1962b; O'Donnell, 1966; Salant, 1962).
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Although, the early 'classic' studies by Lazarsfeld (1944),
Berelson et al
.
(1954), Campbell et al . (1954), etc., point to the in-
fluence of the mass media in the electoral process, they conclude that
the media act as reinforcers rather than formers of political opinion.
These conclusions stem, in part, from the fact that the studies were
conducted during a period when the number of television sets in Ameri-
can households was one fourth of what it is today.
As early as 1948, however, contradictory findings were reported
by Berelson C1948) who suggested then that the media could have "per-
vasive, subtle, and durable effects" on the political behaviors of in-
dividuals Cp. 182). Blumler and McQuail (1969) report that the public
uses television for their "surveillence" needs rather than for guidance
and reinforcement. As such, the researchers conclude that viewers rely
on television for most of their political information.
Blumler's et al . (1969) study of the 1964 British election and
that of Kraus' (1962) study on the 1960 Kennedy-Nixon debates, provide
further evidence of television's pervasive and persuasive role in pol-
itical campaigns, and of the public's use of television for understand-
ing the issues and evaluating the candidates.
Studies and reports on the uses of the media by politicians and
political parties during the: (1) primaries (Churgin, 1970; Kelly,
1962; Pepper, 1973); (2) conventions (MacNeil, 1968; McClure and
Patterson, 1973; Paletz, 1972; Roper, 1960; Salant, 1962; Swanson, 1973);
(3) polling (Brown, 1976; Fuchs, 1965; Harris, 1963); and (4) the tele-
vised debates (CBS, 1976; Gilbert, 1967; Gordon, 1977; Katz and
Feldman, 1962; McLuhan, 1976; O'Connor, 1976; Rider, 1963) further
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point to the media's pervasive influence on voters political behavior
and on the electoral process.
When we examine the influence of television news broadcasts on the
voting patterns and political behavior of adults, the data further sup-
ports the contention that the media informs rather than only reinforces
public opinion. An early study by Danielson (1956) measured the atti-
tudinal effect on voters following Eisenhower's announcement, in
February, 1956, that he would run again for president. Danielson (1956)
reports that the story left the public feeling optimistic about the
choices for a Republican victory in the fall. Robinson (n.d.) studying
the national voting pattern in the 1968 presidential election, in rela-
tion to the George Wallace vote, found that the relationships between
the use of television for information and the support for Wallace among
voters was significant even after controlling for the variables of edu-
cation, age and income.
Another study, conducted by McClure and Patterson (1973) and the
1972 presidential campaign, assessed the influence of the television
news on voters behavior. The researchers report that 30 percent of the
voters sampled who experienced 'high' exposure to television news
changed their belief regarding a corruption issue in the direction con-
sistent with the news message.
The impact of political advertising on political behavior has also
been the subject of investigation by researchers. An early study by
Perentesis (1948) of a 1948 city election in Detroit, found that ad-
vertising via a motion picture trailer was influential in gaining
votes. In 1952, the Eisenhower election campaign committee utilized
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television commercials in areas assessed as crucial to Republican suc-
cess at the polls (Worsnop, 1968). Margolis (1968) reports that by
1956 election campaign strategy relied heavily on the use of radio and
television advertising. After the 'Great' presidential debates of
1960, MacNeil (1968) reported that spot ads were used extensively by
Nixon, Humphrey, and Wallace. The cost of these television ads,
Worsnop (1968) reports, was $12 million, $6 million, and $3 million
respectively for each candidate. More recently, the use of political
advertising by candidates seeking congressional office has increased
significantly and is regularly included in the campaign strategies and
activities of candidates running even for minor political offices
(Apple, 1976; Carroll, 1976; Lelyveld, 1976; Lynn, 1976).
The communication studies and reports cited above on political
socialization and the electoral process (e.g., voting behavior) con-
stitute the empirical bases for the formulation of the early theories
of national communication systems and for the models of "communication
of information," developed by researchers. These two developments, in
the construction of theories of mass communication and in empirical
research, are important inasmuch as they established in this century
the dominant (traditional) paradigms for the study of the mass media.
The Mass Media and the Communication of Political Information
In this section of the literature review, we examine the relation-
ship of the mass media--as an organizational structure--to political
phenomena. We assume that the mass media performs a central role in
the creation, organization, and dissemination of information in Ameri-
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can society as they do, in most, if not all, industrial societies
CGordon, 1977). As such, the mass media constitutes processes in that
information is assembled, screened, and transmitted through various
media channels. These media channels (cinema, television, newspapers)
form complex organizational structures where information related pro-
cesses operate. The media, then, are both systems and processes of
mass communication (Kraus and Davis, 1976; Williams, 1975). When the
mass media influences or is influenced by political institutions, their
structures of communication and the processes by which to communicate
information, correspondingly become political.
Only until recently, have communication researchers begun to un-
derstand and study systematically the relationship between the mass
media (structures and processes) as social systems, to political phen-
omena. As a consequence of the conclusions drawn from many of the em-
pirical investigations cited earlier in this chapter, communication
researchers have advanced theories concerning the structure and poli-
tical function of national communication systems. Early communication
theorists classified national communication systems into four categor-
ies developed by Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm (1956). The four
categories are "totalitarian," "libertarian," "authoritarian," and
"social responsibility." Each system of national communications has
a corresponding set of underlying assumptions about the process of
transmission of political information. In "totalitarian" and "author-
itarian" systems, the flow of information is downward from the "top of
the hierarchy" to the 'mass'. From this perspective, all information
is viewed as political and communication systems are directly control led
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by the government. In "social responsibility" communication systems,
a high degree of self-censorship exists where media groups exercise
control and make decisions concerning the transmission of information
on the basis of whether society as a whole benefits. "Libertarian"
communication systems are devoid of any outside controls. No restric-
tions are placed on access to or transmission of information. Access
to communication mediums are viewed as a right of the public not to be
infringed upon by the state.
This view and typology of communications systems, advanced by
early communication theorists has proven inadequate. The models assume
that it is possible to determine the social consequences of any form of
transmitted information. Recent controversy over the "effects" of
television violence illustrates this point. Furthermore, the technolo-
gies of advanced communication media require trained personnel to
operate them which, in effect, limits access to the media by nonpro-
fessionals. In the case of "libertarian" systems of communication,
they are nonexistent. All governments regulate and constrain, to
varying degrees their national communication systems. Finally, the
above models of national communication systems, are essentially ground-
ed in the descriptive and ideologically based typologies of the early
theorists. They convey little about the organization, complexity, and
relationship of communication systems to other political institutions
in society.
Recently, four alternate models have emerged to supplant the above
theories of national communication systems. These models differ in
their conception of the way the mass media and the public interact.
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Each model, however, is historically related and elaborates on the
models which preceded it.
The first and earliest of these models is referred to as the
"hypodermic needle" model (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971) or "mechanistic
stimulus-response" model (DeFleur, 1966). Developed during World War I,
the "hypodermic needle" model conceived the media "as a needle which
•injects' information directly into the mind" (Kraus and Davis, 1976,
p. 115). Researchers including Lasswell (1927), believed then that the
mass media had a direct impact on the individual and that the media
were capable of producing predictable and uniform behaviors in persons
irrespective of their psychological differences. Individuals were con-
ceived, from this view, as non-discriminating entities, who responded
identically to similar media stimuli. After a series of experiments
and surveys (Katz and Lazarsfeld, 1955), researchers found that this
model failed to account for the social context in which media informa-
tion was received and retained after exposure.
After the "hypodermic model" was found inadequate by research
findings, it was displaced by the "social influence" or "two-step" flow
model (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet, 1944) which emphasized the im-
portance of social and political groups upon the transmission of infor-
mation. This model assumed that an individual's perception and reten-
tion of information was largely controlled by the groups of which he
was a member. Media variables were treated as dependent variables
(Merton, 1949), and researchers focused on interpersonal communication
(the influence of opinion leaders) as the significant sources of poli-
tical influence.
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The third model to attain prominence among researchers was the
"diffusion" model of communication (Katz, Levin, and Hamilton, 1963).
Sharing similar theoretical assumptions and methodologies with the
"social influence" model, the diffusion approach differs conceptually
in one fundamental way from its precursor:
...under certain conditions of access to mass media, for par-
ticular social relationships, for certain types of informa-
tion, media transmission of information will have a direct
impact upon individuals and can produce changes in their
knowledge, attitudes or actions (Kraus and Davis, 1976, p. 125).
Ironically, the diffusion model was not a theoretical creation of
media researchers, but rather was developed by social scientists in
anthropology and education (Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971). The diffusion
model is essentially descriptive in nature and linear in process. It
is characterized by four stages: information or knowledge; persuasion;
decision or adoption; and confirmation or re-evaluation. The mass
media are viewed as central only in the first stage in that the media's
transmission of information initiates the interest in the audience,
renders understanding concerning the information communicated, and, in
so doing, facilitates the advance of the other three stages. Under
certain conditions, however, the media can continue to influence the
audience throughout the later stages (Kraus and Davis, 1976, p. 128).
The mechanistic or linear nature of this model has been the subject of
considerable discussion (Kraus and Davis, 1976). The diffusion approach
treats each stage as if they were discrete rather than interrelated,
processes. Moreover, the model is conceived of in linear rather than
non-linear terms which forecloses the analysis of the media's influence
if it is introduced in later stages of the model.
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The final model concerned with the study of the communication of
information builds upon the three preceding approaches. Referred to,
by researchers, as the "transactional" model, this approach examines
the patterns of media use and the social contexts which 'teach' these
patterns (Baur, 1964). As such, this model includes, within its con-
ceptual framework, the "social contexts" which inform media use (e.g.,
the political institutions of society, and the development of technol-
ogy and the mass media).
In this model the flow of influence does not simply come down
from sources of mass communication. The messages from these
sources are only part of the process. Influence also is
grounded in social situations (Kraus and Davis, 1976, p. 143).
The "transactional" model has not yet been systematically develop-
ed by researchers. It is, however, a critical first step in the devel-
opment of a research paradigm that will account for the relationship of
the mass media to political phenomena where ideology plays a major role
in the construction of political reality.
Mass Media and the Construction of Political Reality
The penultimate section of our literature review concerns itself
with the media's role in reflecting political reality. Concern over
the media's reporting of political events has been questioned, not only
by communication's researchers, but, as well as, by politicians and the
public alike. Richard Nixon, for example, repeatedly accused the media
for unfairness, bias and distortion. In fact, recent disclosures in-
dicate that during Nixon's administration, the White House tried unsuc-
cessfully to control the media (Brown, 1979; Naughton, 1978). During
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the 1968 presidential campaign, press disclosures concerning Spiro
Agnew's performance as governor in Maryland, prompted Agnew to reply:
You know, when a man's reputation is bandied about by a large
newspaper ^n the last few days of the campaign. . .the whole
thing becomes more than a little unfair. So I say to the
New York Times: act with decency, act like men, act with
intellectual honesty-and for heaven's sake let in the fresh
air CNew York Times, p. 28).
These attempts by leading politicians to control and counter the
media's interpretation of political events, illustrates the power the
media is perceived to command by political elites. Recently, aspects
of the production process of information dissemination (editorials,
distortion and intentional bias in reporting and errors of fact) have
come under researchers' scrutiny. Three major conceptual frameworks
on the role of the media in forming political reality emerge from the
research conducted so far.
Anchored in the proposition that behavior depends largely on the
image, the "image" formation framework advanced by Boulding (1961),
argues that messages change images which in turn change behavior pat-
terns. As such, social reality is constructed through the formation of
images by messages transmitted via the media channels. Concomitantly,
political reality is constructed by political messages which modify or
transform political images and, in doing so, political behavior. Poli-
tical reality, in this framework, is viewed as nonstatic and "subject-
ively" experienced, in that message dissemination, image alteration and
behavior changes occur as interactive processes. The media are crucial
during the image formation stage in that they stimulate the individual
to perceive a certain reality that can either affirm, modify, or
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entirely re-construct his image of issues, power roles, etc.. (Kraus
and Davis, 1976, p. 211).
The "communicational reality" framework advanced by Thayer (1968),
describes social reality as a function of human communications 'acts'.
That is reality is formed and ordered through the 'acts' of talking,
listening, and thinking. Thayer argues that "whatever one or more men
can and do talk about, but which is not amenable to direct sensory con-
tact by them has no reality beyond what can and is said about it"
Cp. 54). Mass media then creates reality by extending the environment
and the settings in which communication occurs. The totality of this
process, within which political issues emerge, are discussed and re-
flected upon, constitutes the substance of social reality.
The "agenda-setting" framework examines how the mass media estab-
lishes priorities in the determination of what it reports to the pub-
lic, how editors and broadcasters choose and present information, and
the affect this practice has in shaping social reality for the audience.
Audiences not only learn about public issues and other mat-
ters through the media, they also learn how much importance
to attach to an issue or topic from the emphasis placed on
it by the mass media. For example, in reflecting what can-
didates are saying during a campaign, the mass media appar-
ently determine the important issues. In other words, the
media set the 'agenda' of the campaign. . .Here may lie the
most important effect of modern mass communications, the
ability of the media to structure our world for us (McCombs
and Shaw, 1974, p. 1).
Agenda-setting models have been used extensively by researchers
CFunkhouser, 1973; McCombs, Shaw, and Shaw, 1972; McLeod, 1965; Weaver,
McCombs, and Spellman, 1975). The advantages of this model are that
communication variables can be studied in relation to concrete politi-
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cal events Ce.g., election campaigns, conventions, debates), and that
through the content analysis of media reports and the corresponding
audience self-reports, plausable causal inferences can be made by
researchers.
Discussion and Critique
Rather than limit the discussion to questions of design, measure-
ment, and data analysis we will discuss the ways in which methods of
research and the findings they produce can have different ideological
and political consequences for research and policy making.
Given the range of research subjects (socialization, electoral
process, communication systems), methodologies, and populations exam-
ined in the literature, a holistic compilation of findings that co-
gently and indisputably point to the media's singular and independent
effect on political behavior is, at present, impossible. Political
communication research, in comparison to the more established disci-
plines of political science and sociology, remains a nascent field of
inquiry. Relying largely on the theories and conceptual frameworks
developed in the social and behavioral sciences, communication re-
searchers have yet to develop systematic and critical theories of the
mass media. However, as we have suggested earlier in the literature
review, recent findings report that the mass media influences the
political attitudes and beliefs of children and youth, that it shapes
public opinion in the electoral process, and that politicians in-
creasingly rely on the media in their campaign strategies.
The methods employed in the early 'classical' studies (Campbell,
29
et al., 1954; Lasswell
, 1927; Lazarsfeld, 1944) were produced within
conceptual frameworks that supported the prevailing beliefs concerning
the political processes and institutions in society. Research, sug-
gests Kraus and Davis (1976):
...had the function of confirming what societal leaders al-
ready accepted as true while refuting the claims of trouble-
some social critics. The null findings concerning the in-
fluence of mass media on political behavior confirmed the
wisdom of permitting mass media to develop as profitmakinq
privately operated industries (p. 248).
On another level, the models used during this period were too
simplistic in their respective scopes and designs to account for the
media's dynamic role in the formation of political attitudes. Conse-
quently, political communication researchers tested isolated bivariate
relationships (for example, political attitude formation and parental
influence), which had the effect of precluding any real critical eval-
uation of media variables. As such, the early studies failed to dis-
criminate between the effects of nonmedia variables from those of media
variables on the attitudes and behaviors of the audiences sampled. Nor
were researchers able to ascertain how attitudes change or become mod-
ified in different social contexts. In the few studies that examined
the media, researchers defined the media channels as dependent vari-
ables, and in doing so, excluded the media as possible primary in-
fluences (Kraus and Davis, 1976). Unlike the importance early re-
searchers ascribed to the family, the media were perceived as ancillary
to rather than primary agents of political socialization. This view
argued that the media, at best, served to reinforce the existing atti-
tudes held by children and adults. Consequently, researchers never
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established control groups in their designs nor did they seriously
investigate the patterned and differentiated uses of media channels by
children. Finally, and more importantly communication researchers dur-
ing this period failed to generate conceptual models that conceived of
and studied systematically the mass media as cultural processes embedded
within a political and social system.
Current development in political communication research has not
significantly advanced beyond the 'classic' studies. Consequently,
many of the more recent studies rely on the conceptualizations, conclu-
sions, and designs of the 'classic' studies instead of empirically re-
examining them. By doing so, researchers cannot:
investigate empirically certain events and happenings since
often the stimuli and attending data are "fugitive," that is,
have escaped the researcher's grasp or gone undetected. If
they question investigator's findings they must do so on
methodological grounds or counter with more persuasive evi-
dence (Kraus and Davis, 1976, p. 2).
Gradual development in political communication research has, how-
ever, occurred. Researchers are now treating media variables as inde-
pendent rather than as dependent variables. Moreover, recent research
findings report that the media plays an important role in the process
of political socialization of children and that in the arena of elec-
toral politics the media can and does influence public opinion. More
importantly, researchers are presently examining the media as social
systems. Studies that focus on the media's structure and its influence
on political institutions in society, are the subject of increasing
attention and investigation (Seymour-Ure , 1974).
Variations in conceptual approaches and research designs notwith-
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standing, two important conclusions can be drawn from the studies con-
ducted during this decade in political communication research: (1)
there is qualitative and empirical evidence from traditional research
methods to posit that the media, particularly television, shape and
alter political reality; and (2) the political attitudes and behaviors
of politicians and the public are, in part, formed by the political
reality projected by the mass media.
Though recent research findings support the contention that the
media influence and are influenced by political phenomena, only a rudi-
mentary understanding of the media's capacities, structures, and pro-
cesses exists. We do not understand, for example, the 'effects' of a
steady diet of television fare on the development of political atti-
tudes in children and adolescents, nor do we systematically understand
the role of the electronic 'media' as a surrogate agent of political
socialization for youth in a period where parents are absent from the
home during periods of high media exposure (Chaney, 1970; Surlin and
Dominick, 1970-71). Moreover, very little empirical knowledge exists
from traditional research sources, concerning the organization and
structures of, in particular, television. Researchers have not devel-
oped models that critically study the process of information creation,
organization, as it affects political phenomena.
The paucity of critical investigations that address the above con-
cerns is, in part, explained by the fact that many researchers employ
methods that justify conclusions before the research is conducted, es-
pecially when issues of social policy are concerned. Most funding for
media research is dependent on policy related issues (Kraus and Davis,
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1976). Andreski (1972) contends that many researchers use the "scien-
tific" method to enhance their power as well as to create self-serving
misperceptions of reality. Many social scientists knowingly or often
unwittingly legitimize the political order by convincing the public
that certain policies prescribed and implemented by the state are in
their best interests (Blackburn, 1970; Smith, 1971). As such, re-
searchers and the disciplinary fields they represent collude in and
become reduced to instruments of legitimation for powerful elite
groups who seek "scientific" support for their self-serving policies
and programs (Caplan and Nelson, 1973).
At another level, researchers often secure their reputations on
the bases of investigations which involve refining the methodological
procedures in research developed by others (Brown, 1970), or they
investigate only those variables which are prescribed and considered
"acceptable" by leading scientists in their respective disciplines.
Furthermore, reputations are often established on the basis of
discrete and self-contained (laboratory experiments) research projects,
which appear methodologically sound but fail to advance any substantive
empirical or theoretical contribution to the field of communications
study (McQuail, 1942). This type of research, argues C. Wright Mills
C1953), is "molecular" in conception and design and is unable to trans-
cend the very theoretical frameworks which inform them.
It is, at first glance, characterized by its usually small-
scale problems and by its generally statistical models of
verification. . .Molecular work has no illustrious antecedents,
but, by virtue of historical accident and the unfortunate
facts of research finance, has been developed a great deal
from studies of marketing and problems connected with media
of mass communication. Shying away from social philosphy,
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it often appears as technique and little else (p. 554).
At the philosophical level "molecular" research is informed by
'instrumental rationality,' a conception of reason which divorces fact
from value. Referred to as the Neo-Positivist School, its members em-
brace the 'scientific method'. The world, from this perspective, is
grounded in "objectivity, efficiency, and the reduction of all problems
to the logic of technical mastery" (Giroux, 1976, p. 32.) The scien-
tist is detached from, rather than a participant in research, and the
scientific method is grounded in a set of laws governing both natural
and social relations. What cannot be measured empirically is excluded
from serious consideration and observations do not require value judg-
ments on the part of the observer. Implicitly accepted in this doc-
trine is the belief that the scientific method is value-free or neutral
(Gouldner, 1962). As such, science is abstracted from ideology, al-
though, in fact, it is ideology that informs the way in which the
scientific enterprise is conceived of and engaged in by researchers.
In context, the kinds of problems selected for study and the way
in which they studied are defined by the scientific method (Gadlin and
Ingle, 1975). Mills (1959), poignantly expresses this view:
As a matter of practice., abstracted empiricists often seem
more concerned with the philosophy of science than with social
study itself. What they have done, in brief, is to embrace
one philosophy of science which they now suppose to be the
Scientific Method, this model of research is largely an epi-
stemological construction; within the social sciences, its
most decisive result has been a sort of methodological in-
hibition. By this I mean that the kinds of problems that
will be taken up and the way in which they are formulated
are quite severely limited by the Scientific Method. Method-
ology, in short, seems to determine the problems (p. 57).
From the 'instrumentalist' conception of the world and the scien-
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tific enterprise, then, research is bound up in a host of complex value
and ideological orientations that invariably determine the scope,
method, outcome, and utility of research.
In conclusion, political communications research has essentially
been concerned with the forms and methods by which information is com-
municated and exchanged in the modern industrial state. Considerable
attention has been focused on how, information transmitted via the
media channels, affects political behavior. Despite the findings and
theories derived from the literature on communications research, we
are unable to define and elaborate those functions of the mass media
that, in relation with other political institutions, specify the ways
(techniques) in which audiences are manipulated and political reality
is constructed in modern societies. As such, traditional communica-
tions research fails to critically study the role of the mass media in
a political and economic institutionalized context.
Alternative Frameworks
Alternative radical perspectives that view the mass media in an
institutionalized context having distinct ideological functions for
the state exist. Developed largely from the writings of Marx and
Engels on aesthetics, ideology, and art, Marxist social theorists have
advanced several major models (the orthodox and noe-Marxist base/
superstructure and structuralist frameworks) that interface with or
rather stand in opposition to the dominant positivist models. While
substantially different from one another in the way that relationships
are conceived of between the media and the economic-political order,
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each Marxist model is historically related in that each, serves to ela-
borate on rather than supplant Marx's fundamental assumption that most
forms of human communication are grounded in specific economic rela-
tions. This view maintains that the economic structure (base) of
society determines the relations of production-the ideological forms
(the legal, political, and the cultural apparatus) of the state.
The totality of these relations of production constitutes the
economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which
rises a legal and political superstructure and to which cor-
respond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of
production of material life conditions, the general process
of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the
consciousness of men that determines their existence, but
their social existence that determines their consciousness
(Marx, 1859, pp. 20-1).
From this perspective, then, all forms of "mental production"
(art, philosophy, politics, etc.) are conceived of as epi-phenomena
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determined by the economic processes of production. By extension, the
mass media are defined:
as a means to express and affirm the leading ideas of dominant
economic and political interests as well as perpetuating a
'false consciousness' of the working class. Thus, in this
sense, the apparatus of communication are seen as synonymous
in identity and function with the ideological apparatus
(Petryszak, 1977, p. 35).
Critics of the base-superstructure formula argue that the model is
"mechanistic" in that it compartmentalizes human existence into a set
of spheres (superstructure) that find their reality elsewheres (base).
They contend that, from this dichotomized perspective, social reality
is conceived as a reflection or representation of the underlying eco-
nomic relations rather than that the concepts, practices, and beliefs
of men constitute the bases of social reality (see Williams, 1971).
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In defense of the base-superstructure model, the British Marxist
scholar Raymond Williams (1977), offers an alternative interpretation
of Marx's original formulation. Significantly, Williams states:"
It is only when we realize that the 'base' to which it is ha-
bitual to refer variations, is itself a dynamic and internally
contradictory process-the specific activities and modes of
activity, over a range from association to antagonism, of real
men and classes of men— that we can begin to free ourselves
from the notion of an 'area' or a 'category' with certain fixed
properties for deduction to the variable processes of a 'super-
structure' .Thus, contrary to a development in Marxism, it
IS not the base and the 'superstructure' that need to be stud-
ied, but specific and indissoluble real processes within which
the decisive relationship, from a Marxist point of view, is
that expressed by the complex idea of 'determination' (p. 82).
At another level, the base-superstructure model is criticized for
its inability to locate, within its theoretical purview, the central ity
of the media as the "fundamental basis of political and economic power
in the modern industrial state" (Petryszak, 1977, p. 35).
What emerges unaccounted for in the base-superstructure framework
are a set of critical questions that point to the manipulatory aspects
of the mass media in modern society. For example, how does manipula-
tion technique operate within the communications apparatus? How do
individuals react and accept manipulation as part of their daily lives?
How is the political stability of the state maintained via ideological
manipulation?
The Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation is a particularly
useful conceptual model for the critical study of these questions. The
Institute of Social Research (known as the Frankfurt School) brought
together in 1923 a group of gifted Marxist intellectuals who were com-
mitted to the re-examination and reformulation of Marxist theory in
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light of the changing historical circumstances occuring in the 20th
century. The Institute, under the directorship of Max Horkheimer,
together with Theordor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert Marcuse, Walter
Benjamin, Leo Lowenthal and others, provided through their writings a
significant theoretical and practical contribution to the understanding
of popular culture which revealed the way in which the mass media man-
ipulate and are manipulated by ruling groups in modern society.
Beginning in 1923, its members agreed that many of the analytic
categories formulated by Marx were no longer theoretically and prac-
tically valid and useful for understanding the modern industrial so-
ciety. Confronted by the emergence of fascist movements, the stabili-
zation of monopoly capitalism in Western Europe, and the decline of
militancy among the European working class, the Frankfurt School con-
cerned itself with the "ideological reifications" or manipulations of
consciousness that blocked the self-conscious force in people to re-
sist domination. At the core of their "philosophy was the belief that
the newly advanced industrial societies, with their modern techniques
of production, consumption and administration, had ushered in radically
new modes of political, social and psychological domination (Giroux,
1976, p. 37).
In opposition to the positivist logic (the logic of domination)
that infomred the administrative and production operations of capita-
list society as well as the consciousness of its members, the Frankfurt
School developed one of the most progressive analyses of technology and
alienation to appear in the West.
As a consequence of the decline of worker militancy in Europe, the
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Frankfurt School shifted their attention from the working class as a
group to the individual, and the focus of their study centered on epi-
phenomenal factors (family, religion, mass culture, and the mass media
complex). When the members of the Frankfurt School were forced to
leave Germany in 1933, they came to the United States where a second
shift occurred in the object of their study.
In the U.S.A., the Frankfurt School were confronted with an
advanced monopoly capitalist state, with an equally advanced
network of non-Fascist, but nonetheless manipulative popular
culture. They no longer saw the family as the decisive agent
of socialization; on the contrary, they perceived a dissolu-
tion of the family, and thus a drastic qualification of the
significance of Freud's model of the id, ego and superego.
The psychological component as a whole gradually became sub-
sumed under a broader socio-political analysis of the pro-
duction, distribution and consumption of popular culture
(Slater, 1974, p. 180).
The shift from the analysis of the family to the analysis of 'mass
culture' and the manipulatory aspects of the mass media is explained in
Marcuse's 0964) critique of the advanced industrial state:
Introjection. . . impl ies an existence of an inner dimension dis-
tinguished from and even antagonistic to the external exigen-
cies--an individual consciousness and an individual unconsciou-
ness apart from public opinion and behavior. . .Today this private
space has been invaded and whittled down by a technological
reality. Mass production and mass distribution claim the entire
individual, and industrial psychology has long since ceased to
be confined to the factory. The manifold processes of intro-
jection seem to be ossified in almost mechanical reactions.
The result is, not adjustment but mimesis: an immediate
identification of the individual with his society and, through
it, with the society as a whole (p. 10).
As the members of the Frankfurt School (Adorno, Horkheimer,
Marcuse and Lowenthal in particular) proceeded to advance their criti-
que of 'mass culture' and mass media, it increasingly became evident
to them that in conjunction with the increasing dominance of 'instrum-
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ental' foms of rationality:
the 'culture industry' under late capitalism had enslaved in-dividuals in far more subtle and pervasive ways than had pre-vious modes of domination. Their conclusion was that the in-
dividual was fast becoming a completely assimilated and
socially determined character (Maclntyre, 1979, p. 3).
From the content analysis studies of Lowenthal (1967) on popular
biographies, the newspaper, music, radio, and television analyses of
Adorno (1945, 1967, 1957, 1973; and with Horkheimer, 1944), and the
more recent analyses of distorted communication in the scientific and
adminstrative spheres of industrial society by (Habermas, 1971a, 1971b),
the foundation of the Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation and
critique of 'mass culture' was formed and elaborated on.
Concerned with how the individual psyche interiorizes culture, the
members of the Frankfurt School generally agreed that there exists a
structural relationship "between the organization, content and linguis-
tic symbols of specific forms of communication and the more typical
forms of behavior, common beliefs and fears of large numbers of people
that live within the same social milieu from which the form of communi-
cation. takes its impetus and characterizing features" (Petryszak,
1977, p. 35). These forms of cultural communication (radio, televi-
sion, literature) extant in advanced industrial society distort social
reality and transform history into mythology. The distortions of real-
ity produced by the media form the bases of popular or 'mass culture',
that function to preserve the political order and to anesthetize or
submerge 'consciousness' rather than to liberate it. Specifically,
for Adorno (1967), the focus of attention was not on particular ruling
groups to which cultural phenomena are assigned but rather on "the
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general social tendencies which are expressed in these phenomena and
through which the most powerful interests realize themselves"
(Petryszak, 1977, p. 36).
From this perspective, then, the Frankfurt School attributed the
development and perpetuation of 'false consciousness' to the social
tendencies inherent within popular culture and the mass media, rather
than exclusively to the direct manipulations of ruling elites in
modern capitalist society. Marcuse (1964) significantly advances this
view:
Our insistence on the depth and efficacy of these controls is
open to the objection that we overrate greatly the indoctrin-
ating power of the 'media', and that by themselves the people
would feel and satisfy the needs which are now imposed upon
them. The objection misses the point. The preconditioning
does not start with the mass production of radio and televi-
sion and with the centralization of their control. The people
enter this stage as preconditioned receptacles of long stand-
ing; the decisive difference is in the flattening out of the
contrast (or conflict) between the given and the possible,
between the satisfied and the unsatisfied needs (p. 8).
Within this framework, the Frankfurt School advanced their criti-
que of cultural manipulation. Culture, in the modern capitalist state,
is reduced, they argued, through the content and form of entertainment
provided by the media, to a commodity subject; to the law of exchange
"that it is no longer exchanged; it is so blindly consumed in use that
it can no longer be used" (Horkheimer and Adorno, 1944, p. 161). In
doing so, the individual as well, is reduced to an object.
Art itself is deformed. Popular music functions as a commodity
and produces "cormiodity listening". The astrology column in newspapers
causes readers to project the irrationality of their lives on the stars
rather than on the material bases of their existence (see Adorno, 1957).
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Stereotypes, in media entertainment, serve to eclipse individual dif-
ferences and the possibility of an alternate social existence, and
cliches allow for the individual to order and make sense out of a dis-
ordered world (see Adorno, 1954).
In effect, art, in capitalist society, is leveled and reduced to a
commodity and the people who consume it are, in turn, reduced them-
selves to objects of consumption. The mass media, argued the Frankfurt
School, are the vehicles or instruments of this process where an essen-
tially uniform system of cultural messages and images (stereotypes)
supplant individual differences to virtual one-dimensionality.
The efficacy of the process of cultural manipulation, contend
Horkheimer and Adorno (194-), occurs when:
The most intimate reactions of human beings have been so
thoroughly reified that the idea of anything specific to
themselves now persists only as an utterly abstract notion:
personality scarcely signifies anything more than shining
white teeth and freedom from body odor and emotions. The
triumph of advertising in the culture industry is that con-
sumers feel compelled to buy and use its products even
though they see through them (p. 167).
In summary, the Frankfurt School concluded, Adorno (1944, 1954)
in particular, that the development of 'mass culture' would eventually
homogenize man in the modern industrial and capitalist society into
a generalized culture of "everyman" where all stereotypes previously
ascribed to social groups would be supplanted by a single, all-inclu-
sive stereotype. The critique of 'mass culture' was not, however, a
rejection of the mass media, but rather it was a dialectical critique
of mass culture in its complicity with monopoly capitalism (Slater,
1974). As such, the Frankfurt School's analysis of 'mass culture'
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raises the question of how the mass media can be employed in non-
manipulative emancipatory ways.
The Frankfurt School is to be credited for pointing out how dis-
tortion and manipulation techniques occur within the mass media, and
how that contributes to the pacification of consciousness and the main-
tenance of the political order in the advanced capitalist society. Un-
like the models and frameworks we reviewed earlier in the literature,
the Frankfurt theorists incorporated into their framework, the struc-
tural relationship extant between the political economy of manipulation,
mass media use, and the maintenance of false consciousness. Though I,
in subsequent chapters, take issue with several of the Frankfurt
School's formulations, it is within their theoretical framework that
I advance the thesis of the dissertation.
CHAPTER III
A REVIEW OF TELEVISION RESEARCH:
AUDIENCE, CONTENT, AND EFFECT STUDIES
The Black Audience
Media exposure studies. Interest in viewing behaviors and preferences
of the television audience paralleled the early formation and expansion
of the broadcasting industry. Studies, conducted by Nielson, Roper and
the networks, focused on particular characteristics (e.g., social class,
age, sex and education) of the viewing audience. It was not until the
early 1960's that commercial advertisers and network producers acknow-
ledged that the black audience constitutes a significant segment of the
viewing audience.
The first comprehensive and massive survey of the viewing behav-
iors of the American television audience was conducted by Steiner
C1963). A national cross-section of the adult population was inter-
viewed. Demographic data was collected on viewers, their viewing ha-
bits, and attitudes toward the medium. Steiner found, in part, that
education and race were the most significant variables of viewer atti-
tudes toward television. The black adult viewer, Steiner sampled, ex-
pressed a high regard, as did generally his white counterpart, for
television. Black viewers with no more than a high school education
expressed the most favorable attitude toward the medium. Black viewers
were less critical of television than whites of comparable education.
Television was generally perceived as entertainment by both groups.
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and preferred and used more by black viewers than other mass media.
Five years later Bogart (1968) examined the differences between
black and white media exposure to newspapers, radio, and television.
He reports that black viewers watched less television than did whites,
although both groups had equal access to television. Comparing the
viewing behaviors of the black audience in different geographical
areas of the country, Bogart found that northern blacks watched more
television than those in the south. The patterns between black and
white television exposure during the day were reported similar for
the two groups. However, black viewers watched significantly less
television than whites in the evening.
In a later and more comprehensive study, Bogart (1972) reported
that during prime-time black and white viewer exposure to television
was similar. This finding is contrary to that reported in his earlier
study. Also inconsistent with his earlier finding, Bogart reports
that, with the exception of prime-time, black exposure to television
was substantially more than that for whites. He contends that black
women accounted for the difference, spending significantly more day-
time and fringe-time hours watching television than white women. Among
the black audience, during prime-time, young blacks (age 18-25) were
reported to be the heaviest viewers of television, while older blacks
were found the lightest viewers. Evidence was reported in this study
to support his earlier finding: that geography and climate affect the
viewing behaviors of the television audience. In the south, prime-time
exposure was comparatively less among black and white viewers than in
the north. Further differences between black and white viewers were
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found when education and income-level of viewers were considered. Un-
like white viewers of comparable education, upper-income blacks, espec-
ially women, watched more television than those lower on the income
scale, and black middle- income men watched more television during day-
time and fringe-time viewing periods, including the weekends and late
evenings, than did white males of higher and lower incomes. In summary,
Bogart's findings suggest that the differences in media exposure be-
tween and within the black and white audience reflects differences in
social class and geography. Although Bogart fails to define the na-
ture (e.g., values, life-styles, etc.) of the social class differences
between the two groups, his findings are significant and demand further
empirical and theoretical study.
In a more narrowly focused study, employing a smaller sample,
Allen (1968) interviewed 100 black ghetto residents of Pittsburgh, and
found that family exposure to television occurred seldom before 1 p.m.
The heaviest exposure to television occurred between 5 p.m. and 7 p.m.
through the evening hours till midnight. Of particular interest in
this study was that black viewers depended almost entirely on televi-
sion for news outside of their community. Although several researchers
report that blacks prefer television to other mass media, none have
found that the black ghetto residents rely solely on television for
news information.
A year later, Greenberg and Dominick (1969), in a more systematic
manner than Allen, examined the uses of television by low-income, black
and white, urban teen-agers. Identical data was collected from a
sample of 206 lower class black and white teen-agers, and 100 middle-
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class white teen-agers attending public high schools in Philadelphia.
The researchers found that black low-income teen-agers watched more
television than did both low and middle-income white teen-agers.
"
In
comparison to the middle-income group, both black and white low-income
teen-agers preferred and spent more time watching television than other
mass media. Based on the reports of the teen-agers sampled, it was
found that black parents spent more time watching television than did
parents of the other two groups. The researchers contend, as a result
of the teen-ager's reports, that significant social class differences
exist between the three groups. Although there may be significant
social class differences between the three groups studied (e.g., edu-
cation, occupational level), Bogart's study (1972) suggests that tele-
vision exposure (time spent watching television) is a poor indicator
of the viewer's social class background.
The same year, Shostech (1969) investigated the viewing habits and
attitudes of black and white adults residing in Indianapolis. Using
stratified random sampling techniques, Shostech sampled 450 black and
400 white subjects in his study. One interview was conducted per
household, and an attitudinal measure was adminstered to each subject
in the study. The results of his investigation indicate that televi-
sion and the newspapers are the most important news sources for both
the black and white respondents sampled. Blacks, in general, relied
more on television for community news than other media. Black respon-
dents, however, who were identified according to attitudinal measures
as "militants" were found less likely to use television as their major
source of community news. When compared to whites, black viewers were
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found no more likely to watch television than white viewers. Both
black and white viewers reported, more often than not, that television
news and special reports were beneficial in helping to solve community
problems. Two out of every three respondents regarded television news
as "fair" in reporting civil unrest. Black "militants", however,
judged news reports as biased and unfair in their coverage of civil
disorders. While only a few blacks, who expressed concern for civil
unrest, agreed that television contributes to riots, most whites agreed
that television did aggravate the conflict. When both groups were
asked what bothered them about television, approximately, half in each
group said that nothing about television bothered them. The respon-
dents who were reported critical of television identified television
ads, crime, violence, immorality, vulgarity, poor acting, and dullness
as the principal complaints. No respondent complained of frustrations
they may have experienced in watching programs depicting affluence
unobtainable to them. Shostech (1969) further reported that blacks
were found significantly (statistically) aware of the increase of black
performers and newscasters appearing on television, and that they ex-
pressed a highly favorable attitude in support of it. Perhaps the most
interesting finding reported in this study was that black respondents
preferred more black-oriented programming that protrayed blacks in
"average or typical" roles than as heroes.
We should regard this finding as a significant expression of the
black viewing audience desire to see themselves portrayed on TV in real
life situations, and not as "super" or "sambo" caricatures.
Using survey research procedures employed, a decade earlier
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by Steiner and Bower (1973), in an equally comprehensive study inves-
tigated nationally, the attitudes of the American audience toward tele-
vision. Sampling a national cross-section (1900) of the adult poplua-
tion, Bower found, as did Steiner ten years earlier, that the adult
viewing audience was generally favorable toward television. Steiner
found that education and race (in that order) were the best predictors
of viewer attitudes toward the medium. In this study, Bower reports
the opposite, that race and not education was the more predictive
variable of viewer attitudes toward the medium.
Evidence supporting several of Steiner' s findings was reported in
the Bower (1973) study. Black viewers, when compared to white at com-
parable educational levels, held a significantly more favorable atti-
tude toward television. Black viewers were less critical of television
commercials than were whites-, less apt to think newcasters biased in
the presentation of news events; and more believing of the alleged
benign effects of television on their children. Consistent with
Bogart's (1968) finding, this study reports that black viewers spent
less time watching television than did whites.^ The better educated
black viewer, however, was found proportionately higher among the
heavy viewers.
Viewer program preference studies . The first major research inquiry
of import that examined the program preference behaviors between black
and white television viewers was conducted by Carey (1966). A massive
sample of 5,000 Illinois families were studied in which 9.9% were black.
Using a Spearman Rank-Order Correlation for 75 selected programs, Carey
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found significant differences between black and white viewers in their
preference for television fare. Black viewers favored fewer variety
and family programs than did whites, preferring physically aggressive
comedy and conflict centered dramatic programs in which the principal
characters were cast in lonely and individualistic roles. Unlike white
viewers, Carey further reports that black viewers tend to watch tele-
vision heavily on the weekends; reflecting different social and occu-
pational living styles between the two groups.
Several years later, Fletcher (1969) examined the television pre-
ference behaviors of black and white youth, attending public school in
Georgia. Using rank order procedures, similar to that of Carey's to
test for similarities between the two groups, Fletcher reports no sig-
nificant correlation between the two racial groups in their preferences
for television fare. This finding supports that of Carey's, However,
contrary to Carey's data that revealed a strong preference among black
adult viewers for violent and crime oriented programs, Fletcher reports
that black youth preferred situation comedies and family programs. One
possible explanation for the differences in program preference between
the two black samples examined in both studies may be the result of
regional differences.
A third regional study, Surlin and Dominick (1970), examined the
preference behaviors between black and white lower-income and white
middle-income teen-agers attending high school in Philadelphia. In
order to code each respondents program preferences, four typologies
of program categories were created: loner, family, team, and enter-
tainment (variety).
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Findings reported in this study indicate that programs with
family themes were preferred more by black and white lower-income teen-
agers than by white middle-income teen-agers. No significant differ-
ences were found between the three groups for shows portraying charac-
ters cast in a "loner" role. Programs featuring team characterizations
were preferred equally by both black and white teen-agers. However,
significant differences, according to race and income-level of teen-
agers, occurred in their preference for entertainment programs. Black
teen-agers preferred fewer variety shows than did white teen-agers of
both lower and middle-income. A comparison of the three above studies
reveals that black and white viewers prefer different kinds of televi-
sion fare. Ambiguity exists, however, in the identification of program
types differentially preferred between and within the two racial groups.
Results of Surlin's and Dominick's investigation support Carey's asser-
tion that black viewers prefer variety and entertainment programs less
than whites. The two researchers, however, found that, unlike Carey,
black and white teen-agers preferred equally individualistic, or
"loner" programs. More significantly, Fletcher and Surlin, et al .
,
found that contrary to Carey's finding, black viewers preferred more
programs that centered on family interactions than programs featuring
loner portrayals.
In summary, the studies cited above yield both contrasting as well
as consistent information. The findings are reported below in state-
ment form:
1. Attitudes toward television are significantly related to
race and education of viewers.
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2. Black viewers express more favorable attitudes toward
television than whites of comparable education.
3. Black viewers regardless of education, generally have a
favorable attitude toward television.
2
4. Several studies found that the more affluent black viewers
spend more time watching television than the lower-class
black viewer.
5. Black viewers prefer television more than other mass media,
6. Several studies report that black viewers rely on televi-
sion more than other mass media for world and community
news information.
7. Black viewers watch more television than white viewers
(however, several studies report the contrary).
8. Geography affects the viewing behaviors of both black and
white viewers. Specifically, Northern blacks were found
to view more television than blacks from the South.
9. Black and white viewers prefer different kinds of televi-
sion fare.
10. Black viewers prefer black-oriented television program-
ming, especially when blacks appear in significant roles.
11. One study reports that, unlike black viewers, whites be-
lieve that television contributes to civil unrest.
12. "Black Militants" were found to rely less on television
as a major source of community news than did blacks in
general
.
The Black Image on Television
Content studies . In the past decade, the content of television pro-
gramming has been the subject of considerable research. Numerous stu-
dies have investigated the effect of televised violence on viewer be-
haviors, while, to a lesser extent, researchers have focused on the
degree to which television portrayal of sex and occupational roles con-
form to social reality. Results of several studies (OeFleur, 1964;
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Gentile and Miller, 1961; Smythe, 1954) suggest that television pre-
sents a highly selective and distortive view of social reality. Re-
cently, researchers have broadened their investigations to include
racially diverse television programming.
In a well designed study, Roberts (1970) investigated the extent
to which blacks appeared in television; the character and occupational
roles in which they were cast; and the context in which they performed.
Selecting three commercial network affiliated stations in Iowa City,
Roberts recorded each time a black appeared on television during prime-
time for a week. Each time a black appeared on television two measures
were taken. First, if a black appeared, regardless of how long or in
what role, and secondly, if they were cast in a recognizable occupa-
tional role (e.g., professional, managerial, clerical, sales, domestic,
etc.) for a period of at least three minutes.
Roberts reports that when black portrayals were compared to the
national racial composition of the labor force, television is signifi-
cantly distortive of social reality. Black performers were cast more
often in occupations related to law enforcement and entertainment; and
they appeared financially well-to-do. As such blacks were overrepre-
sented in professional roles and underrepresented in occupations of
less prestige. Approximately 50% of the television programs appearing
on television. Blacks, however, were found stereotyped in appearance
and action: as light-skinned and conservatively dressed people who
always respected the laws, and seldom, if ever, engaged in phyiscal
contact with white women. Comparing the three network's presentation
of blacks, Roberts found that blacks appeared more often on ABC than on
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NBC and CBS.
A later study, conducted by Seggar and Wheeler (1973), compared
the portrayal of ethnic minorities (including blacks) with those of
white portrayals in television dramas. They investigated the following:
the over and underrepresentation of minorities appearing on television
in relation to each group's actual proportion in the national popula-
tion; the sex distribution in the portrayal of roles; the occupational
portrayals of each minority group in relation to their proportion in
the national population; the representation of each minority group vis
a vis specific occupations portrayed; and the amount of television ex-
posure each group received. On a massive scale, data for 1830 distinct
portrayals was collected from 250 half-hour programs viewed over five
consecutive weeks. Cartoons , news , westerns , commercials, sports, his-
torical, and talk programs were excluded from the study. Each portray-
al was related to occupational role, sex, and ethnicity of the performer,
and grouped in the following typologies: Portrayal, Minority, Perfor-
mance Time, Occupational Role, Census Category of Occupations, Prestige,
Distortion (when compared to the actual labor force), and Labor Market.
Results of the study indicate that the frequency of portrayals of
ethnic minorities on television is inconsistent with their respective
proportion in the national population. Black portrayals were signifi-
cantly underrepresented while those for whites were overrepresented
,
with black women being most underrepresented. Consistent with Robert's
finding, blacks were reported, in this study, to be overrepresented in
both professional and managerial occupations, being most frequently
portrayed as government diplomats, musicians, policemen, guards, and
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servicemen (in that order). Conversely, blacks were found underrepre-
sented, except for household domestics, in all occupations of little
prestige. Finally, like the other non-white minority groups examined
in this study, blacks were portrayed, in most cases, in roles of less
than three minutes, reflecting, the researchers contend, the network's
policy of tokenism towards minority groups.
The following year, Hinton, Seggar, Northcott, and Pontes (1974)
compared black and white portrayals on television in order to determine
whether tokenism and stereotyping occurred in network programming. The
researchers hypothesized that blacks would be portrayed more than
whites in minor roles; and that blacks would be portrayed more in nega-
tive stereotypes than are whites.
A sample of 133 randomly selected programs, regularly televised
between 5 and 11 p.m., were collected over 6 consecutive weeks. The
researchers excluded, as in the previous study, variety, news, talk,
etc. programs from their study. The only programs samples were comedy
and drama. For every nine whites one black performer appearing on
television for more than three seconds was recorded. Three hundred and
seventeen different portrayals were collected in a ratio of ten whites
to one black. In order to determine whether differences in stereotyp-
ing occurred between the two groups, these researchers operational i zed
the following stereotypes: industriousness , competence, attractiveness,
hostility, morality and dominance.
Results of the study, ^ support the finding of Seggar and Wheeler
C1973): that blacks are portrayed more often than whites in minor
roles. Moreover, black and white females, black females to a larger
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extent than white females, were reported excluded from significant
roles on television. Support was also found for Roberts' finding that
ABC portrayed blacks more often than the other two major networks. In
this study, CBS and ABC presented blacks more than NBC. Contrary to
the research hypothesis, evidence was found to indicate that whites
were stereotyped more negatively than were blacks. Whites appeared
more often than blacks as violent, hostile, criminal, and immoral. The
researchers, however, observed a tendency toward a negative stereotype
of blacks in the "dominance" category. That is blacks were portrayed
more than whites in subordinate roles.
The final three studies reviewed in this section, examine the
networks' portrayal of blacks on television newscasts.
In the first study. Pride and Clarke (1973) investigated the
differences between the networks news coverage of race issues. They
examined the news story's position and duration in the broadcast; the
language structure used by newsmen; and the manner in which the net-
works treat social and institutional symbols in presenting the news.
Systematically, one day a week was randomly selected over a two-year
period (1968-70) of televised news programming. Transcripts were made
for each race-related story broadcast. Each sentence in the story was
coded using a classification system designed to identify inference
statements. Data was also collected and coded for date, network,
source, and story number for each program. Nine symbols (President,
Courts, Police, Blacks, Black Militants, etc.) were constructed and
measured according to direction (positive, neutral, or negative), and
dimension (strength or morality) of each sentence.
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Pride and Clarke found that the networks do not operate uniformly
in the amount of coverage and emphasis each placed on race issues. NBC
provided more coverage (time) and greater priority (order of presenta-
tion) than did the other two networks. Unlike ABC, CBS and NBC more
often identified the source of their information when reporting race-
related events. Network anchormen were more likely, however, to make
unidentified reports. The treatment of different symbols was found
consistently the same for all the networks. "Black Militants" were
treated more severely by the networks, while the courts received the
most positive treatment.
In the second study, Roberts (1975) recorded, from two three-week
periods sampled during the early evening, the number of news segments
in which a black appeared on television. Data was collected on the
frequency of black appearances; the nature of the news story in which
blacks appeared; and their occupations (when it was possible to deter-
mine).
Roberts found that blacks appeared in approximately 25% of the
news programs sampled. The majority (52%) of black appearances were
seen but not heard. Non-speaking appearances were significantly higher
on ABC than on the other networks. Blacks appeared more often in news
related to civil rights issues, and unlike entertainment programming
where blacks most often appear in high prestige occupations, blacks
appeared more often in news programs in blue-collar occupations.
The final and most recent study on minorities in network televi-
sion news, was conducted by the United States Commission on Civil
Rights (1979), Using a sample of news programs broadcast on each of
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the major networks on five randomly selected dates in 1977, 330 stories
from 15 news programs were analyzed. Of the 330 stories, only 8 (2.4
percent) were found related to women and minorities. Two of the eight
stories that related to women or minorities were reported by a minority
or female correspondent. The Commission reports that the mean length
of all news stories was 128 seconds, while the mean length of stories
on minorities was 73 seconds (40 percent shorter than the average).
Moreover, the few stories concerning minorities tended to occur late in
the programs which the Commission suggests is a measure of its
(story's) importance.
The studies cited above reveal the following:
1. Television is distortive of reality, portraying blacks
more often in professional and high prestige occupations
than in occupations consistent with their actual social
status in society.
2. Although blacks are significantly underrepresented on
television in proportion to the national population, an
increase in the frequency of blacks appearing on televi-
sion was reported by several researchers.
3. Stereotyping of blacks is practiced by the major three
networks.
4. Blacks are portrayed more than whites in subordinating
roles.
5. One study reports that whites are portrayed significantly
more than blacks in violent, hostile, criminal and immoral
roles.
6. Blacks are portrayed most often as entertainers and regul-
ators (e.g., guards, policemen, officials).
7. Blacks are portrayed more often than not in minor roles.
8. Blacks appear more often than not on television for less
than three minutes. Several studies suggest that this
reflects the networks policy of tokenism toward blacks.
58
9. Blacks are more often seen on television than heard.
10. Black women are most underrepresented on television, and
to a large extent, are excluded from significant roles.
11. Differences exist between networks in the amount of cov-
erage and emphasis placed on race issues.
12. The three major networks treat issues related to black
militancy severely.
13. Blacks appear more often on news broadcasts in blue-
collar than professional and high prestige occupations.
14. A character profile emerges of blacks appearing on en-
entertainment programs. They are cast as regulators,
law-abiding citizens, subservient to whites, profession-
als, financially successful, living in luxurious settings,
and seldomly shown in physical contact with whites.
^
Attitude Formation/Elaboration: Television's Impact
Effect studies . Television is not a definable, discrete, and unitary
element. Like other mass media, television performs a mediating func-
tion prescribed by external forces. As such, it responds to and is
manipulated by externally imposed restraints, and, therefore, operates
as a conduit through which cultural messages become reified in the form
of image and sound. The medium itself, however, functions as a stimu-
lus that conditions the viewer for subsequent value ladened stimuli.
The viewer, on the other hand, comes to television with a host of
values and beliefs that the medium can either modify or reinforce ac-
cording to the content and format of its programming. Consequently,
cause and effect relationships (that are reliable and valid) between
the message, mediated by the medium, and the behaviors of the viewers
are difficult to discern given the present experimental paradigms
available to researchers.
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Laboratory experiments have, however, suggested that children
learn from and identify with characters in films (Maccoby and Wilson,
1957); that children imitate film-mediated aggressive models (Bandura,
Ross and Ross, 1963); and that stereotyping can change after television
exposure to counter-stereotypes (Scherer, 1970-71).^
If television is more than mere entertainment, but functions as
an important social izer, then the effects of television content on the
social behaviors of viewers is of enormous import.
Until recently, relatively little systematic research has been
conducted on the influence of racially diverse programming on viewers
behavior. The studies reviewed in this final section, examine the
effects of television programming on the racial attitudes of viewers.
Gerson (1966), investigated the use of mass media (television,
movies, books, and magazines) by black and white adolescents residing
in the San Francisco Bay area. The study was concerned with how the
media functions as an agency of socialization for different groups in
society. Gerson examined the social contexts in which media socializa-
tion behavior was more likely to occur. Using a pretested question-
naire, he collected data from a large sample of 623 (272 white and 351
black) adolescent males (49%) and females. Media socialization func-
tions were divided into two categories; media reinforcement and media
norm-acquiring behaviors.
Results of the study indicate that significant differences exist
between the two racial groups in their use of mass media. Black adol-
escents were reported to use mass media to learn how to behave like
whites. Older black adolescents were reported to use mass media more
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for norm-acquiring behaviors than did younger black adolescents. White
youth relied more on mass media, especially the older white adolescents
for social reinforcement than for norm-acquiring behaviors than did
black adolescents. White females were found more dependent on media
for socialization than white males, while black males used media for
socialization more than black females. When the two racial groups were
compared for socio-economic differences, black and white working-class
adolescents were found highers users of mass media as a socialization
agent than did middle-class adolescents.
Several years later, Byrne (1969) investigated the influence of
mass media (television and newspapers) on the political socialization
of children. Comparing four subcultures: rural black, urban black,
rural white and urban white in North Carolina, Byrne administered a
questionnaire to 184 black and 203 white students in the 6th, 10th and
11th grades.
Black children were reported exposed to news on television as of-
ten as white children. The racial groups differed, however, in their
exposure to newspapers. Black children were exposed less to newspapers
than whites. Families of urban children, regardless of race, used
newspapers more often than those of rural children. Children of lower
socio-economic status, regardless of race and residence, watched the
news on television less than did upper-income youth. Black children
who were exposed less to newspapers than whites, reported more positive
attitudes toward the government than did white children. Byrne con-
tends that type of mass media exposure is related to certain attitudes
towards political authority. Evidence was found to support this con-
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tention. When race, geographical, and socio-economic characteristics
of the children sampled were compared to the type of media they were
exposed to, it was found that black, rural, and lower-income children
were exposed more to television than to newspapers. These three groups
in the aggregate, reported more favorable attitudes toward the govern-
ment than did children of urban, white, and middle-income backgrounds.
Three years later, Greenberg (1972) examined black and white
children's reactions to blacks portrayed on television entertainment
programs. Greenberg hypothesized that black children would identify
more with black characters and black programs than would white children;
and that black children would watch more programs featuring blacks than
would white children. For white children, who were geographically
distant from blacks, and, therefore, seldom interacted with blacks,
Greenberg hypothesized that television portrayals of blacks would serve
as a primary source of information for white children; and that it
would generate more positive attitudes toward blacks.
Four groups (one black and three white) of fourth and fifth
graders were interviewed from several urban and rural public schools in
Michigan. Each child was presented with a list of 25 programs and ask-
ed what programs they regularly viewed. The program list included 12
programs that regularly featured, blacks, and 12 that did not, plus one
"Sesame Street" program. Data was collected on the following: the
children's exposure to the 25 programs, their preference for specific
programs, their perceived reality of life (including black life) por-
trayed on television, where they obtained information about each others
race, their attitudes toward blacks, and their contact with blacks.
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Analysis of the data indicates that black children watched more
television than did white children, and that black children preferred
programs that featured blacks more than did white children. Black
children's identification with black programs increased as they were
exposed to more black shows than did white children. White children,
however, identified strongly with several programs that featured a
black performer. Interestingly, neither black nor white children iden-
tified with child characters appearing on the programs. Black children
perceived television to be more realistic than did white children.
White rural children reported that television was a major source of
information about blacks, while most black children reported that
whites lived in their neighborhoods. Perhaps Greenberg's most signifi-
cant finding was that white children identified with blacks and black
feature programs from television exposure and not from personal exper-
iences with blacks; and that television exposure, and not personal con-
tact, contributed to the belief in white children that black performers
were representative of blacks in the real world.
Impressive findings notwithstanding, Greenberg was unable to iden-
tify why both black and white children identified with black performers,
nor did he examine the mediational influence of peers and parents in
the structuring of the child's racial attitudes.
The following two studies discussed in this paper constitute part
of the Surgeon General's Advisory Committee report on Television and
Social Behavior: to date, the most exhaustive investigation of tele-
vision's impact on children's social behaviors.
Concerned with the legitimation functions television performs for
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the social order in American society, Clark (1973) investigated the
medium's affects on the formation of black personality and self-concept,
Clark argued that the mass media in general , and television in parti-
cular, generates violences, and is by its character and function vio-
lent. In order to empirically demonstrate this phenomena, Clark con-
ducted a series of related studies: that operationally defined the
concept and dimensions of identification vis a vis psychoanalytic and
cognitive models of learning; that generated a psycho-dynamic profile
of "Black consciousness"; and that distinguished between black and
white behavioral responses to the media's presentation of blacks.
The results of his studies indicate that blacks are presented un-
favorably on television in comparison to white portrayals. This en-
ables whites, by comparison, to feel a sense of self-esteem and legi-
timacy. Conversely, Clark reports that blacks as a result of this
process, experience often severe and crippling personality disorders.
As such, television commits an act of "violence" against non-white
peoples. Paradoxically, Clark reports, that respondents judged high
in "race consciousness" experienced a heightened racial awareness by
virtue of their inability to identify with mass media models. Conse-
quently, he argues, that a cause and effect relationship is manifest
in that blacks who commit acts of social violence are responding, to a
large extent, to the social violence committed against them by the
social order and the mass media, and especially television.
Greenberg and Gordon (1972), examined the influence of social
class and race on children's perception of television violence. They
sampled 325 (black and white lower-class, white middle- and upper-class)
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fifth graders attending public schools in Michigan. Each subject was
shown a 45.minute video tape depicting a variety of television violence.
Results of the study indicate that low-income black and white
children found violent scenes more acceptable than did the white
middle- and upper-class children. The low-income groups preferred
watching the violent scenes more, and believed that they were more
real to life than did the middle- and upper-class groups. Interesting-
ly, low-income black children were found to perceive less violence in
scenes of violence when compared to other groups. When the four
groups were compared, black low-income children were found more accept-
ing of the violent scenes than were the other three groups.
In a more recent study (Donohue, 1975) examined black children's
perceptions of television characters. Donohue hypothesized that black
children would prefer more violent than nonviolent television charac-
ters, and would respond to violent characters more violently when com-
pared to other response categories measured in the study.
A sample population of 247 black elementary school children was
selected from two schools in New Orleans. Data was collected for age,
sex, favorite television program, favorite television character, amount
of television exposure, and the time in which viewing usually occurred
in the children's home. Each child heard descriptions of four situa-
tions, and after each description was asked how to identify their
favorite television character, how their parents , and their best friend
v/ould respond in the situation described by the interviewer. The data was
grouped according to violent or nonviolent response categories.
The results of the study indicate that television provided essen-
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tially harmless behavioral models for the black children studied. In
only a few children did television provide a negative behavioral model.
Black children imitated their favorite television characters behavior
for the situation described. Both male and female children believed
that their favorite television characters would respond violently to
several of the situations described by the interviewers. In situations
where the favorite character was perceived by the black child to re-
spond violently, the character served as an antisocial model of be-
havior. The behavioral categories that provoked the most violent
responses in the children sampled were "you", "TV character", and
"best friend". Donohue also reports that black male children preferred
violent television programs more than females, and that aggressive
responses and preferences for both violent programs and characters
tended to decrease in older children, especially among males.
The same year, in a well designed study, Graves (1975) investigat-
ed the affects of racial diversity in children's television cartoons on
black and white children's racial attitudes and preferences for pro-
gram characters. Eighty children (age six-eight) were randomly select-
ed from racially mixed schools in the Boston area. Subjects were
distributed equally, according to race and sex, and randomly assigned
to experimental or control conditions. Each child was individually
tested on racial attitude and program preference measures. Several
weeks later, the children in the experimental groups were exposed to
one of several different types of cartoon programs, and then immediat-
ely re-tested on attitude and preference measures. The cartoons used
in the study were one of four types: positive portrayals of blacks
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when they were in the numerical minority; negative portrayals of
blacks when they were in the numerical majority, negative portrayals
of blacks when they were in the numerical minority. The children in
the control group were exposed to one of two wildlife programs.
Results of the experiment indicate that the cartoon programs used
in the study had an effect on the children's racial attitudes. How-
ever, the extent of the influence, Graves contends, was determined,
largely, by the child's racial attitudes prior to exposure. She found,
as Greenberg (1972) reports, that positive portrayals of blacks tend
to produce more positive attitudes in black and white children. How-
ever, negative portrayals affected the two groups differently. Ex-
posure to negative portrayal of blacks produced significant negative
attitudes in white children, while for black children, negative por-
trayals produced positive attitudes, especially for black females, who
were exposed to cartoons featuring black women. That is regardless
of the portrayal, black children responded positively, suggesting that
the inclusion of blacks, in cartoons, had a salutary affect on their
attitudes. Graves reports that no significant difference in program
preferences between the two racial groups was found. Both groups re-
sponded favorably to cartoons featuring both black and white partici-
pants.
Although the final study reviewed in this section, Gorn, Goldberg
and Kanungo (1976), does not directly bear on blacks, I consider the
researchers findings of import. Gorn, et al . , using a traditional ex-
perimental design, examined English Canadian children's reactions to-
ward other racial groups (American Indian and Oriental) portrayed on
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television. A total of 205 white upper-middle income nursery school
children (age 3h to Sh) were randomly assigned to an experimental or
control group. The experimental group was exposed to "Sesame Street"
inserts containing children of racially mixed groups playing together,
and to inserts where one racial group, other than their own, was por-
trayed in a non-integrated, though similar play setting. Eac child,
immediately after viewing the inserts, was interviewed and shown two
sets of four photos selected from the inserts depicting, in one set,
white children, and in the other set, Oriental and Indian children.
1
Each child was then asked which group of children they would prefer
to come visit the nursery school the next day.
Response preferences for both the experimental and control group
were compared, and results indicate that the children in the control
I
I
group showed a significant preference for playing with white children.
'
The children in the experimental groups, who were exposed to the multi-
racial inserts, preferred playing with the Oriental and Indian child-
ren. When the children's responses for both types of inserts (inte-
;
grated and non-integrated settings) were combined, it was found that
children in the experimental groups continued to prefer to play with
non-white children more than did the children in the control group.
Although statistically not significant, it was found that an increase
in the children's exposure to the television inserts produced a more
favorable reaction toward the Oriental and Indian children.
The findings of the studies cited in this section are summarized
below:
1. Four researchers found that racially diverse television
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programming affects children's racial attitudes positively.
2. The extent of the effect of racially diverse television
on children s racial attitudes depends on the child's
racial attitudes prior to television exposure.
3. Black adolescents use mass media (including television) in
order to learn how to behave like whites.
4. As a result of television exposure, black youth were found
to express more positive attitudes toward the American
government than did white youth.
5. Several researchers found that black children perceive tele-
vision content to be more realistic than did white children.
6. Three studies indicate that black children identify with
black programs and black characters more than did white
children.
7. Several studies indicate that white children identify with
black characters and programs featuring blacks.
8. Television is a major source of information about blacks
for white children.
9. Mass media (including television) contributes to the de-
struction of black personality.
10. One study found that television provides essentially in-
nocuous behavioral models for black children to imitate.
11. Black youth were reported, in one study, to perceive less
violence in scenes of violence on television than did
white youth.
12. One study found that white children preferred playing
with non-white children after exposure to multiracial
programming.
Critique of the Research
The findings gathered in the literature review, suggest that there
exists, little, if any, consistently reliable evidence of either the
neutral or the salutary effects of television on the racial attitudes
of viewers.
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No doubt, the "image" of blacks portrayed on television has chang-
ed from the menial [servants, cooks, and janitor), or comical (Amos
'n' Andy) characterizations of the past that overtly emphasized sub-
servancy and ridicule. The question, however, is whether new stereo-
types of blacks, equally as destructive as of those of the past, have
emerged to supplant images no longer tolerable to the viewing audience,
especially the black audience. Several studies cited in the review
report that blacks are persistently stereotyped in television enter-
tainment fare. They are cast as "regulators" (policemen), law-abiding
citizens, professionals, financially successful, living in expensive
dwellings. At a deeper level, in interracial scenes, blacks are, in
most cases, subtlely portrayed as subservient to whites, and are seldom
shown in physical contact with whites, especially when the scenes are
sexually charged.
Although many of the studies cited in the review used distinct and
elaborate empirical research designs and traditional and innovative
data acquisition and measurement techniques, only one study (Clark,
1972), attempted to link systematically empirical data with underlying
psycho-dynamic (cognitive and emotive) processes. Like much of the
research we reviewed in chapter two on the 'effects' of mass communica-
tion on political behavior, most of the studies ej<amined in this
chapter failed to render intelligible the relationship between media
variables and the racial attitudes and behaviors of viewers.
The problem, as I have suggested earlier in the critique of poli-
tical communication research (chapter two), lies in the implicit value
systems of traditional researchers; values that inform the logic of
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research itself. Smythe (1954) has observed that:
The bulk of the research in the interdisciplinary field
known as 'communications research' has been in the hands of
persons who more or less consciously adopt the stance of
'scientism'
.
By this I mean that they will accept as 'know-
ledge' only what has been demonstrated through 'controlled
experiments'; and that their assumptions and preconditions
are often inexplicit and seriously biasing. One of the more
serious of these preconceptions has been that there is a
simple cause-and-effect relation between the content of
mass media and the behavior and attitudes of the audience
(pp. 20-1).
The assumption here is that the only evidence--particularly in
studies of 'effects' on social behavior—deemed "legitimate" by, es-
pecially experimental researchers, must come from laboratory settings;
and, more significantly, must be "blessed" with statistical measures of
variance. As early as 1951, Fearing remarked vis a vis the influence
of film and radio on social behaviors that:
The viewer and listener are dynamic participants in the situ-
ation. They react on_ the content presented rather than react-
ing to it. How they react is determined by many factors only
one of which is the content of the film itself . This is not
equivalent to saying that film and radio have no effects.
Rather, it raises the much more complicated question of what
effects under what conditions (p. 40, emphasis in the origin-
al).
In context, social scientific experimentation concerning the ef-
fects of television programming on viewer attitudes and behaviors have
frequently exhibited methodological problems. These problems are as-
sociated with the research designs of controlled investigations in
which relevant factors (normal viewing conditions) either cannot be
overtly manipulated or cannot be varied in accordance with strict logi-
cal design sequences (see Nagel , 1961). Consequently, causal imputa-
tions based upon controlled investigations have faced serious technical
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problems concerning the identification and definition of variables,
the choice of relevant variables, the selection of representative
sample data, and the familiar £ost hoc fal lacy in which data about
sequentially manifested events are interpreted as indicating causal
connections.
Specifically, in the controlled experiments ('effect' studies)
cited in the literature review, the artificial conditions of the lab-
oratory setting is by no means equivalent to the normal viewing condi-
I
tions of the child or adolescent. By distorting the context of the
viewer in his home, etc., the experimental setting becomes an abstrac-
I
)
tion, so divorced from reality as to make any generalization of find-
'
ings problematic. Even laboratory conditions which attempt to repli-
cate the natural television viewing environment have low-order genera-
lizability to society. Moreover, methods (surveys) which attempt to
collect data based on natural viewing conditions of subjects within
their hom.es are also of limited usefulness.
Halloran (1974) poignantly sums up what happens as a consequence
of this spurious "scientific" process:
In our operational definitions we have disembodied, fragmented,
and pigeon-holed human beings into cognitive, affective, and
behavioral bits and pieces. We have rid society of its embar-
rassing complexity by displaying a total disregard for what is
really taking place. The situation has been approached, seen,
examined and analyzed, according to the requirements of fabri-
cated model or design... Our obsession with scientific method
(with reliability in particular), accompanied by the neglect
of validity, has frequently led to a serious distortion of
social real ity. . .How valuable is it to be precise and consis-
tent about something that isn't true or doesn't matter? (p. 15).
Researchers must take cognizance of these traditional research
problems and devise mul ti -procedural designs which allow for observa-
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tion and logical rigor outside of the confines of the controlled-
experimental format and situation. As such, the expansion of psycho-
logical and mass communications methods and theories delineating the
relationship of media to learning processes and the formation of
racial attitudes awaits further empirical and, especially, theoretical
study.
CHAPTER IV
TECHNOLOGY, CULTURAL HEGEMONY AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF POLITICAL REALITY
There is a profound interconnection. . .between the new Age of
Ideology-- the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries prolifera-
tion of ideologies--and the "communications revolution"
grounded in the development of printing, printing technolo-
gies, and the growing production of printed products.
- Alvin W. Gouldner
In chapter 2, we reviewed and critiqued the corpus of literature
in political communications research. We examined the major theoreti-
cal models and the conceptual frameworks that inform and are represen-
tative of political communications research. We established the frame-
work—the Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation--wi thin which the
thesis of the dissertation will advance and develop.
In the present chapter, we generate and develop a set of inter-
related and sequentially ordered propositions that render support for
the thesis of the dissertation--that the electronic media, in collusion
with other cultural forms of manipulation (education, printed media,
electoral process, legal order), constitute the complex institutional
apparatus through which ruling elites in the United States maintain
control and ideological hegemony over the rest of us.
Proposition I . Technology in the modern capitalist society is inten-
tionally employed by elite groups to mystify the social world and to
alienate people from the object of their labor, the process of produc-
tion, and from themselves and the world.
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Proposition II. The "electronic media" are by definition technological
and cultural innovations. As such, they are employed in the modern
capitalist society to manipulate and inhibit rather than to liberate
the consciousness of men of women.
Proposition III. Language, as a communicative form and 'act', is the
basis for the advancement of 'rationality', or for the mystification
and distortion of the social world. When language is systematically
distorted the possibility for rational discourse (and freedom) to
occur is correspondingly obstructed. The content of programming in the
electronic media are informed largely by linguistic messages that are
systematically distorted. Furthermore, the electronic media, as a
technical mode of communication, contribute to the distortion of social
reality, and, in doing so, further inhibits 'rationality' from becoming
manifest in the way people reflect on and conduct their lives.
Proposition IV . The electronic media transmits systematically distort-
ed messages concerning the nature of the social world. The transmis-
sion of distorted messages (meanings) are not the consequence of the
communication technology itself, but rather are the result of the in-
tentional manipulations by ruling elites in society. As such, the
electronic media collude in presenting a distorted view of the social
world that affirm and legitimize the false truth claims (advanced by
elite stratum) concerning the nature of social relations and the poli-
tical order in society.
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Technology and Social Relations
Belief in the omnipotence of technology is the specific form
of bourgeois ideology in the late capitalism.
-Ernest Mandel
The proposition that technology has altered the world and our
lives is regarded as true by most, if not everyone, living in the post
industrial society. How and in what ways (by accident or design) has
technology altered our lives, however, has been the subject of an in-
tense debate for the past half century. Opinions concerning this pro-
blematic can be distinguished and assigned under one of three schools
of thought: the neo-Posi tivist, Anti-Technology, and the neo-Marxist
school s.
The neo-Positivist school celebrates technology and, as we have
discussed earlier in chapter two, supports the 'instrumentalist' con-
ception of rationality. From this perspective, technology is viewed
as the consequence of the scientific enterprise and progress is con-
ceived of in terms of technological efficiency and growth.
The Anti -Technology school, most recently represented by Ellul
(1964), Wilhelmsen (1956), Roszak (1972), and Toffler (1970), essen-
tially view technology as an independent and increasingly uncontrol-
able force in modern society. The "machine" is regarded as a threat
to mankind and 'instrumental' rationality, the philosophical foundation
and rationale for technology's ascendance, is viewed as the maniacal
force that will further alienate and eventually subordinate mankind to
the objects of their creation.
Though both the neo-Positivist and the Anti -Technology schools
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represent antithetical positions vis a vis the role of technology in
the modern industrial society, they share several common characteris-
tics. Both schools abstract technology from ideology and each for dif-
ferent motivations, support a conception of the world grounded in
"technological determinism". Two broad classes of opinion underlie
the two schools. The first class of opinion contends that the specific
forms of new technology are in effect accidental —that is they emerge
by an internal process of scientific research and development inde-
pendent of external manipulation and design. The social consequences
of the new technology on society are similarly viewed as accidental In
that they are technological effects. This view assumes that if the
technology had not been developed certain cultural phenomena would
not have occurred.
The second class of opinion argues that although the development
of new technology is accidental, its significance lies in its uses.
This position, suggests Williams (1975), is less determinist than the
first class of opinion because it considers other causal factors in
social change.
It then considers particular technologies, or a complex of
technologies, as systems of change of some other kind. Any
particular technology is then as it were a by-product of a
social process that is otherwise determined. It only ac-
quires effective status when it is used for purposes which
are already contained in this known social process (p. 13).
In both classes of opinion, labelled by Williams (1975) as "tech-
nological determinism" in the former and "symptomatic technology", in
the latter, research and development of new technology are assumed to
operate as self-generating processes independent of external manipula-
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tion. In "technological determinism", social change is assumed to
occur as a direct consequence of the new technology; while in "sympto-
matic technology", new social conditions for life and the technologies
that effect and shape them become manifest within a social order and
process (e.g., the Industrial Revolution) than is otherwise determined.
Each perspective then, depends on the isolation or detachment of tech-
nological development from the external social and political influences
that would otherwise influence the nature and scope of scientific re-
search. From these two views, technology is conceived of as a "self-
acting force which creates new ways of life, or it is a self-acting
force which provides materials for new ways of life" (Williams, 1975,
p. 14). In either case, technology is assumed to have an inner logic
and dynamic of its own, though in the case of "symptomatic technology",
the uses of the new technology are intentionally informed by an exist-
ing social formation.
In contention with the neo-Positi vist and Anti -Technology schools
of thought stands the neo-Marxist position. Technological development
and use is viewed quite differently from this perspective. Signifi-
cantly, Williams (1975) states:
Such an interpretation would differ from technological deter-
minism in that it would restore intention to the process of
research and development. The technology would be seen, that
is to say, as being looked for and developed with certain
purposes and practices already in mind. At the same time
the interpretation would differ from symptomatic technology
in that these purposes and practices would be seen as direct :
as known social needs, purposes and practices to which tech-
nology is not marginal but central (p. 14, emphasis in the
original )
.
The neo-Marxist position represents an alternative interpretation
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of the role of technology in the modern capitalist society and, as
well, a critique of the positivist and anti -technology position.
Jacoby (1975), in criticizing the two positions argues that:
The reduction of social antagonism and misery to a maladjust-
ment between people and technology is an old approach; tech-
nology in this scheme exists in a no man's land beyond profit
and exploitation. . .the sleight of hand involves shifting at-
tention away from the social -economic structure to supposedly
"
neutral territory, as if today no one controls technology.
Such an analysis permits enough pathos to creep in to make
an enthusiasm for capitalism such as Toffler's acceptable to
those who rightly think that something is terribly wrong
Cp. 8).
Despite differences in view among the neo-Marxists they all share
the common position that technology is not an independent force detach-
ed from the economic-political structures of society. Technological
determinism is viewed, from this perspective, as an ideological argu-
ment employed to mystify the social world. Moreover, the use or abuse
of technology is considered, by the neo-Marxists, as dependent upon
the underlying power relations in modern industrial society.
The neo-Marxist position on technology and social relations, re-
presents a significant departure from orthodox Marxist political theory.
Represented by such diverse social theorists as Karl Korsch, George
Lukacs, Antonio Gramsci , and Herbert Marcuse, the neo-Marxist school,
in the early 1920' s, committed itself to the re-examination and re-
formulation of Marxism in light of the changing historical circum-
stances occurring in western Europe soon before and after the first
world war.
As a consequence of the failure of the II International in the
face of World War I (Jacoby, 1971), the stabilization of capitalism
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worldwide, and the emergence of fascist movements in western Europe,
the traditional Marxist assumption concerning the revolutionary role of
the working class was viewed as problematic by many intellectuals out-
side of the established Left parties. They argued that the concept of
revolution held by the orthodox Marxist was deterministic in that
socialism was believed to be the natural and inevitable outcome of
capitalism. Technological growth was assumed, from the orthodox
Marxists viewpoint, to heighten class conflict and, in doing so,
strengthen the class consciousness among workers who would eventually
seize power.
The failure of the orthodox Marxists to account for the decline of
the worker's militancy during this period prompted Lukacs (1922) and
Korsch (1923) to mount an attack on the orthodox Marxian view that
human behavior is merely a reflection of the economic and social con-
ditions in society. For both Lukacs (1922) and Korsch (1923), objec-
tive forces and conditions were central, however, they become signifi-
cant when they are "subjectively realized" by the working class. In
effect, both Lukacs and Korsch questioned a Marxism that failed to
account for the impact of bourgeois ideology and culture on the con-
sciousness of the workers. Lukacs (1922) charged that the orthodox
Marxists, and not Marx himself, had obscured Hegel's contribution to
the understanding of how development occurs in society. For Hegel,
"development in society is the movement from unconsciousness to self-
consciousness" CGi>oux, 1976, p. 34). According to both Korsch and
Lukacs, the orthodox (vulgar) Marxists had reduced this phenomena to an
automatic process where "consciousness" stood independent and distinct
80
from the very process that informs it. Rejecting this mechanical and
one-directional formula of social development, many of the neo-Marxists
Cincluding the Frankfurt School) argued that the subjective dimension
of experience was a significant (the last element) property in Marxism.
In context, the early neo-Marxist' s analyses of the changing his-
torical circumstances, unfolded a different and theoretically signifi-
cant Marxist perspective on technology and alienation.
Giroux (1976) summarized the rationale advanced by the neo-
Marxists for the reformulation of the classical Marxian critique of
technology and alienation.
If a change in individual consciousness was a prerequisite of
revolutionary social change, .. .then alienation would continue
to exist for workers even though political and economic changes
had taken place. Unless accompanied by socio-psychological
changes, the character structure of the public would still be
operating in an alienating frame of reference left over from
the past. The call to extend revolutionary social change be-
yond political and economic institutions and into the daily
life and consciousness of individuals, prompted an analysis
of alienation that seemed to go unanswered in Marx's own
examination of the subject (p. 34).
Marx's critique of alienation has been the subject of considerable
debate (Meszaros, 1970). Set forth in the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts of 1844 , Marx conceived of "purposive productive activity"
(work) as the essential foundation for human existence. Through work
man developed the capacity for self-realization and in doing so, the
basis for the command of his existence.
Marx's theory of alienation refers to the disruption in the pro-
cess of man's social development. Specifically, states Oilman (1971),
Marx's theory seeks to account for the "devastating effect of capital-
ist production on human beings, on their physical and mental states and
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on the social process of which they are a part" (p. 131). The trans-
formation of the work process ruptures man from experiencing himself
as the center and creator of his existence. As such, the worker's
products are rendered meaningless to him and his labor and products
become both reduced into a commodity (see Meszaros, 1970, p. 125).
According to Marx, alienation is manifest in Man in three forms:
alienation from the object of one's labor, the process of production,
and from his fellow men. The first form--al ienation from the object
of one's labor--the worker no longer controls what he produces, it be-
longs to the owner who employs him. What is produced operates inde-
pendently of his needs and values.
...the worker is related to the product of his labour as to
an alien object... The worker puts his life into the object;
but now his life no longer belongs to him but to the object
...Whatever the product of his labour is, he is not... The
alienation of the worker in his product means not only that
his labour becomes an object, an external existence, but
that it exists outside him, independently, as something
alien to him, and that it becomes a power on its own con-
fronting him. It means that the life which he has conferred
on the object confronts him as something hostile and alien
(Marx, 1844, p. 64).
The second form of alienation--al ienation from the process of pro-
duction--the worker is reduced to an appendage of the production pro-
cess. Because of the division of labor and the process, plan and
objectives of production, under capitalist society, the worker is
separated from his work and his labor. His labor, contends Marx (1844)
"is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him that
in it he belongs, not to himself, but to another" (p. 66). Consequent-
ly, the worker plays no significant role in what to do and how to do
it. Hence he is further detached from his life activity.
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His task IS simple, mechanical, boring and intrinsically
worthless to him. Forced to sell his labor power for a
wage, the laborer can no longer experience his work as a
means for satisfying the need for creative expression, but
only as a means to make money to satisfy his immediate,
material needs. Man is thus reduced to the status of an
animal (Giroux, 1976, p. 35).
Marx C1844), forcefully explicates the devasting social conse-
quences of this process on Man. He states:
What, then, constitutes the alienation of labour? First, the
fact that labour is external to the worker... he does not af-
firm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental
energy but mortifies his body and ruins his mind. The worker
therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his
work feels outside himself .. .His labour is therefore not
voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is there-
fore not the satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to
satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character emerges
clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other
compulsion exists, labour is shunned like the plague... As a
result, therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely
active in his animal functions--eating, drinking, procreating
or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in
his human functions he no longer feels himself to be anything
but an animal. What is animal becomes human and what is
human becomes animal (p. 66).
The third form of alienation in Marx's theoretical framework lies
in the worker's estrangement from himself and nature. Here, in the
workers relationship to the process of production, he (the worker)
views himself and others as fragmented and isolated human beings.
If the product of labor does not belong to the worker, if it
confronts him as an alien power, this can only be because it
belongs to some other man than the worker. . .man ' s relation
to himself only becomes objective and real for him through
his relation to other men... Every self-estrangement of man
from himself and from nature appears in the relation in which
he places himself and nature to men other than and differen-
tiated from himself (Marx, 1844, p. 70).
From Marx then, alienation represents a break with nature, a
cleavage between human beings, and an antagonistic separation between
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producer and consumer within the division of labor in capitalist
society (see Axelos, 1976, p. 58). From this view, alienated labor was
the inescapable consequence of social relations in capitalist society,
and the individual is reduced or degenerates into an 'abstraction'. By
'abstraction', Marx implied that the worker has lost touch with human
specificity. His relation to his work, fellow human beings, and the
products he produces are lost in the emptiness of his social and pro-
ductive activity (see Oilman, 1971, p. 134).
Finally, within Marx's theory of alienation, the capitalist him-
self is alienated. Both worker and capitalist live in the 'realm of
alienation', thus both must be in a 'state of alienation'. Specifi-
cally, the capitalist, rather than engage in the creation of products,
he merely appropriates them for profit. Marx (1844) delineates the
'state of alienation' existing between the worker and the owner.
...it has to be noticed that everything which appears in the
worker as an activity of alienation, of estrangement, appears
in the non-worker as a state of alienation, of estrangement
...the worker's real, practical attitude in production and
the product (as a state of mind) appears in the non-worker
confronting him as a theoretical attitude. .. the non-worker
does everything against the worker which the worker does
against himself; but he does not do against himself what he
does against the worker (p. 74).
Throughout the critique of alienation, Marx emphasized the objec-
tive political and economic forces that promote and maintain domina-
tion. Marx assumed that the formation of a class consciousness in the
working class would emerge from the material (subsistence) conditions
of their existence. The degradation of the work experience, Marx as-
sumed, would eventually compel workers to unite as a class and advance
demands that the capitalist class could not meet. This process would
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inexorably heighten the class consciousness of the workers resulting
in revolution. According to Marx, consciousness and class struggle
were structurally linked to and determined by the objective eonomic
forces grounded in the prevailing social formation (society). From
his historical vantage point, then, Marx focused on the working class
solely on the bases of their class position and productive experience.
Unable to anticipate the social disruptions that would subvert working
class militancy in western Europe during the first two decades of the
20th century, Marx's theory of alienation was necessarily specific to
its time in its critique of social relations under capitalism.
When Marx failed to consider how other institutions and cultural
experiences (mass media, science) under capitalism effect consciousness
Lukacs (1922), Korsch (1923) and others incorporated these factors into
their theoretical analyses of monopoly capitalism. During the 1920's
workers were rallying throughout Europe in support of fascism. Mono-
poly capitalism was consolidating throughout Europe, and the revolution
Marx foresaw had not developed. In light of these historical events
many neo-Marxists called for a reformulation of Marx's theory of class
consciousness which could account for the new forms of cultural and
ideological manipulation of working class consciousness.
'Hegemony' as a Theory of Ideological
Control and Manipulation
The first major reformulation of the orthodox Marxist theory of
alienation was achieved by Lukacs (1922). Lukacs incorporated into the
Marxist world view, Hegel's dialectical notion of alienation which cen-
85
tered on how alienation is produced at the level of everyday life (see
Schroyer. 1978, pp. 97-100). Unlike the orthodox Marxists, Lukacs
(tangential ly) and the members of the Frankfurt School (specifically)
examined the myriad forms of social alienation that were manifest in the
subjective dimensions of social relations of production. Beginning
from the material and objective factors that shaped consciousness, many
of the neo-Marxists stressed in their analyses, the subjective and
psychic dimensions of alienation (for example, the role of the uncon-
scious and its relationship to cultural forms of social and sexual
socialization). What emerged, as a consequence of the neo-Marxists
investigations, contends Giroux (1976) was a:
Creative synthesis of the Hegelian and Marxian theoretical
domains and systems, which was the first major step in the
updating of outworn, orthodox Marxism. The relationship be-
tween technology and alienation was soon to be explained as
part of this synthesis in which cultural forces acted as a
mediator (p. 35).
Lukacs was not, as we have stated earlier, the only neo-Marxist
committed to the reevaluation of classical Marxism. While Lukacs was
formulating the synthesis of the Hegelian and Marxism conceptions of
alienation, another equally important social theorist committed to the
same tasks as Lukacs emerged. Born on the isle of Sardinia in 1891
and imprisoned by the Fascists until the day before his death in 1936,
Gramsci 0946, 1947) is considered on of the seminal Marxist thinkers
of this century. An active organizer and theoretician, and one of the
major founders of the Italian Communist Party (PSI), Gramsci was con-
cerned with how the state, technology, and culture (schools, newspap-
ers, religion) enforced a passive consciousness among the European (spec-
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ifically Italian) working class. Both Lukacs and Gramsci rejected, in
part, the orthodox Marxian notion that the objective material forces in
society are the sole bases for revolutionary change. Revolutionary
change, both theorists argued, only occurs when the subjective and ob-
jective dimensions of the working class simultaneously merge.
Significantly, then, Gramsci established:
a theoretical structure for examining the political impor-
tance of culture. His first premise began with a refined
constriction of the Hegelian division of society into the
state and civil society. The state referred to those insti-
tutions of control that used direct force in maintaining
power. . .According to Gramsci, the traditional Marxist theory
of the state was limited by the exclusive attention it paid
to the role of direct force as the basis of ruling-class
domination. The orthodox Left had little or no understanding
of the subtle but pervasive forms of ideological control that
operated outside of the realm of direct coercion (Giroux,
1976, p. 36).
From Gramsci, civil society was embodied in the complex of social,
cultural, and political institutions (churches, media, schools) that
were not directly a part of or controlled by the state. As a conse-
quence of his study of civil society, Gramsci formulated the conception
of ideological 'hegemony' as a lived social process in society.
Traditionally, 'hegemony' is conceived in terms of political rule
or domination, especially in relations between nations. Marxist's
extended the definition of rule to include relations between social
classes. For Gramsci, however, 'hegemony' meant:
...an order in which a certain way of life and thought is
dominant, in which one concept of reality is diffused
throughout society in all its institutional and private
manifestations, informing with its spirit all taste, morality,
customs, religious principles, and social relations, parti-
cularly in their intellectual and moral connotations
(Cammett, 1967, p. 182).
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The significance of Gramsci's conception of 'hegemony', suggests
Williams C1977), is that it "at once includes and goes beyond two
powerful earlier concepts: that of 'culture' as a 'whole social pro-
cess'
,
in which men define and shape their whole lives; and that of
'ideology', in any of its Marxist senses, in which a system of meanings
and values is the expression or projection of a particular class inter-
est" (p. 108). Williams (1977) further states that:
It is in just this recognition of the wholeness of the pro-
cess that the concept of 'hegemony' goes beyond 'ideology'.
What is decisive is not only the conscious system of ideas
and beliefs, but the whole lived social process as practi-
cally organized by specific and dominant meanings and
values. Ideology, in its normal senses, is a relatively
formal and articulated system of meanings, values, and
beliefs of a kind that can be abstracted as a 'worldview'
or a 'class outlook' (p. 109).
'Hegemony' then refers to a form of "lived" and indirect control
rather than a direct coercion. It permeates throughout the daily lived
experiences of people via the cultural institutions of the church,
media, schools, etc. In effect, 'hegemonic' control eclipses or re-
moves from recognition the very structures of that control and domina-
tion. In context, ideology operates to mystify the social world and to
depoliticize people into accepting their oppression.
Again, Williams (1977), brilliantly explicates the pervasive na-
ture of 'hegemonic' control.
Instead (hegemony) it sees the relations of domination and
subordination, in their forms as practical consciousness, as
in effect a saturation of the whole process of living— not
only of political and economic activity. . .but of the whole
substance of lived identities and relationships, to such a
depth that the pressures and limits of what can ultimately
be seen as a specific economic, political, and cultural
_
system seem to most of us the pressures and limits of simple
experience and common sense. Hegemony is then not only the
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articulate upper level of 'ideology', nor are its forms of
control only those ordinarily seen as 'manipulation' or
'indoctrination'. It is a whole body of practices and ex-
pectations, over the whole of living... It is a lived system
of meanings and values--constitutive and constituting--which
as they are experienced as practices appear as reciprocally
confirming. .. It is... in the strongest sense a 'culture',
but a culture which has also to be seen as the lived domin-
ance and subordination of particular classes (p. 110).
Within the 'hegemonic' concept of control then, domination is
'lived' at the level of daily life. It is a practiced activity exper-
ienced directly in personal relationships and in the way people use
their physical and material resources. In this sense, cultural activ-
ity within a 'hegemony' are seen as more than the reflections or medi-
ations of an economic structure. They are the basic elements of the
social formation itself (see Williams, 1977, p. 111).
Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony' represents a major reformulation
of classical Marxian theory. Like Lukacs and the members of the
Frankfurt School, Gramsci elaborated a theory of culture and domination
that included the subjective as well as the material and objective
dimensions of alienation.
Moreover, Gramsci, in particular, is to be credited for showing
how the major cultural forms of manipulation, legitimation, and control
function within a 'lived' social process in the modern capitalist
society. It is within Gramsci's framework of 'hegemony' and the
Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation that we advance the disser-
tation to the next stage of its development.
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The Political Economy of Media
Control and Manipulation
In the past decade, increasing concern over the mass media's
influence on political behavior has expanded significantly the domain
of communications research. The mass media in general and the elec-
tronic media in particular are currently the subject of intense study.
The focus has broadened to include the study of the media as complex
organizational structures and as cultural forms in society (Piepe,
Crouch, and Emerson, 1978; Williams, 1975). Significantly, researchers
are presently, in their investigations, linking these complex media
systems to other political structures in society in order to determine
their interrelated processes and functions (Garnham, 1978; Goldin,
1969; Gouldner, 1976; Schiller, 1969, 1973; Williams, 1975). Central
to their studies are the factors (military, social class, corporate
ownership) that influence and determine the organization, use and
control of the media channels.
The first major comprehensive treatment of the structure and
policy of mass communication in the United States in relation to their
economic and political functions was conducted by Schiller (1969).
Concerned with the United States' expanding imperial network abroad,
Schiller (1969) examined the 'motor' force behind broadcast communica-
tions in the United States. His study reveals the mil itary--industrial
--governmental linkages behind the giant national communications sys-
tems, and how the American electronic media are extended to the inter-
national arena as instruments of cultural domination. Specifically,
Schiller (1969) shows how prior to the second World War:
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...the development of these media (radio and television) wasdetermined at all points by the market system which surround-
ed them. Business balance sheets, intent on profitability
and unconcerned with human realization, enveloped broadcast
communications (p. 20).
^jruauca
Since the second World war, a marriage has occurred between mili-
tary and political communications research and development, and the
development of commercial broadcasting in the United States. Schiller
(1969) contends that:
Three changing elements can be distinguished in the machinery
of American communications since World War II. There is the
growing military influence on the national governmental com-
munications system. There is the continuous enlargement of
the civilian mi 1 itarv--industrial communications bloc. There
is the special role of American military communications in
securing the international status quo (p. 33, emphasis in
the original )
.
Williams (1975) reports that during the 1950's and 1960's, the
institutional framework of broadcasting in the United States "led to
a situation in which it was not possible to separate, into distinct
categories, military electronics, government agencies concerned with
information and propaganda, and the most visible institutions of gen-
eral 'commercial' broadcasting" (p. 40).
Within this interrelated structure, where military, commercial,
and political interests converge and overlap, the formal assumption
of control of domestic broadcasting communications was achieved in 1963
when President Kennedy established the National Communications System
(NCS). Under the Department of Defense, headed at the time by
Secretary McNamara, the NCS consolidated and extended the military's
influence in the communications complex of the United States (see
Schiller, 1969, pp. 43-49). Under this new structure (NCS), the
91
broadcasting system in the United States was placed more directly under
the control of the political order constituted by a tri -lateral struc-
ture—the military, corporate and governmental agencies of the state.
In this context, the government finances the research and development
of new communications technologies that are, in part, employed by the
military. The research and development of new communications technol-
ogies are achieved largely by the corporate industrial sector through
contracts financed by both the government and the Defense Department.
Nevertheless, I am not suggesting that internal conflicts do not
exist within the political order composed of elite groups. Former
President Nixon's attempt to pressure and manipulate the press and the
broadcasting networks (see Naughton, 1978) and the recent "media wars"
between the giant newspaper and magazine chains (Safire, 1978), and,
more recently, the challenges to A.T. & T.'s monopoly over the tele-
communications industry (Kleinfield, 1979) clearly indicate that inter-
nal conflict and competition among elite stratum are endemic to the
political order. These structured antagonisms, however, do not funda-
mentally alter the "essential interests" and power relations within the
American social order. They are merely the internal power struggles
between ruling elites competing for control of the media channels, or
for a greater portion of an estimated $50 billion dollar communications
industry Csee Kleinfield, 1979).
The concentration and monopolization of media channels in the
United States has increased significantly in recent years (Szymanski
,
1978). Schiller (1973) contends that the:
Ownership and control of the mass media, like all other forms
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of property, is available to those with capital. Inevitably
radio- and television-station ownership, newspaper and maga-'
zme proprietorship, movie- ma king, and book publishing are
largely in the hands of corporate chains and media conglomer-
ates (p. 4).
Nixon (1968), describing the trends in the concentration of owner-
ship of daily newspapers in the United States, reports that nearly 50
percent of the newspapers in the nation's 1500 cities 'are owned by
some group or national chain. Kleinfield (1979), in an essay on the
Gannett Company, reports that the giant press chain (the largest in the
United States) owns 78 out of the 1,764 daily newspapers in the country
The essay by Kleinfield (1979) further indicates that:
Gannett 's magnitude and its role as a management trend-setter
make it the very model of a modern American chain. Gannett
has become a publishing empire that grossed $690.1 million in
1978, and routinely has added 10 or more papers every year.
In addition, the Gannett Company interests have spread to in-
clude radio and TV stations, a scattering of 19 weeklies and
the Louis Harris pollster organization. Gannett is also in
the midst of wrapping up one of the biggest media deals of
all time, the acquisition of the huge Combined Communications
Corporation, owner of seven television and 12 radio stations,
an outdoor advertising group and two good-sized newspapers
(p. 42).
A recent study by Szymanski (1978), reports that out of the forty-
two daily newspapers in the United States with a circulation greater
than 300,000, thirty are owned by ten large newspaper chains. Ten are
controlled by independent millionaires, and the remaining two are con-
trolled by a company of Chicago banking interests. The newspapers own-
ed by the ten newspaper chains account for 62 percent of the total cir-
culation of newspapers in the country (see Szymanski, 1978, pp. 241-
242).
The same year, Archibald MacLeish addressing a group of book pub-
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lishers In New York commented that the giant publishing conglomerates
have a "high devotion to private profit at the expense of everything
else, including the country's literature" (Mitgang, 1978, p. C22).
"
Later, during the address, MacLeish went on to say that the corpora-
tions have "no knowledge of literature, no interest in it, (they) have
acquired publishing houses not to enter publishing, but to diversify
their interests" (p. C22).
Examination of the broadcasting industry shows the same patterns
of concentration and ownership. In fact, both media industries (broad-
casting and printing) are controlled, in many instances, by the same
investment and corporate groups. Studies and reports by Johnson (1970),
Goldin (1969), Eck (1967), Ehrlich (1974), and Smythe (1977) render
further evidence to support the contention that the mass media are
owned and controlled by powerful ruling groups in the American politi-
cal order; and that the concentration of ownership is manifest both
within and between media.
At the apex of the television structure in the United States
stands the three major networks, CBS, NBC, and ABC. These three com-
mercial networks dominate television. Each network constitutes a pri-
vate corporation. The three commercial networks have a virtual mono-
poly on what is broadcast on television. Szymanski (1978) reports
that: "of the 533 VHP TV stations in the early 1970' s, 424 were affil-
iated with or owned outright by NBC, CBS, or ABC" (p. 241). Each
affiliate (local) station is by the very nature of it's affiliation
almost entirely dependent for both the national and the international
news coverage on one of the major networks. Of the remaining stations.
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eighty, reports Szymanski (1978), "are NET affiliates and twenty-nine
are independents" (p. 241).
The major broadcasting networks clearly, then, represent a power-
ful force in American society. They are, however, within the context
of the economic-political order, dependent on and influenced directly
by the large nonmedia corporations. The media giants rely almost en-
tirely for their profits on corporate advertising (see Szymanski, 1978,
p. 242). Consequently, the corporations who advertise their products
on television exercise a powerful influence on the content and program-
ming of television fare. Advertisers, in fact, have often intervened
directly in network programming (see Miliband, 1973, chapter 8). Pre-
sently, the content of a considerable amount of advertising broadcast
on television, is designed to neutralize the rising hostility of the
American public towards the major industrial corporations, particularly
the petroleum corporations. EXXON and several of the other major oil
companies have sponsored a sustained PR effort via the major TV net-
works to convince the public that they are not responsible for the
current petroleum shortages, but rather are concerned with a clean en-
vironment, and are seeking to produce a cheap supply of energy for the
American people, the American Enterprise Film Series , which is designed
to interest the American people in the free enterprise system (see
Dougherty, 1976). The giant oil company has disseminated the film
through schools and community groups, reaching an estimated 12 million
people a year. In 1975, the oil company, reports Dougherty, "spent
$1.25 million to run a TV spot promoting the concept (free enterprise),
and this year (1976) is spending an additional $250,000 for a print
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campaign urging other corporations to sponsor the same spot" (p. 55).
The development and expansion of "Cable" television is another
potential media channel for use and manipulation by corporate and poli-
tical interests. Present estimates indicate that the cable system is
a $1.4 billion dollar industry, with well over 12 million subscribers
(see Moore, 1978). The political implications of the cable system,
suggests Strouse (1975), is that:
...a political message may be directed to an audience that is
almost coterminous with the exact constituency. The cost is
significantly reduced and the message reaches the exact
audience for which it was intended. The spillover effect and
cost is eliminated (p. 253).
As such, the cable system can create partisan channels for the ex-
clusive use of political parties and interest groups able to pay the
high costs of rental. The concentration and eventual control of these
cable channels by powerful corporations and political interest groups
will, as in the case of the broadcasting and printed media, provide
another agency for the manipulation of opinion. Tom Wicker (1977) con-
tends that the move from broadcasting to cable "would put great power--
and probably profits--in the hands of the cable carrier, which under
present conditions would be mostly the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company" (p. 17).
The media channels, then, are corporate institutions as well as
complex systems of communication (Skornia, 1965). They influence and
are influenced by political phenomena. In 1978, Chief Justice Warren
E. Burger warned of the power held by the giant media corporations
(Raines, 1978). Burger argued that the large media conglomerates have
amassed vast amounts of wealth and power and that they represent a
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larger threat to "valid interests" in the electoral process than other
nonmedia corporations. In 1977, NBC projected that it's revenues by
1985 would exceed $2 billion a year (see Fraser, 1977).
At another level, recent disclosures reveal the extent to which
the media are manipulated by the American intelligence, military, and
governmental establishment, as well as by foreign nations. Brown (1979)
recently reports that the White House under Nixon undertook a campaign
to pressure and manipulate the television networks.
Efforts by the Nixon Administration to control public broad-
casting, purge it of commentators considered hostile to the
President and reorganize it so it might serve the Administra-
tion's aims are detailed in newly disclosed documents from
files of the White House Office of Telecommunications Policy
for 1969 to 1974 (p. 1).
Schorr (1976), Shabad (1979), and Carmody
.
(1976) report that the
intelligence community, particularly the C.I. A. and the F.B.I. , financ-
ed and employed American news organizations and journalists, and
broadcasting media in their covert operations. More recently, Burham
(1979), reports "that for the last quarter-century, one of the Govern-
ment's (American) most secret agencies (National Security Agency) has
played an important, largely undisclosed, role in shaping the nation's
privately-owned communications network of microwave towers, underground
cables, satellites and computers" (p. Al). The NSA is accused: (1)
of persuading the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) to reverse
an earlier descision it had made concerning the construction of a $200
million trans-Atlantic communications cable, (2) of encouraging Ameri-
can business to spend millions of dollars on the development of techno-
logy that will prevent interception of their communications, and (3) of
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being a major source of research funds for the computer and telecommun-
ications industries. The manipulation of the media channels are not
exclusively the domain of American political-economic interests. Most
recently the government of South Africa was reported to invest more
than $11 million dollars in the U.S. news media operations (see Rawls,
1979).
The most alarming development vis a vis the media concerns the
F.C.C.'s proposal to deregulate the communications industry nationally
(Holsendolph, 1979). Critics opposed to the F.C.C.'s proposal argue
that the deregulation of communications rules will result in the pub-
lics loss of its control over the airwaves (Dunaway, 1979). Specifi-
cally, they argue that the F.C.C.'s rulings will allow some public
broadcasting stations to sell commercial time and eliminate the
agency's role in enforcing equal -employment rules. Moreover:
Limits on the number of commercials would be lifted, and the
value of a broadcasting license could soar. Local broadcast-
ers would no longer be required to ascertain and serve the
needs of their community. The commission may even relinquish
its control over the business dealings of broadcasters, in-
cluding fradulent billing and monopolistic network proce-
dures... with greater pressure to make every minute of radio
count, programs of interest to minority (particularly minor-
ities with low buying power) may begin to disappear. . .An-
other major effect could be greater stratification of the
radio audience, and, indirectly, the increased polarization
of society (Dunaway, 1979, p. 25).
We can infer from the evidence presented above that the media in
the United States are not independent of the political order. The
media are powerful organizational institutions that are structurally
linked to the ruling order. Since the second World War, the relation-
ship between the commercial media, government agencies, and the mili-
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tary apparatus of the state have converged to form the military/indus-
trial/governmental complex. As such, the media influence and are in-
fluenced by each sector in the ruling order, internal conflict and
competition notwithstanding. Despite the media's consistent claim
that its primary function is to serve the public, it operates as a
corporate entity, and, like any other commercial enterprise in capi-
talist society, the media is concerned with increasing its revenues
and profits. A political and economic force itself, the media commands
vast amounts of wealth and power. The media conglomerates accrue
their wealth primarily from advertising revenues. Schiller (1978)
contends that the newspaper industry obtains three-fourths of it's
revenues from the advertising industry, and one-fourth from the readers
while for the broadcasting industry, revenues are secured entirely from
advertisers.
The concentration (monopolization) and ownership of media channels
is increasingly manifest in the control that the major networks main-
tain over their affiliate stations. Local broadcasters, either as
"independents" or affiliates, are virtually dependent on the major net-
works for their news and entertainment programming. The one-way flow
and content of television fare is, therefore, largely dominated and
determined by the three major commercial networks--NBC, ABC, and CBS.
Concentration of the ownership of the media occurs both within and
across the media channels. This phenomena, is, in part, the conse-
quence of the huge amounts of capital required to finance and maintain
media operations. Concomitantly, the federal government directly
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supports via legislation the present structure and patterns of media
ownership and concentration. From this perspective, the media in
America can be seen as structurally linked to the political order, and,
as such, are a powerful form of social integration and control. What
emerges, then, is a media complex that is located in an industrial
society that is privately owned, corporately structured, governmental ly




A definition of language is always, implicitly or explicitly,
a definition of human beings in the world.
- Raymond Williams
Dance and Larson (1976), contend that the functions of human com-
munication are to link the individual with the social word, to develop
higher mental processes, and to regulate human behavior (p. 48). Each
communicative function described above implies that, in order for com-
munication to occur between people, a system of symbols or language
exists. More importantly, these definitions of the function of commun-
ication suggest, that language has a history, is an "activity", (pro-
cess) and that it is concretely connected to a social realm.
Every modern society has a "standard" language, however, it is not
internalized equally and uni formally by all of its members. That is
linguistic codes and "signs" within language differentiate between
social classes (including ethnic and racial groups) in society. The
code of a social group, suggests Mueller (1973), "reflects the
socio-
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economic conditions of that group, while the environment, in turn, re-
inforces and validates the individual's language (p. 14). In this
sense, the code (language) a social group shares is 'context specific'.
As such, the possibility of transcending the context of one's code,
argues Mueller C1973):
...is contingent upon accepting and learning other codes.
Change from one code to another implies, therefore, not only
a change of the language spoken but also a change of the
social context (p. 15).
The implication and significance of Mueller's argument is that the
type of language an individual internalizes influences his perception
of himself and the social world; and that the context in which language
is learned can inhibit an individual from comprehending social reality
and the political code (the language of mystification) of society.
Studies by Bernstein (1964), Coward and Ellis (1977), Woolfson (1976),
Tolson (1976), Bourdieu (1977), Camargo (1972), and LaRossa (1974), on
hierarchial message structure and language patterns and use by social
classes render significant support for Mueller's (1973) thesis.
As an 'activity', communication can be defined as a process of
social interaction through messages. In delineating the approach to
the study of communication, Gerbner (1967) states that:
The distinction between the 'communication approach' and the
other approaches to the study of behavior and culture rests
on the extent to which: 1. messages are germane to the pro-
cess studied; 2. concern with the production, content, trans-
mission, perception and use of messages is central to the ap-
proach. A 'communication approach' (or theory) can be dis-
tinguished from others in that it makes the nature and role
of messages in life and society its central organizing con-
cern (p. 44).
It is within the general parameters set forth by Gerbner (1967),
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for the study of communication, that I present the work of Jurgen
Habermas, the eminent representative of the Frankfurt School of social
theorists. Concerned with the achievement of communication free from
domination, Habermas (1971) argues that the idea of reason is embedded
in the very "structures" which make communication possible. Habermas
believes, an investigation of those structures will reveal the norma-
tive principles of speech and language which contain an image of social
life and organization free of distortions.
The first set of theoretical proposition Habermas (1970) develops,
concerns the structural conditions required for "normal" communication
to occur. He states:
Ca) In the case of a non-deformed language game there is a
congruency on all three levels of communication. Linguistic
expressions. . .do not contradict one another. .. Intended con-
tradictions which have some informational content, are normal
in this sense.
Cb) Normal communication conforms to inter-subjectively recog-
nized rules; it is public.
(c) In the case of normal speech the speakers are aware of
the categorical difference between subject and object.
Cd) In normal communication an inter-subjectivity of mutual
understanding. . .develops and is maintained in the relation
between individuals who acknowledge one another.
(e) Finally, normal speech is distinguished by the fact that
the sense of substance and causality. . .is differentiated ac-
cording to whether these categories are applied to the objects
within a world or to the linguistically constituted world it-
self, which allows for the mutuality of speaking subjects
(pp. 352-55).
In "normal", communication, Habermas (1970) presupposes that the
'ideal' speaker has mastered the linguistic rules necessary for the
production of "speech acts"; and that he can maintain the interpersonal
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(inter-subjective) context in which language communication is possible
(see McCarthy, 1973, p. 473).
It is from the above theoretical propositions that Habermas ad-
vances his framework for a theory of communicative competence. Breifly
stated, Habermas posits that social reality is constituted by "speech
acts" which involve the testing of truth claims which are then accepted
or rejected by the participants in communication. It is assumed that
the communicative process rests on a background consensus of shared
intersubjective meanings. The consensus is grounded on the mutual re-
cognition of various kinds of validity claims which are implied in all
speech acts (see Connerton, 1976, p. 31). As such, communicative in-
teraction includes the possibility of questioning the truth claims ad-
vanced by others. When a claim becomes problematic the background con-
sensus is questioned and the claim now requires justification through
discourse. Through this process misunderstandings are clarified and
full-scale metalevel discourse becomes possible. Such 'discourses' are
theoretically possible only by assuming that the ideal speech situation
is possible, and each participant in the ideal speech situation is able
to engage in questioning and discourse. Consequently, each participant
recognizes the subjectivity of the other. Furthermore, the premise of
an ideal speech situation allows each participant to distinguish be-
tween systematic distortions of communication where the intersubjective
rules are being questioned and mere misunderstandings where consensus
is arrived at by the force of the better argument. For Habermas, then,
the structure of discourse is free from constraint:
only when for all participants there is an effective equality
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of chances to take part in the dialogue. Hence the require-
ments of the ideal speech situation are such that the condi-
tions for ideal discourse are connected with conditions for
an ideal form of social life (Connerton, 1976, pp. 31-32).
Concomitantly, for discourse to occur between participants each
subject must agree in advance on the meaning assigned to a symbol
(language). In this sense, communication is only a tool by which un-
derstanding is achieved.
Conversely, for Habermas, systematic distortions foreclose the
possibility of rational discourse in communication. The consequence of
such distortions for the participants (and in a broader sense, social
classes) is that intersubjective norms are broken and rational dis-
course is made impossible. The individual and/or social group who can-
not communicate rationally may be said to be dominated by unconscious
forces which foreclose the possibility of rational judgement. In sit-
uations of social repression and political domination, communication is
systematically distorted. It's subjective correlate is fal se conscious-
ness for both the dominator and the dominated. Authority and rule are
perpetuated by an acceptance of false claims to legitimacy. In con-
text, language becomes ideological in that it "not just distracts at-
tention away from real social relations:
...nor does it explain them away, nor does it ever directly
deny them. It structurally excludes them from thought
(Mepham, 1972, p. 15).
For Habermas, communication in the modern industrial capitalist
society is constituted by "instrumental action". That is, reality is
objectified and the relationship between participants in communication
is that of a subject to an object (see Wellmer, 1976, p. 248). Commun-
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icative behavior proceeds according to technical rules that are the
result of the development of science and technology. They are inte-
grated with the imperatives of an economic system that is founded on
inequality. Language is, in the modern capitalist society, transformed
and is used ideologically to legitimize and order social activity. For
Habermas, then, blockages to communication and discourse are located,
from this perspective in the very structure of communication itself.
Habermas' contribution to the understanding of how the structure
of language and speech inform or rather form social life is significant.
He has recognized how through the systematic distortion of communica-
tion, 'hegemony' and ideological consensus is maintained in the modern
capitalist society. Moreover, Habermas has shown how these blockages
in communication are structurally located not only in language itself,
but in the political realm (government and mass media) as well, and how
they are linked to and result in the "depoliticization" of the public.
Finally if Habermas' theory of communication is correct, the anticipa-
tion of a new form of social life must be prefigured or imagined in
the structure of speech itself.
Habermas' theory of communication in society represents the third
and final major conceptual framework employed in the formation and
elaboration of the thesis in the dissertation. We shall extend and
link Habermas' concept of "systematic distortions of communication"
in language and those generated and amplified by the electronic media.
The Electronic Media: Legitimation Functions
Fundamental to our way of life is the belief that when infor-
105
"'•^lu"i?i''^
properly belongs to the public is systematicall
v
Tf ftVr
P^"' become ig 0 anl
'
o thei own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them
and-eventually-incapable of determining their own destinies.
- Richard M. Nixon
Every activity and every product within capitalist society
participates in the world and in the logic of commodity The
very language that allows the meaning of any given activity
or product to be communicated to the public is the language
of the merchant, who is transformed into the custodian of all
language.
- Armand Mattel art
The electronic media channels of television and film are "techno-
cratic" mediums through which visual and linguistic messages are trans-
mitted. By technocratic, I mean that the electronic media's very struc-
ture and format is a complex organizational/bureaucratic/technical
system informed by the political economy of advanced capitalism.
Television and film are unique among communication systems. Un-
like personal experience and dialogue, the audience plays an essentially
passive role in relation to the messages being transmitted; that is,
the flow of messages are in one direction. The audience does not
participate in the event whether in the form of action or linguistic
interaction, notwithstanding the feedback from opinion surveys. The
audience cannot ask the television to clarify a statement, or to debate
a point, they are limited to taking what information is transmitted.
In doing so, television establishes the bounds within which discussion
can take place.
On another level, and in contrast to the printed media, the elec-
tronic media have significantly broadened the "iconic" element of
communication. As such, the media channels of television and film have
106
introduced, in the realm of communication, a new mass experience (see
Gouldner, 1976, pp. 168-170).
By assuming the social (entertainment) and political functions
previously performed by the printed media (newspapers) as well as the
myriad forms of literature and theatre, the electronic media also as-
sumes and expands their political-ideological functions to a mass
audience.
I have in the present chapter, already discussed the primary func-
tions of the media in capitalist society. These functions are to main-
tain and legitimize the 'hegemony' of ruling interest groups in society
Specifically, the media, argues Enzensberger (1974), serve:
to sell the existing order, to perpetuate the prevailing pat-
tern of man's domination of man Its main task is to ex-
pand and train our consciousness— in order to exploit it (p. 10).
A fundamental requirement, then, in order "to sell the existing
order," is to develop a consumer consciousness in the public. At a
deeper level, the effective control (indirect) of a populous demands
the conscious effort to manipulate their understanding of the social
world, so that they will collude unknowingly in their own victimiza-
tion. The manipulation and management of consciousness requires that
distortions concerning the nature of the social world, operate at the
level of everyday life. People must come to believe in and practice
daily the distortions that inform their lives. In this sense, the
media operate as conduits where distortions are intentionally manufac-
tured and disseminated for consumption by the public. As instruments
of domination which can structure social reality because they are
themselves structured, the media systems reproduce the social class
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structure (the nature of power relations) in unrecognizable forms. Th
electronic media, from this view, represent a form of "symbolic power".
Bourdieu (1977), defines "symbolic power" as being:
The power to constitute the given by stating it, to create ap-pearances and belief, to confirm or transform the vision ofthe world, and therefore the world itself, this quasi-magical
power which makes it possible to obtain the equivalent of what
is obtained by force (physical or economic) thanks to the
• specific mobilizing effect is only effective if it is recog-
nized as legitimate. This means that symbolic power doesTot
reside in symbolic systems' in the form of an ' illucutionary
force
, but that it is defined in and by a determinate rela-
tionship between those who exercise this power and those who
undergo it (p. 117, emphasis in the original).
Clearly, "symbolic power" is a subordinate form of power. It repre-
sents an unrecognizable and transformed form of ideological power that
attains legitimacy when people recognize it as legitimate. The elec-
tronic 'media' create and deliver to a mass audience the ideological
images and messages that constitute the substance of symbolic power.
I shall elaborate on this phenomena later in the discussion.
Though I have discussed the functions of the electronic media in
the modern capitalist society, I have not, however, shown how manipu-
lation and control occurs and is practiced via the media agency of
television in particular.
Manipulation Techniques
The presentation of social reality . Content Analysis studies of tele-
vision programming (entertainment, information and orientation) in the
United States conducted by Smythe (1954), Gentile and Miller (1961),
DeFleur (1964), and Gerbner and Gross (1976), indicate that the por-
trayal of occupational roles (especially in the case of working class
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portrayals); stereotyping of characters, according to their social
class, gender and ethnic backgrounds are grossly distorted and/or
underrepresented on television when compared to the actuality of real
life in society. As early as 1954, Smythe noted these tendencies in
television's portrayal of occupational roles: (1) persons in profes-
sional and managerial roles are generally "well dressed, socially
skilled and intelligent, but they also tended to be handsome" (p. 71),
(2) the occupations shown were stereotyped (e.g., nurses were cold and
impersonal, taxi and bus drivers were burly and aggressive), (3) the
portrayals were in atypical settings where, for example, a physician
is implicated in a socially unacceptable practice (abortion).
More recently, Gerbner and Gross (1976) have observed that "three-
fourths of all leading characters on prime-time networks are male,
mostly single, middle- and upper-class Americans in their 20s or 30s
(p. 44). Moreover, the researchers Gerbner and Gross (1976), report
that unlike the real world:
...where personalities are complex, motives unclear, and out-
comes ambiguous, television presents a world of clarity and
simplicity. In show after show, rewards and punishments
follow quickly and logically. Crises are resolved, problems
are solved, and justice, or at least authority, always tri-
umphs. The central characters in these dramas are clearly
identified: dedicated or corrupt; selfless or ambitious;
efficient or ineffectual (p. 44).
From this perspective, television entertainment presentations
depict the illusory workings of society. Programming that protray the
trials and tribulations of raising a family, crime and law-enforcement,
climbing the corporate ladder, etc., provides the audience with a dis-
torted experiential context with which they can vicariously identify.
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In doing so, the audiences are beguiled into accepting social values
disguised as truths concerning the nature of power, personal relation-
ships, justice, morality, in sum, the nature of the social world.
The distortion and omission of information . The influence of the media
lies not only from what is reported via the news, but more significant-
ly from what is not reported. Breed (1958) examined the functions of the
media in maintaining social order in America. He reports that the most
frequent items screened out of the press pertained to political and
economic issues. Specifically, Breed (1958) found that two-thirds of
the issues screened out by the press pertained to the undemocratic
exercise of power by business elites. He concludes "that 'power' and
'class' as structural strata are protected by media performance" (p.
114); and that cultural patterns (supportive of the values of capital-
ism, the nation, and religion) are also given protection by the media.
According to the polls, 31 percent of all Americans consider tele-
vision their exclusive source of news, and 50 percent their prime
source of news (Brown, 1976). If this estimate accurately reflects
the public's dependency on television for its primary source of infor-
mation concerning politics, world events, etc., then we can presume,
given the functions of the media, that the intensity and frequency of
omissions and distortions of information is highest in news broadcasts.
Studies and reports by Wax (1970), Johnson (1971), and Schiller (1973)
indicate the distortions and omissions of information that occur in
the news broadcast when political issues are presented. Bernstein and
Gordon (167), in their analysis of the press coverage of the "Bay of
no
Pigs" invasion, report that "the press decides for or against coopera-
tion with government not on any basis of principle, but on the basis
of the issue" (p. 141). The implication drawn here is that the media
do in fact take positions on issues. They are not merely vehicles for
the dissemination of information, they chose the issues for coverage,
adopt a position, and present it before the public. As such, the
media function as molders of opinion. Two significant reports by
Arlen (1969) and Chomsky (1978) show how the major media channels in
reporting the news throughout the Vietnam War seldom, if ever, strayed
from the system of state propaganda.
Recently, a group of communication researchers, based in Britain,
have begun to study systematically not only the content of news cover-
age, but also the role of the broadcaster (Hall, 1974); the types and
variation of news photo (Powell, 1972), and the determination of the
news photographs (Hall, 1972) in both the print and broadcasting media.
This field of communications of "cultural" study represents an attempt
to examine the production processes involved in creating the news. Al-
though still a nascent field of inquiry, the research conducted thus
far suggests that through the broadcaster's relationship to the power
structure in society, balance and definition of the political order is
maintained (see Hall, 1974); and that, in the case of news photographs
they articulate and underscore certain ideological themes (authority
and power) (see Hall , 1972).
Another aspect of the news broadcasts that distorts social reality
is the manner in which the news is presented. With the exception of
several lengthy news "specials", the news, suggests Robert MacNeil,
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is presented as a "blizzard of indigestible information", (see Withers-
Sa;<, 1978, p. 4). Television networks generally provide half-hour news
programs where in intervals of ten seconds critical events and issues
are presented and cancelled immediately after by the next story. Each
news story is brief, often little more than a headline-juxtaposed by
a series of commercials and pictures—that rather than critically in-
form the audience on important social issues, the news merely presents
to them the world as "the way it is". Consequently, the news events
pass by unexplained without a context or history. The world is made to
appear as discrete events. Concomitantly, pictures are used extensive-
ly by the networks when reporting the news. They keep the audience
there insists MacNeil: "They are boredom zappers to prevent anyone
from going away" CWither-Sax, 1978, p. 4). On another level, contends
Lermack (1978), the film clips, as Hall (1972) argues, contain their
own ideological message.
Thus, a film clip of the remains of an explosion may be set
in Beirut, in South Africa, or in a New York City airport...
to a viewer who sees this film,... the picture carries its
own partial message: the terrorists are at it again. Some
stations give additional visual cues by using standardized
symbols. A logotype of a clenched fist appears before
stories about terrorism (Lermack, 1978, p. 191).
The organization and content of the news, then, is not only dis-
torted, it is presented as a commodity. The networks, insists MacNeil,
show "a certain contempt for the audience and the feeling that the news
is just another commodity that can be shaped, manipulated, or abbrevi-
ated to suit whatever purpose" (Withers-Sax, 1978, p. 4).
The interventions of advertising . The rise of the advertising industry
112
- the past two decades indicate that not only is the corporate sector
concerned with reaching out to new markets, it is, in effect, creating
the. (see Hansen, 1976, pp. 183-84). Smythe (1977) estimates that in
1973, $25 billion was spent in the United States in advertising. This
fact alone is significant; it suggests that the maintenance of a "con-
sumer consciousness" in society is largely dependent on a tremendous
investment of capital in advertising. Our concern, however, is not
the expenditure of capital in advertising, but rather how advertising
influences and manipulates the consciousness of the public. Gossage
(1961) contends that advertising:
...is a brand-new instrument, unique to our age, but at thesame time It plays mankind's oldest themes. . .In an advertise-ment s effort to persuade people of the justice of fts caise...n invariably seeks a common denominator. The more people
mL! i^^"'? i° persuade, the more common the denominator, themore basic the appeal will be. When. ..the product advertised
IS virtually identical with its competitors the appeals
become so basic that they slide away from fact as we know it.
ihey go beyond reason into something even more basic the
most common denominator of all, magic (p. 38).
The appeal of advertising-its "magic"-is that it sells hope. It
creates a need in the individual and then supplies the commodity (the
magic) to fulfill the need. Krugman (1965) suggests that advertising
via repetition transfers information concerning a product from short-
term to long-term memory, and, in doing so, alters the structure of our
perception of a brand or product. The objective of the manufacturers
of the product are obviously to sell their products and to develop
a loyalty in consumers for their brands. On a deeper level, however,
Ewen (1976) has shown how the advertising industry developed during the
early years of this century in order to generate a new and different
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kind of value system; a value system that would change habits in accor-
dance with the demands of American capitalism.
In context, Williams (1975) has observed that:
The sponsorship of programs by advertisers has an effect be-
yond the separable announcement and recommendation of a brand
name. It is, as a formula of communication, an intrinsic set-
ting of priorities: a partisan indication of real social
sources. . .Again, to see international news brought by courtesy
of a toothpaste, is not to see separable elements, but the
shape of a dominant cultural form (pp. 68-9).
As an element of a specific cultural form in society (American),
the advertisements on television: (1) are presented as rapidly drama-
tized events in which pain, beauty or pleasure are negated (pain) or
enhanced (beauty) by a specific brand product, (2) employ the enter-
tainment techniques of singing and dancing suitable for the promotion
of the product, (3) insert the product within picture-sequences of
sports and travel, and (4) use well-known actors and athletes shown
consuming or using the products advertised (see Williams, 1975, p. 69).
The importance of the above forms of advertising are that they
render further evidence of the character of the consumer culture, in
which needs are "satisfied" or displaced in the consumption of com-
modities. The product and its consumptions become, from this ideolo-
gical framework, the "substance" of life, and all social activity is
organized according to its requirements.
Language and message format . Language is used on television essential-
ly for pragmatic ends: to impress, cajole, misinform, request--all of
which are informed by underlying ideological and commercial motiva-
tions. The distortion of language meaning are manifest in the promo-
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tion of new products. Advertisers will often employ nonsensical neo-
logisms in commercials to convey the impression of novelty in their
products. The product is presented as "better" as "scientific" tests
have shown. A new deodorant is referred to as "microencapsulated", or
a new medication has a "special" or "improved" ingredient to relieve
the discomforts and misery due to colds or indigestion.
When speakers appear as representatives for organizations, corpor-
ations or political groups, a certain "prepackaged" language is usually
employed. The style and jargon (technical) used in the presentations
convey a certain public relations image. In fact, it is widely recog-
nized that most politicians employ public relations experts to develop
their style of communication especially for the broadcast media. The
audience is affected by the use of this standardized language format.
They begin to associate the language with the political group or organ-
ization represented rather than with the individual representative.
The formats within which language is used on television become,
especially in political affairs, highly ritualistic, defining the para-
meters through which communication occurs. Whenever social conflicts
occur, as in the case of the Vietnam war, the major media channels, in
order to obscure and distort the facts, often adopted the technical
language prescribed and used by the propaganda apparatus of the Ameri-
can government. A new vocabulary (metaphors) emerged on the scene
to describe and define the actions and policies of the government. For
example, the term "vietnamization" was employed to mask the reality of
concentration camps; "strategic bombing" veiled the indiscriminate
slaughter conducted against the civilian population in both zones of
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Vietnam; and the term "deterrence" was subtlely used to soften the real-
ity of offensive operations against neutral neighboring countries
(Cambodia). The distortive uses of language, then, via the electronic
media constitute an elemental feature of manipulation as both techni-
que and policy.
Summary
I have attempted to show in this chapter that the content, form
and structure of the electronic media are organized essentially to
manipulate the consciousness of the public; to inculcate in them, a set
of beliefs, values and myths that affirm at the level of daily life the
social order in American society. Schiller (1973) contends that five
myths structure the content of the American media complex. They are:
(1) the myth of individualism and personal choice, (2) the myth of the
non-existence of manipulation, (3) the myth of the unchanging nature of
human behavior, (4) the myth of the absence of social conflict in
society, and (5) the myth of media pluralism (see pp. 8-24). Together
with the manipulation techniques described earlier, and the myths list-
ed above by Schiller (1973), the shaping or "packaging" of conscious-
ness occurs. As such, Lazarsfeld and Merton (1948) correctly contend
that:
these media not only continue to affirm the status quo but, in
the same measure, they fail to raise essential questions about
the structure of society. Hence, by leading toward conformism
and by providing little basis for a critical appraisal of so-
ciety, the commercially sponsored mass media indirectly but
effectively restrain the cogent development of a genuinely
critical outlook (p. 103, emphasis in the original).
The relationship between the electronic media and the "control
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culture" is a symbiotic relationship upon which a host of sub-markets
(entertainment, advertising, sports) exist parasitically. The "con-
trol culture" defines the substance of social life (activity) and the
media function as legitimization agents and reproducers of that life
in the production of both the images required to maintain a consumer
consciousness and the audience necessary to practice a consumership
existence. In context, Robert MacNeil argues that: "Television is no
longer in the business of providing information, but of delivering to
its advertisers the audience at the cheapest per thousand" (Withers-
Sax, 1978, p. 4). Smythe (1977), in general agreement with MacNeil,
extends the analysis of media functions in capitalist society a step
further. He contends that:
The prime purpose of the mass media complex is to produce
people in audiences who work at learning the theory and prac-
tice of consumership of civilian goods... The second principal
purpose is to produce audiences whose theory and practice
confirms the ideology of monopoly capital i sm. . .The third
principal purpose is to produce public opinion supportive of
the strategic and tactical policies of the state... the fourth
purpose of the mass media complex is to operate itself so
profitably as to ensure unrivalled respect for its economic
importance in the system (p. 64).
Within this pol itical -economic framework, the electronic media
generate and amplify communicative distortions extant in the social
world. The elemental features of manipulation, at work in this pro-
cess, requires repetitiveness, technical precision, and a one-
dimensional ized representation of social life; and, more importantly,
ubiquity if media are to effect and control for mass behavior.
Though I agree with Smythe' s (1977) analysis of the media func-
tions in capitalist society, I shall argue in the next chapter, that a
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fifth function must be included in his framework. The electronic
media, particularly television, fifth's principal purpose is to main-
tain the racial division extant in American society, and in doing so,
legitimize the socio-racial structure of the American social order.
CHAPTER V
THE HISTORICAL FORMATION AND ELABORATION OF
RACIAL STEREOTYPES IN FILM AND TELEVISION
American moviemakers did not invent the world, nor even the
version of world history they present in their films How-
ever, they must be given full credit for developing a highly
successful and satisfying cinematic form to encapsulate an
existing ideological message. With this form, they have been
able to relegate the great horrors of Western expansion into
the rest of the world, and present-day American hegemony over
great hunks of it, another universe of pleasure and enjoyment.
They have successfully tied extermination of non-white peoples
to laughable relief, and white racial superiority to the na-
tural order of things. They have destroyed any possibility
for explaining the various ways in which non-white (not to
speak of white) people could resist invasion, colonization,
exploitation, and even mass slaughter.
- Tom Engelhardt
The history of blacks in film and television is a social commen-
tary on American attitudes toward blacks; more importantly, it is at
once both a revealing statement of the nature and of the structure of
race relations in the American social order. The stereotypical images
of blacks in film emerged well before motion pictures became a form of
mass entertainment in the United States (Cripps, 1977). During the
period of slavery, blacks were commonly caricatured in the printed
media, especially in the South, as "sambos" who had little, if any,
intelligence of their own. Starke (1971), in tracing the development
of black portraiture in American fiction, points out that:
Supported by the myth of white superiority and black inferior-
ity, authors could, without compunction, depict blacks as
accomodative chattels in our literature ( p. 30),
In keeping with the Southern literary tradition, the theatrical,
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ministrel and vaudeville shows greatly contributed to the perpetuation
of black stereotypes. The ministrel shows, in particular, specialized
in characterizing black plantation life in the Old South where white
performers appeared with blackened faces; and behaved according to the
stereotype of the happy-go-lucky, singing and dancing childlike "nig-
ger" CGunther, 1973).
Leab C1976) has observed that well before the Civil War, the li-
terary and theatrical traditions established in the South:
...succeeded in fixing the black man in the American conscious-
ness as a ludicrous figure supposedly born, as one show busi-
ness history puts it, 'hoofing on the levee to the strumming
of banjos'. He was prone to frenzied dancing, shiftlessness
,
garish dress, gin tippling, dice shooting, torturing the lan-
guage, and inevitably, was addicted to watermelon and chicken,
usually stolen (p. 8).
It is within the American literary and theatrical traditions, then
that the expression of black stereotypes was formed, long before the
motion picture emerged as a new form of mass communication in society.
The distorted images of blacks in both literature and theatre, and
later in film, were not the demented creation of a handful of writers
and artists; they reveal, at a deeper cultural level, the dominant
racial attitudes and beliefs of most whites in American society at the
time. In this sense, the stereotypic characterizations of blacks,
reflected then as they do now, the dominant racial group's ordering of
society's members in its own mind.
The history of blacks in film and television can be divided into
six historical (including the present) periods.
The pre-World War I period . Films that featured black characters dur-
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ing this period invariably fell into one of two categories: the slap-
stick variety type that portrayed blacks as buffoons or idiots; or
"the sentimental melodrama full of laughing, hymn-singing slaves toil-
ing contently for their benevolent masters" (Polski and Marr, 1976, p.
893). Racial labels, during this period, abounded throughout the mass
media. The black character was in most film productions played by
whites in blackface as woolly-headed, thick-lipped, and dark-skinned
(see Cripps, 1977). Leab (1976) suggests that white actors were cast
in blackface in order to serve 'the psychological function of reducing
audience anxieties that might occur of real Negroes were used, espec-
ially in scenes of overt and covert sexual nature or when the Negro
gets the upper hand over the white man' (p. 11).
Among the hundreds of films produced between 1895 and 1919, a num-
ber of cinematic productions to emerge where blacks were portrayed in
an especially demeaning manner were: The Wooing and Wedding of a Coon
(1905), The Slave (1909), and Sambo Series (1909-1911), the Rastus
Series (circa 1910), For Massa's Sake (1911), the Octoroon (1913),
Coon Town Suffragettes (1914).
Another notable film to emerge during this period was based on
Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel. Uncle Tom's Cabin . First produced in
1909, Uncle Tom's Cabin was the longest and most expensive American
film produced until that time. For over a quarter century, the thea-
trical production of Uncle Tom's Cabin was dominated by white actors
even though Uncle Tom himself was a black character. In two out of
the nine film versions of Uncle Tom's Cabin, black actors were chosen
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for the title role. The most significant fault, however, with the
film version of Uncle Tom's Cabin is that it seriously distorted the
abolitionist intent of the novel into a sentimental tale about slaves
who know "their place". Uncle Tom was consistently portrayed as a
good-natured, dull-witted slave.
The most pernicious and degrading portrayal of blacks, however, to
emerge in film during this period (1895-1919) was D.W. Griffith's
Birth of a Nation .^ Released in 1915, Birth of a Nation is a polemical
defense of the "Old South" where the belles remain "pure" and the gen-
tlemen gallant. Conversely, the blacks are portrayed a half-step up
from animals; some trainable while others savage and corrupt. The son
of a Brigadier General in the Confederate Army, Griffith presents in
his film, an incredibly idealized and mythologized drama of the strug-
gle of an elegant civilization (the South) against the brute force and
ignorance of a corrupted and contaminated society (the North). The
film concerns itself with the conflict between the states during the
Civil War and the period immediately thereafter--Reconstruction.
From the opening scenes, the film reveals the status of the
Southern aristocracy; a status maintained by the slave system. The
wealthy Southern aristocrats, paradigms of culture and delicacy, idly
watch as the black slaves work. The aristocrats never question their
superiority, or their right to trade and own other human beings; in-
justice is ignored and the concept of a ruling class is tacitly af-
firmed.
Blacks, on the other hand, in the Birth of a Nation are charac-
terized as clowns, villains or loyal servants. The plantation blacks
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entertain the Southern aristocracy and rejoice when the confederate
troops march off to war, or the blacks from the North are depicted as
invaders and plunderers of the South. No mention is ever made in the
film of the blacks who escaped from their masters and the plantation
system. Those characters who are cast in the film as villains are
either Black, mulattoe, or white (from the North). The Ku Klux Klan
is glorified as the savior of the Southern way of life.
The two Swedish film critics, Furhammar and Isaksson (1971), have
observed in their review of the Birth of a Nation that:
The most curious aspect of the film,... is on a personal,
psychological level: the hatred, the story of blacks and
whites in black-and-white terms. The whites have noble
souls; they come from touching family groups; the horrors
of war have a purifying effect on them; they die with com-
posure. The blacks are undignified; they roll their eyes
and jump about like devishes--detestable creatures who
need to be crushed. Worst of all in the half-breed,
Silas Lynch, The crime of the rest is that they have set
themselves up against the white power structure, but Lynch
represents something much more serious to Griffith; he
stands for good corrupted by evil, a man of impure blood.
Of all the blacks in the Birth of a Nation , who include the
faithful, sobbing servants, he is the only one credited with
any intelligence, but it is destructive, murderous, insane
(p. 202).
On another level, the Birth of a Nation finds tragedy only in war
when war brings loss to the Southern aristocracy. The film, in this
sense, is a statement of fear: the fear of retaliation. The threat
that "we shall crush the white South under the heel of the black
South". Consequently the Ku Klux Klan are depicted as morally justi-
fied in their actions when they commit murder against blacks in the
film.
The Birth of a Nation presents a myth of the South where race and
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social class inequality are accepted as the natural order. The signi-
ficance of the film, however, is that it established firmly the range
of black stereotypes that would influence and determine, for the next
two decades, the black image in film (see Leab, p. 37-9).
While the film industry consistently portrayed blacks as childlike
and loyal servants or brutal villains during this period, several tal-
ented black actors and film makers attempted to produce and distribute
their own films. In 1915, Noble Johnson established a film company
and produced, among other films. Trooper for Troop K , the first black
western. Oscar Micheaux, wrote, produced, and directed over forty fea-
ture films between 1918 and 1948. Producing films for black audiences,
these black film makers were forced to operate largely underground, and
were consistently plagued by problems of distribution, publicity, and
financing (see Cripps, 1977, p. 5).
In summary, the films produced between 1895 and 1919 sharpened the
distinctions between the black and white experience and yet excluded
black actors almost entirely from the screen. The characterizations
of blacks in film were largely drawn from the Southern stereotypes "of
the wretched freeman, the comic Negro, the black brute, the tragic
mulatto, in keeping with literary and theatrical tradition" (Cripps,
g
1977, p. 8). Whether played by a black or white actor, the black
image, insists Leab (1976), was always presented "as a composite of
qualities that were the opposite of the values treasured by white
American society" (p. 20).
The 1920' s. During this era, the motion picture industry was fast
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becoming America's major mode of entertainment. Little recognition was
accorded to the fact that the cinema was "not only entertainment but an
enormous propaganda machine that inordinately influenced the thinking
and the behavior of its audiences" (Ploski and Marr, 1976, p. 893).
Unlike in the pre-World War I period, blacks were increasingly cast,
during this period, to depict black characters. Moreover, unlike in
the previous era, where blacks were stereotyped according to the images
created in the Southern literary and theatrical traditions, during the
20's the image of blacks crystallized into a new form— comedy. Two
distinct character types are exemplified in this new genre (comedy) of
films— the "Darkies" and the "Dummies". Ploski and Marr (1976) contend
that the earliest portrayal of the new black stereotype of the "dum-
mies" type is found in a film directed by Griffith. "In 1922 with
D.W. Griffith's One Exciting Night , a type had been born: the black
as a blubbering, superstitious coward whose hair turned white at the
approach of even the mildest form of danger" (p. 893).
The "dummy" was usually played by a slight, 'saucer-eyed' black,
who was cast in the role of a night watchman or porter. When afraid
his teeth would chatter and his knees would knock; and he would scream-
out 'feet-don' t-fail-me-now' . The "darkie", on the other hand, was
cast usually as a comedian whose ambition was to teach Shirley Temple
how to sing and dance.
The other two genres of black films to emerge during the 20 's were
the "jungle" movies where blacks were portrayed as cannibal istic savages
in "darkest Africa" (see Cripps, 1977, p. 23); and in the "our Gang"
comedy series where black children ("Farina, "Buckwheat" and "Stymie")
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were cast playing with other white children. The humor achieved in the
"Our Gang" series was frequently at the expense of the black children.
Moreover, the power relationship between the black and white children
was always explicitly in favor of the white children.
One film featuring an all black cast was produced in Hollywood
during this period: Hearts in Dixie in 1929. An all black cast not-
withstanding, the film relied largely on the familiar Hollywood cliches
and stereotypes of blacks. In Hearts in Dixie , the film lacked a plot,
the movie suggests Ploski and Marr (1976) "was merely a succession of
'darkies' picking cotton, praying and getting together to sing spirit-
uals" Cp. 894). Throughout the 20's then, the black image in films
produced by Hollywood consistently failed to depict realistically, life
among black Americans. The black characters were portrayed largely
according to a white fantasy of black life and culture. Such charac-
terizations were far from harmless, they reinforced the image that many
white Americans still have of blacks today.
The 30'
s
. With the advent of sound in motion pictures, the 1930's (the
Depression) represents an era of commercial exploitation of blacks.
Countless Hollywood musicals were produced during this period that em-
ployed black singers, dancers, and musicians. Cab Cal loway, Lena Home,
Louis Armstrong, among others became box-office names. These black
performers were cast in Hollywood films that subtlely reinforced an-
other old myth; the myth of the "rhythm man" which found "its most
demeaning expression in the grinning, shuffling, eye-rolling antics of
Stepin Fetchit, Mantan Moreland and Sleep 'n' Eat, among others"
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(Ploski and Marr, 1976, p. 894).
With the exception of several film productions in which Paul
Robeson starred (The Emperor Jones and Borderline ), the portrayal" of




. The new liberalism of the war years, contend Ploski and Marr
(1976), "with its concern for morale at home and its support of the
country's fighting men of all colors, had a corrective influence on the
black's film image" (P- 894). The image of blacks shifted from the
"Stepin Fetchit" characterizations to the earnest and skillful "Negro".
Documentary films of the early 1940's showed blacks at work ( Henry
Brown , Farmer ; A Place to Live ) , or in the armed services. Blacks
appeared in Of Mice and Men and Strange Incident as responsible citi-
zens and, in several films, as semi-heroic figures (Bataan ; Sahara ;
and Lifeboat ) . Though the stereotyping of blacks persisted in many
Hollywood produced films, the demands of the war required that unity
at home be maintained. Consequently government propaganda attempts
were made, especially via the use of documentary films, to change the
image of blacks in film. Change in the appearance and not the sub-
stance of stereotypical images of blacks in film was also partly
achieved by the protests of the black and liberal press, and by the
NAACP and the International Film and Radio Guild (see Cripps, 1977).
The 50 's and 60'
s
. The 50 's is a significant period in the history of
blacks in film. The blatantly negative stereotypes of the scatter-
brained servant, foot-shuffling janitor, and crazed savage or brute
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were gradually supplanted by new characterizations of blacks. Black
characters who did not sing, dance, or clown, now appeared on the film
screens. The "new" image that emerged during this period was that of
the educated, sophisticated and articulate black. Embodied in the
person of Sidney Poitier in such films as No Way Out (1950), Cry the
Beloved Country C1952), and Something of Value (1957), a distinctly
different image of blacks was introduced to the American audience.
Themes that were taboo a decade earlier were now subjects for cinematic
presentation. For example. Island in the Sun (1957), Night of the
Quarter Moon (1959) and The World, the Flesh and the Devil (1959)
dealt with interracial love, while The Decks Ran Red (1958) and
Tamango were concerned with the slave trade.
While displacing the old stereotypes of blacks, most Hollywood
films produced during the 50' s, created a new one: "the sober, somber,
slightly uptight, superhumanly noble, and dignified Christian Black
man ready to sacrifice his cultural past and himself for the white
world" (Bogle, 1974, p. 324). In describing Sidney Poitier's cinema-
tic roles during the 50's and 60's, Bogle (1974) contends that:
His characters, while realistically acted, were white liberal
fantasy creations. . .They were sexless, humorless, non-aggres-
sive, non-assertive, non-funky, content to help nuns build a
chapel... or to guide a young blind white girl to maturity
(p. 324).
During the 60' s, the pressure of social change via the civil
rights movement, and the recognition by Hollywood of the buying power
of black audience caused the film industry to introduce a plethora of
films dealing with a broad range of black themes. Sidney Poitier, with
the exception of A Raisin in the Sun , was again consistently cast.
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during this period, as the articulate super-educated "Negro" in film
after film. In one of Poitier's more notorious roles
( Guess Who's
Coming to Dinner), he was cast as a "super" black. The film critic,
Wilfred Sheed (1968), in his review of the film points out that:
He (Poitier) is not your average second-string tackle from
Grambling College, but a doctor of world significance, a
big wheel in the World Health Organization, a Ph.D. summa
cum laude avec palme and an awfully nice chap on the side
Ip7 224, emphasis in the original).
Cognizant of the criticsm he was receiving from both white and
black critics, Poitier replied in an interview that:
...if the fabric of the society were different I would scream
to high heaven... to deal with different images of Negro life
that would be more dimensional. But I'll be damned if I do
that at this stage of the game. Not when there is only one
Negro actor working in films with any degree of consistency,
where there are thousands of actors in films (Leab, 1975,
p. 231).
The significance of Poitier's reply to his critics is that he links
the roles he has performed in film with not only the film industry, but
more importantly with the "fabric of the society". The implication
here is that the film industry creates images of blacks that are con-
sistent with the culture and social order of American society. We will
return to this point later in the discussion.
With the exception of a handful to progressive films ( One Potato ,
Two Potato ; The Dutchman ; and Nothing But a Man ) produced in the 60' s,
the majority of Hollywood films distributed during this period, liberal
intentions notwithstanding, elaborated on the stereotypes of blacks
developed during the 50' s. In what appeared to be an effort by liberal
directors and producers to depict blacks as "respectable" human beings,
they created an image as one-dimensional and demeaning as the earlier
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stereotypes conveyed. This "new" image implied that it was the black
man's similarity to white bourgeois culture and society that qualified
him for membership in the human race.
Concomitantly, the portrayal of blacks in television during the
1950's was to a large extent influenced in Hollywood (Fife, 1974).
Black entertainers were featured on the Ed Sullivan, Arthur Godfrey,
and Milton Berle shows; and in 1950, one sitcom show (Beulah) was aired
weekly on television. In 1953, the infamous Amos and Andy show was
aired, and in 1956 Nat King Cole established his own show on NBC. With
these few exceptions, the black presence on television was negligible
Fife C1974), contends that the audience--the black audience in parti-
cular:
Had to be content with watching Rochester take care of
'Mr. Benny", or an occasional special like "Green Pastures',
or someone's maid doing a walk-on bit. Other than such rare
roles, their TV screens remained white (p. 11).
Beginning in 1963, however, blacks were featured in three regular
weekly television shows. Ossie Davis was hired as a regular performer
in Car 54, Where Are You . In 1965, I Spy was televised starring Bill
Cosby and Robert Culp, and in 1968, Diahann Carroll starred in Jul ia .
Though only a handful of black performers appeared regularly in situa-
tion comedies and dramatic series, a break from tradition had been
achieved. Black performers could now be seen on television networks
regularly. Despite the increased presence of blacks on television,
their portrayals were always defined by white script writers, directors
and producers.
In her analysis of the situation comedy Julia , Fife (1974), observ-
130
ed that:
Ju^ia showed a somewhat fictionalized set of lives Here was
a woman with a highly accepted job, a great wardrobe, and un-
common good looks, following a happy, pleasant life in middle-
class, integrated America (p. 13).
Even in I Spy . Bill Cosby, as the black character in the series,
seldom was confronted by racial issues, nor was his character as a
black man very seriously developed. The script writers were, however,
careful to define the power relationship between Cosby and his white
counterpart Robert Culp. Moreover, in the portrayal of sex scenes,
'
Cosby never seemed to appeal to Caucasian or Asian women. 1
As a consequence largely of the Civil Rights movement, the tele- '
vision networks during the 60' s, like the movie industry, televised
blacks in a variety of different roles. The networks were, however,
\
reluctant to introduce substantially more and better programming in
accordance with blacks' demands at the time. The networks claimed
that they could not present black programs that deviated from the
|
"tradition" developed during the '50's because it would antagonize
I
their advertisers, and, therefore, jeopardize their major source of '
revenues Csee Fife, 1974).
'
Clearly the image of blacks in film and television changed during
the sixties. The changes were, however, cosmetic. Blacks were being
accepted as "Negroes", not as human beings, and the new stereotypes
that emerged during this period in film and television reflect merely
a change in image rather than a recognition of blacks as people.
The 70'
s
. The release of several Hollywood produced films in the late
1960's OOP Rifles, Rio Conchos ) herald the new wave of "Blaxploita-
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tion" films. The film industry anxious to produce films for a huge
black audience, released countless motion pictures depicting blacks as
superheroes, studs, drug dealers, pimps, etc. Black audiences suggest
Bogle C1979), appeared, at first, to be eager to see themselves pro-
jected on the screen as supermen.
At the start of the 70' s, I suppose all of us were dazzled
and giddy simply because of the idea of a Black film. Whether
it be... Shaft (1971), Super Fly (1972). ..or the latest Jim
Brown or Fred Williamson opus, never before in our history
had we been able to run out to the local movie house and see
a batch of Black heroes up there on the silver screen. Be-
cause the movies touched on the fundamental dissatisfaction
of a dispossessed people... the features offered a delirious
promise, that of 'positive' Black political statements/images
(p. 16).
While financially providing huge revenues for Hollywood, the
"Blaxploitation" films played on the "needs of. black audiences for
heroic images without answering those needs in realistic terms"
(Bogle, 1979, p. 16). These new black films have, however, drawn
criticism from many black performers and political leaders. As early
as 1973, 400 concerned black artists met in Hollywood to discuss the
black image in films. As a consequence of their meeting an organiza-
tion was formed--the Coalition Against Blaxploitation. Critics of
the "Blaxploitation" films argue that the images they project are as
demeaning as the images of the past and that by supplanting the old
Stepin Fetchit stereotype with that of the "Super Nigger", the film
industry is perpetuating a form of "cultural genocide" against blacks.
Despite the array of films that portray blacks as superheroes,
several "quality" pictures appeared in the early 70"s: Sounder (1972),
Buck and the Preacher (1972), Black Girl (1973) and Lady Sings the
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Blues 0972). Recently the tone of black films suggests Bogle (1979),
has changed:
...becoming lighter, less politicized, more playful. Fewer
'
action movies were made. Then Black humor was ushered firm-
ly back into vogue with a trio of films starring Sidney
Poitier. . .and Bill Cosby: Uptown Saturday Night (1974)
>
Let's Do It Again (1975), A Piece of the Action (1975).
More recently, Richard Pryor starred in the comedies Greased
Lightning (1977) and Which Way Is Up (1977). The black film historian
and critic, Noble (1979), suggests that with the Poitier comedies and
the Pryor films the genre of black humor has "returned to the screen,
a humor not too different from that of Stepin Fetchit or Mantan
Moreland" (p. 19). If Noble's assessment of the new black films ap-
pearing today on the screen is correct, then, the history of blacks in
Hollywood films has taken a full circle back to the period of the 20's
and 30' s where blacks appeared in films as foot-shuffling buffoons.
Evidence for Bogle's thesis is also rendered in television fare. The
comedy shows of Sanford and Son , Good Times and The Jeffersons clearly
play on the stereotype of the happy-go-lucky, mild-mannered, black.
Consistently, both film and television, with very few exceptions (e.g.,
several sequences of Roots I ) , have failed to portray blacks as complex
breathing, living human beings.
Of course stereotyping is the dominant mode of presenting all
characters on television (regardless of race) however, we would argue
that stereotypical representations of racial minorities have a differ-
ent impact than stereotypical representations of racial majorities.
As many whites lack substantial contact with blacks in their daily
lives, the blacks whom they meet on television are representative
of
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all black people. On the other hand, daily interaction with other
whites presents the white viewer with a contrast to the stereotypical
images of television.
The fact that the black image in American film and television has
been persistently distorted throughout the history of both media in-
dustries, poses several questions. Why have blacks (and other racial
groups) consistently been stereotyped, variations in image notwith-
standing, in the media channels of film and television? Are the images
of blacks intentionally created? If so, why? Are these images the
creations of a few racist screen writers, or are they the cultural
expression of a dominant racial group's conception of blacks? Or are
they the devisive manipulations of a ruling political order bent on
maintaining the racial divisions and structure in the American social
order? If the answer to the last question is yes, then, intention im-
plies that conspiracy informs the use and the manipulation of the mass
media in America.
Discussion
In recent years, the major broadcasting networks, under sustained
pressure from Civil Rights groups, have increased the number and fre-
quency of blacks appearing on television. I suggest, however, that the
networks recognition of and interest in the black audience was largely
motivated by three significant factors: (1) the intensification of
rivalries between the networks competing for old and new audiences,
C2) the interest of the corporate sector eager to exploit a hitherto
ignored and underdeveloped "Negro" market estimated in 1967 to be worth
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$32 billion (see Evans, 1967), and (3) the increasing concern of the
political order for the legitimization and maintenance of its authority
over potentially rebellious racial groups in society.
As a consequence of the above factors, black characterizations
alleged to be representative of the black experience, can be viewed
daily on television. As we have discussed earlier racial and ethnic
entertainment programming (e.g.. Good Times , Sanford and Son , All in
the Family ) , relies largely on the presentation and expression of
stereotypes.
Gordon All port (1961) has defined stereotype as a generalization
concerning a category. The category of concern is that of racial
heritage. The generalization concerns the attribution of particular
personality and physical traits, and cognitive aptitudes as character-
istic of blacks. The category itself is definitionally "neutral"
(e.g., Hispanic, Native American, Japanese, etc.), however, as gener-
alizations become attached to the categories as labels, the distinction
between generalization and category erode. ^ The group (black) as well
as the individuals within the group become totalistically defined as
the generalized labels. The "power" of stereotype rests precisely
on this process of "objectification"
.
Labels ascribed to the group become the framework from which cog-
nitive and emotive decision networks (attitudes and beliefs) develop.
These processes act as ideological filters, thereby predefining the
nature of the possible interactions between members of different racial
and social groups. This ideological screen effectively distances the
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individuals and groups from each other in such a way as to confirm the
social group to which he is a member of, become reduced to objects
as defined by the generalization-category matrix. As such, the ster-
eotype rather than reality govern what people see. This process is
inherently an act of violence against the integrity of the individual
and the group of which he is a member.
We have seen that film and television have persistently stereo-
typed blacks, and that the images projected of blacks, in the two
electronic media, have been both distortive and demeaning.
Recently, criticism has increased, in regard to how blacks are
depicted in situation comedies on television (see U.S. Commission on
Civil Rights, 1979, pp. 2-4). Critics argue that blacks are almost
always cast in situation comedies as pathetic and absurd characters.
Morrow (1978) recently observed that the male characters in every 1978
black situation comedy were portrayed in one or another black stereo-
type:
Here we have George Jefferson: entrepreneur, black bigot, a
splenetic whip of a man who bullies like a demented overseer,
seldom speaks below a shriek and worships at the church of
ostentation. . .or consider the character J.J. on TV's Good
Times : a bug-eye young comic of the ghetto with spasms of
supercool blowing through his nervous system, a kind of
Electra-Glide strut. "Dyno-mite!" goes J.J., to convulse
the audience in the way that something like "Feets, do your
stuff! " got to them three decades ago. Then there is the
character Ray Ellis in Baby, I'm Back : a feckless black
creep who deserted his wife and two children seven years
ago, one step ahead of his bookie's enforcers, and has now
reappeared to make excuses and bedroom eyes at his wife.
Ellis and the show's writers make much merriment at the
expense of the sober, straight career Army officer court-
ing the wife; obviously, he is a turkey (p. 101).
In the fall 1977 season of Good Times , a particularly disturbing
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sequence of the show was aired on television. Under the guise of
humor, a mother was portrayed abandoning her children. An essay in
Time magazine concerning the image of blacks on television states vis
a vis this particular sequence that:
It was a strange and destructive message that Good Times sent
out when its producers eliminated not only the family ' s "strong
if frustrated, father (John Amos) but also, later, its mother
(Esther Rolle), who abandoned her three children in their
Chicago housing project to move to Arizona to be with her new
man. Says Rolle, who quit the show because of her differences
with the producers over the way the characters were portrayed:
"It was an outrage, an insult" (pp. 101-2).
Concomitantly, situation comedies ostensibly for white audiences
have been found to perpetuate and legitimize racial prejudice. Vidmar
and Rokeach (1974), in their study of All in the Family , report that
in the character of Archie Bunker, a conservative, superpatriotic
working-class American, racial and ethnic prejudice is being reinforced
rather than reduced in viewers. The researchers report that some
viewers, applaud Archie Bunker "for his racist viewpoint, while others
applaud the show for making fun of bigotry" (p. 37). Moreover, many
of the viewers studied "saw nothing wrong with Archie's use of racial
slurs" (p. 42). Vidmar and Rokeach' s (1974) findings support the
critics who argue that All in the Family encourages bigots to ration-
alize their own prejudices.
Occasionally, blacks are cast in serious roles dealing with sub-
stantive themes (e.g., Roots ). These dramatic presentations are,
however, scarce. The reason, suggests Barnouw (1978), for why serious
dramas on blacks or other non-white racial groups appear infrequently
on television is because the network producers are concerned with
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"entertainment" rather than deeply provoking and controversial sub-
jects. Moreover, Barnouw (1978), contends that such dramatic programs
do not, from the broadcasters view, make good advertising conduits.
In other dramatic presentations on television Blacks are seldom
portrayed realistically. It is as if, blacks provide nothing more
than a backdrop against which the tensions and problems of the white
world are resolved. In an interview in 1968, P. Jay Sidney, a veteran
black actor, cast then in an "important" supporting role in the soap
opera As the World Turns states:
I was supposed to be a research physician in that series...
and yet, emotionally and dramatically, I did not exist as a
person. My whole function in those 14 segments was getting
a white boy out of jail. I was a nonperson in the plot, a
one-dimensional figure with no life of my own. I didn't have
any problems. There were no things about which I was person-
ally glad or sad, nothing toward which I personally aspired.
I had no past, no future, no family. I existed only for that
white boy. I was, in other words, an auxiliary, not a human
being (Peters, 1970, p. 261).
In the past (1900 to 1940' s), blacks were portrayed as maids,
buffoons, etc.; today (1968), suggests Bill Cosby:
Writers and producers seem to think you need a special reason
for a role to be played by a Negro--that he has to pounce on
someone or be pounced upon... When a Negro comes on the screen
the audience immediately tenses up. They know they are about
to witness some violence, whether physical, verbal or emotion-
al CPeters, 1970, p. 260).
Whether the roles are in comedy or dramatic presentations, blacks
are consistently stereotyped in television according to the images
America has created and maintains of them. In film, the image of
blacks today parallels that of television's. Wander (1978), in his




Unifying these fims is an uneven stream of social realismand physical black culture. On screen the mimesis of a bLckman s life is punctuated by a rap to the head or a kick to
the groin. The struggles are framed by songs or primal
screams... Gone is white-inspired Amos 'n' Andy, but blacks
"
degrade each other throughout. While romanticizing the war-
rior s distinct style, the various white and black film-
makers can't think of a creative framework by which to order
black experience. The consciousness of these demigods is
limited to their primary American experience, an abusive
order of master/slave relationships. . .Vested white interests
will be against spreading a gospel which contradicts its own
and threatens to destroy its economic base by raising con-
sciousness of not only black viewers, but white viewers too
Cpp. 10-1).
Like the film industry and commercial television, Public Broad-
casting has been assailed for its failure to address the needs of
non-white groups in the areas of management, employment, training and
programming (see Shepard, 1978). A report issued by a 28-member "Task
Force on Minorities" concluded that "the public broadcast system is
asleep at the transmitter" when it concerns Black, Asian, Latino and
Native American needs and interests (see Shepard, 1978, p. 88). The
task force further reported that:
In the fiscal year 1977 series dealing with minorities consti-
tuted 9.4 percent of the total television series funded by the
corporation at $5.8 million. About 48.6 percent of the mana-
gers of 40 public service television stations who responded to
the task force questions said that they each spend less than
$5,000 annually on national minority programming. . .Only one
minority program funded by the cooperative (PBS), "Black
Perspective on the News", is now being shown... by 77 of the
276 stations that could show it (Shepard, 1978, p. 88).
Significantly, as early as 1968, the Kerner Commission , although
contradictory in reporting several of its findings, concluded that "the
media have thus far failed to report adequately on the causes and con-
sequence of civil disorders and the underlying problems of race rela-
tions" in the United States (see Emergy and Smythe, 1972, p. 462),
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In context the Kerner Report further states:
"fws organizations have failed to communicate
to both their black and white audiences a sense of the pro-
blems American faces and the sources of potential solutions
^
The media report and write from the standpoint of a white
man s world. The ills of the ghetto, the difficulties of
life there, the Negro's burning sense of grievance, are sel-
dom conveyed. Slights and indignities are part of the Negro's
daily life, and many of them come from what he now calls
"the white press"— a press that repeatedly if unconsciously
reflects the biases, the paternalism, the indifference of
white America (see Emery and Smythe, 1972, p. 465).
The failure of the press and broadcasting networks in reporting
the black experience in America is perhaps best conveyed by a young
black teenager attending a conference in 1969 on "Does TV serve the
needs of Black Youth?" The youth states:
You just don't give us any coverage--you know, if we try to
get a family off unemployment. . .This doesn't seem to be im-
portant to the news media... We call them up--they don't ever
show up... Like when we start rioting. . .everytime we're doing
something bad--like the whites look at that show, they look
at this news thing like they probably think that all those
'niggers' do over there is riot and tear up--it's like we
got a program going--we don't get any coverage until we
start messing up the furnace... We got to be right up in the
papers, as soon as somebody steal a check or something, then
you got a big old thing about that. But you never see any-
thing like we get some jobs, picket or something, to try to
get some jobs or get a proposal in downtown. . .Anything
that's instrumental that's doing anything for Black people,
we never get any coverage about that. As soon as we're out
there making fools of ourselves, or else we're out there
rioting or tearing up or something, we get a lot of coverage
behind that (Stavins, 1969, p. 202, emphasis mine).
If television (and film) obscures and distorts the "image" of the
black experience in America, as I have attempted to show, then: "It
may well be that commercial television will prove to be the most re-
solute enemy of black people because of its tremendous capacity for
absorption of just those elements where we excel --sports and entertain-
140
ment-blinding us from the reality of our condition; and it may well
be too, that by emphasizing just that entertainment which is escapist
in nature, lulls senses which should otherwise be stimulated to "ac-
tion" Cfiibbons, 1970, p. 50).
In context, then, "superspade" represents a caricature created for
the 70's. Unlike "sambo" he is both cunning and brutal, but like
"sambo", "superspade" is a black image in the white mind. As such,
"sambo" and "superspade", and all the other images created for blacks
by America, stand as metaphors for a bankrupt and dying culture.
The Thesis Diagnosed
I will attempt now a synthesis of the various theoretical models
advanced and developed in the course of the discussion in order to
locate and render intelligible the thesis of the dissertation within
a coherent and critical framework.
Census data indicates that over 96% of American homes have televi-
sion sets. Americans are today exposed, more than ever before in human
history, to essentially a uniform system of cultural messages and
images. What images of the world are being presented to the American
people? Who governs the selection and the creation of the messages and
images? I have attempted to show that the images of the social world,
presented by the mass media in general, and the electronic media in
particular, did not develop, nor are they presently maintained, in a
vacuum. They are the products of a systems that is structurally linked
to the American political order and to the commercial requirements of
the modern capitalist society. We have seen that the patterns of own-
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ership and control of the major media channels in the United States are
entirely monopolized by elite groups. Moreover, since the second
World War, the commercial broadcasting industry has structurally merg-
ed to form the military/industrial/governmental/media complex.
What are the functions of the electronic media within the context
of the ruling order? I have attempted to show that as early as in the
1920's, the Frankfurt School identified the mass media as agencies of
manipulation in the modern capitalist and industrial society. The
Frankfurt School argued that the mass media (as elements of the 'cul-
ture industry'), in the modern capitalist society, function to manipu-
late the consciousness of the individual in order to enslave him in
far more subtle and pervasive ways than do other more direct modes of
domination.
Specifically, the institutionalized media complex in American op-
erate as Smythe (1977) insists:
...to produce people in audiences who work at learning the
theory and practice of consumership. . . to produce audiences
whose theory and practice confirms the ideology of monopoly
capitalism. . .to produce public opinion supportive of the
strategic and tactical policies of the state... to operate
itself so profitably as to ensure unrivalled respect for
its economic importance in the system (p. 64).
In order to mystify the world so that people will accept the exist-
ing order, the media, as legitimization agents of the "existing order",
must distort people's perception of the social world. The production
of distortions via the media complex operates at two levels. The first
level of distortion is informed by the government, military, and corp-
orate sectors of the ruling structure in American society. The second
is internal or endemic to the media itself: that is, the organization.
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hierarchy, and production process of media systems create distortions
of social reality that operate often independent of external influences.
Those who work in the media are gradually socialized into it
They learn the criteria of inclusion and exclusion, as well as
the conventions, and the ground rules of the operation. They
eventually come to recognize the appropriate ways to repond
to the subtle pressures which are always there but which are
rarely overtly applied (Halloran, 1974, p. 17).
Seemingly, I am contradicting my thesis in the above statement.
I argued earlier that the media complex is structurally linked to the
ruling order in society. Although the media are technically malleable,
the manner in which they are used is culturally and politically deter-
mined. If the media are employed by a ruling elite to distort social
reality, then, the organization structure that informs the use of
media technology must itself internally (organizationally) replicate
the distortions it generates for public consumption. In this sense,
once a system is organized to perform "maintenance" functions for the
state, it operates according to the logic (distorted or otherwise) and
the interest of those working in the organization as well as of those
who control and set the conditions in which the system (media complex)
functions.
I have in the discussion shown how the media channels in America
systematically communicate distortions to the public concerning the
nature of the social world. The media, through entertainment fare and
news presentations, advance a set of ideological messages that beguile
people into accepting social values disguised as truths concerning the
nature of social relations, power, etc., in society. As such, the media
reproduce the cultural images that simultaneously affirm the existing
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order, and prescribe the patterns of social life. Through the manipu-
lation techniques we discussed in an earl ier chapter (e.g. ideological
mystifications, distortion and omission of facts, distortions in the
meaning of language, etc.), the media "systematically" distorts
social reality, and in doing so creates the imagery and rhetoric within
which people are constrained to act. In context, the media serves as
'hegemonic' agents for ruling elites in the American social order.
The Media and Race
We have established the general framework within which the media
complex operate in the American social order; and we have discussed how
the media function in the advanced capitalist society.
I will attempt now to extend the analysis of media functions to
the problematic of contemporary race relations in the United States in
order to show how the media, particularly television and film, maintain
and legitimize, through their portrayal of blacks, the racial divisions
extant in American society. By way of introduction I establish the
following points: (1) White American relations with blacks (and
other non-white racial groups) have been historically characterized
by white domination, (2) color in America has and remains a factually
accurate index of wealth, power and status in society (see McKenney,
1975), C3) the images of blacks created in literature, theatre, film,
and currently in television serve to legitimize the belief that color
denotes a differential status and experience, (4) the legal ("equal")
status of blacks notwithstanding, the beliefs and imagery of white
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superiority remain common currency in the United States, and (5) there
persists in American culture the pervasive tendency to accept the sub-
ordinate position of blacks as natural and necessary.
It is impossible to understand the relationship between the mass
media and contemporary race relations apart from the above considera-
tions. Each of the five factors listed above are historically rooted
in the American racial experience. As such, prejudice (color) can
only be seen as a normative phenomena, specific, though not unique,
to American culture. It is within this framework that racial prejud-
ice and discrimination is examined and evaluated in relation to the
role of the mass media. I do not mean to imply that racial prejudice
can be reduced to a personal characteristic of individuals; neither
is it a matter of misinformation that can be resolved by education.
Halloran (1974) argues that:
It is important to stress that an analysis of race relations
which does not seek to relate individual attitudes and cul-
tural norms to underlying social structures is unable to
generate proposals capable of leading to real social change.
Attitudes cannot be changed significantly, independently of
the structural factors to which they relate. In brief,
racism should be seen not simply as a psychological matter
but also as a cultural phenomenon historically rooted in
social relationships, integral to the values system of modern
Western societies, and serving particular interests in exist-
ing social structures (p. 23, emphasis mine]"!
The "particular interests" that maintain racial inequality in
America are: Cl) the dominant white racial group, and (2) the elite
white stratum who dominate both the members of its own racial group as
well as the members of all other racial groups in society.
American society is stratified along social class and ethnic and
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racial criteria. In context, the socioracial structure of American
society is characterized by a "racial selection process" (Hoetink,
1973). Historically rooted and culturally specific, this process of
social selection and differentiation is determined and maintained by a
ruling elite in collusion with other strata in the dominant racial
group. Membership in the hierarchically racial structure prevails over
achievement and nonsomatic acquired social position. Hence:
An affluent black doctor in the United States is considered a
black first; his professional qualities and economic achieve-
ments only serve to determine his position on the socioeco-
nomic scale within the black group (Hoetink, 1973, p. 49).
In this sense, racism, as a culturally practiced phenomena enables
whites to maintain a higher position of status and power in relation to
blacks and other non-white racial groups in society.
At a deeper cultural level, racism serves a stabilizing function.
Kovel O970), in a trenchant analysis of white racism in America
states:
The most difficult, because unpleasant, fact that we must
face is that for all its malevolence, racism served a stabi-
lizing function in American culture for many generations.
Indeed it was a source of gratification to whites. It de-
fined a social universe, absorbed aggression, and facilitated
a sense of virtue in white America— a trait which contributed
to America's material success (p. 4).
Racism, in my estimation, continues to serve a "stabilizing" func-
tion in American culture. In this sense racism, both in its historical
and contemporary forms, provides for the maintenance of the dominant
culture's definition of itself, and, therefore, the potency of the
culture. Racism, then, is both an attitude and a practice that accords
higher status, material benefits, and a sense of cultural potency for
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whites in America. At the level of the ruling order in society, racism
serves as a divisive cultural practice through which hegemony is main-
tained by an elite stratum in the dominant racial group. By promoting
and maintaining racial divisions in American society, ruling elites
shift attention from themselves and from the structures that maintain
their dominance to subordinate social groups in society. Consequently,
subordinate social classes, ethnic, and racial groups are unable to
perceive their common interests. When common interests are recognized
by subordinate social groups, they are rejected in most cases by whites
on the basis that it would fundamentally alter the power relationship
between the two racial groups. The ability to transcend the cultural
experience that historically has differentiated, in terms of wealth and
status, the relations between the races in America is beyond the capac-
ity of most whites at present. The maintenance, then, of racial divi-
sions in the American social order is central to not only the dominant
racial groups definition of itself, but also to the way in which hege-
mony operates at two levels of the social order: control at the level
of the dominant racial group and control at the level of the ruling
stratum. At both levels of the 'hegemonic' process whites are in
command.
Our concern, however, as stated at the inception of the inquiry,
is how ruling elites organize and use the electronic media to maintain
and legitimize racial divisions in American society. In order to main-
tain the racial divisions in American society, and, in doing so,
weaken
resistance among subordinate social groups who "objectively" have
common interests but who are unable to subjectively realize
them, rul-
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ing elites have historically defined blacks as different from and in-
ferior to whites Csee Kovel , 1970).
The electronic media have historically played a central and con-
sistent role, as I have shown, in projecting images of blacks from in-
ferior and subservient buffoons to "superspade" portrayals. As such,
television and film continue to project an image of white society in
which blacks are seen as aberrations or oddities rather than as people
who are members of society.
Hartmann and Husband (1971) contend that:
Communication between people is possible to the extent that
they share common frameworks of interpretation. They need to
have similar meanings for the same symbols, and a way of
thinking about things in common before they can communicate.
Our perceptions are structured by the mental categories
available to us for making sense of our world (p. 267).
The images of blacks in the electronic media, as in the printed
media, distances whites from blacks in American society. By doing so,
both racial groups are unable to recognize their common experience and
condition.
Gibbons (1970), in describing how television conspires to differ-
entiate and distance blacks from whites in American, argues:
By creating the myth of the special person (blacks) and by re-
solutely and steadfastly believing in it, television sets him
aside from the group to which he belongs and by implication
from the rest of the people. By refusing to identify the aims
of the majority, it deceives the majority into thinking that
the aims of that special person are in no way related to that
of the majority (p. 51 )
.
The Kerner Commissions have astutely observed that:
The absence of Negro faces and activities from the media has
an effect on white audiences as well as black. If what the
white American reads in the newspapers or sees on television
conditions his expectation of what is ordinary and normal in
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the arger society, he will neither understand nor accept the
black American. By failing to portray the Negro as a matter
of routine in the context of the total society, the news media
have, we believe, contributed to the black-white schism in
this country. When the white press does refer to Negroes and
Negro problems it frequently does so as if Negroes were not
part of the audience. This is perhaps understandable in a
system where whites edit, and, to a large extent, write news.
But such attitudes, in an area as sensitive and inflammatory
as this, feed Negro alienation and intensify white prejudices
Csee Emergy and Smythe, 1972, p. 467).
Hartmann and Husband (1971, 1974), in their analysis of the rela-
tionship of the mass media to race relations in Britain, support the
Kerner Commission's contention that "the way race-related material is
handled by the mass media serves both to perpetuate negative perceptions
of blacks and to define the situation as one of intergroup conflict"
Cp. 270). The researchers Hartmann and Husband (1971) conclude that
the news coverage of race related matters in Britain causes:
...people to see the situation (race related issues) primar-
ily as one of actual or potential confl ict. . .The result is
that real conflict is amplified, and potential for conflict
created. For the media not only operate within culture, they
also make culture and they help shape social reality (p. 280).
Correspondingly, in the United States, as a consequence of the
civil unrest of the 60' s, the decolonization struggles occurring
throughout the Third World, and the severe structural crisis in the
'central' capitalist economy, blacks and other non-white groups are
currently presented as a "problem" by the media, television in particu-
lar. Daily, television presents to the American public, in distorted
formats, race related issues concerning education, employment, etc.,
which heighten interracial hostility (see Fisher and Lowenstein, 1967).
The images and messages derived from television infer that blacks are
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in various ways a problem and threat to whites. Seldom, if ever, are
the problems related to unemployment, unequal distribution of resources,
etc., presented by television as symptoms of deeper structural inequal-
ities in society. By distorting, then, the image of blacks and presen-
ting them as a "treat" to society, the electronic media perform a main-
tenance function. From the prespective, the electronic media serve to
legitimize white racism as a culturally practiced activity; and in
doing so, the media, in general, obscure and shift attention away from
the source and cause of the racial conflict— the system of capitalism




Two final comments before I bring the discussion of the media and
racial conflict to a close. In chapter two, I suggested that the
Frankfurt School's theory of manipulation was an appropriate model for
the analysis of the electronic media in the modern capitalist society.
Throughout the development of this inquiry, I have relied on the work
of several of the Frankfurt School's major social theorists (Adorno,
Horkheimer, etc.). I am in general agreement with many of the Frank-
furt School's theoretical formulations concerning the nature of social
relations and of the role and function of the 'culture industry' in the
modern industrial capitalist society. I disagree, however, with
Adorno 's (1944) thesis that the development of mass culture will even-
tually homogenize society into a generalized culture of "everyman"
where all stereotypes previously ascribed to social groups will be sup-
planted by a single, all-inclusive stereotype.
No doubt, the electronic media function to reduce individual dif-
ferences in American society to virtual one-dimensionality. However,
if the maintenance of racial divisions in society is a necessary and
central dynamic of the ruling elite hegemony (as I have argued), then,
the portrayal of cultural differences between racial groups will
con-
tinue in film and television. As such, the electronic media
will con-




non-wKite racial groups in American society. Accordingly, people are
being systematically reduced or levelled to 'one-dimensionality', but
different stereotypes predominate at different levels of the social
structure. The media process operating via the electronic media, dir-
ect different sterotypes to selected audiences based on racial criteria.
Obviously, the net effect of this process is that "everyone", is reduc-
ed to a virtual one-dimensionality but in different ways.
The final point I wish to advance concerns the nature through
which hegemony is maintained by ruling elites in the American social
order. Hegemony, as I have defined in chapter four, is a "lived" so-
cial process.
It is a realized complex of experiences, relationships and
activities, with specific and changing pressures and limits
...Moreover, it does not just passively exist as a form of
dominance. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, de-
fended, and modified. It is also continually resisted, limit-
ed, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own. We
have then to add to the concept of hegemony the concepts of
counter-hegemony and alternative hegemony, which are real
and persistent elements of practice (Williams, 1977, pp. 112-13).
Within this 'hegemonic' process, where contradictory elements and
alternative forms emerge, the change in the image of blacks in film and
television, parallel corresponding changes in social relations in so-
ciety.
Until the 40' s, blacks were portrayed in films as buffoons or
savages; during the second World War period, the image partially
changed to accomodate the protests of Civil Rights groups; and in
the
early 70' s the image of blacks changed further to depict the
new black
superhero. These changes in the image of blacks in film and
television
occurred as a response to opposition which questioned or
threatened the
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ruling order. "Any hegemonic process," contends Williams (1977),
"must be especially alert and responsive to the alternatives and oppo-
sition which question or threaten its dominance (p. 113)." By intro-
ducing new images of blacks in television and film fare, ruling elites
absorbed and neutralized, within the hegemonic process, resistance to
their dominance. From this perspective contends Williams (1977, p.
114):
It can be persuasively argued that all or nearly all initia-
tives and contributions, even when they take on manifestly
alternative or oppositional forms, are in practice tied to
the hegemonic: that the dominant culture, so to say, at once
produces and limits its own forms of counterculture.
1 have attempted in the present inquiry to: (1) examine and
assess critically the corpus of research conducted on the nature, struc-
ture, role and effect of the electronic media on social relations in
the United States; (2) bring to bear relevant social relations in the
discussion of media functions in modern society; (3) determine in what
ways the electronic media are structurally linked to the ruling order
in America; and (4) show how the media serve to maintain and legitimize
the racial divisions, and therefore, the socioracial structure of the
American social order.
The evidence gathered in this dissertation point to the following
conclusions:
1. Variations in conceptual approaches and research designs
notwithstanding, there is qualitative and empirical evidence
to show that the media, particularly television, shapes and
alters political reality; and that political attitudes and
behaviors are in part, formed by the political reality pro-
jected by the electronic media.
2 Since the second World War, the media complex in the
United
States has emerged with the military/industrial/government
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complex. As such, the media are structurally linked to the
power elite in the American social order.
3. The patterns of ownership and control of the media chan-
nels in the United States are increasingly concentrated in a
small elite stratum.
4. The broadcasting medium is virtually dependent on adver-
tising revenues from the corporate sector, and therefore, op-
erates in accordance with the commercial requirements of cap-
ital ism.
5. The images of the social world (race relations, power,
social life) presented by the media are largely consonant
with the interests of the elite stratum in society.
6. The electronic media systematically distort social real-
ity, and in doing so, beguile people into accepting social
values disguised as truths concerning the nature of the social
world.
7. Media structures, by their organization and production
hierarchy, systematically reproduce distortions of social
reality.
8. Television and film in America have consistently presented
a distorted image of blacks and other people of color. Blacks
are presented either as deviants, oddities, or subversives.
9. In recent years, the electronic media have, in reporting
the news on race related issues, presented blacks as a pro-
blem and a threat to whites and the status quo in America.
In doing so, the media contribute to the maintenance of racial
divisions and hostility in society.
10. Since the owners of the mass media in the United States
have encouraged the practice of stereotyping blacks through
their portrayal in entertainment and new shows, we must assume
that the maintenance of racial antipathy is a necessary and
central dynamic for ruling elite hegemony.
Areas For Further Research
While the development of communications technology has grown ex-
ponentially, research into its social and political uses, has not
developed on a commensurate scale. The following are areas
which hav^
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been neglected and where further study is required.
Research into the production and decision-making processes . Studies
are required that examine how media producers perceive their role and
intentions. Since the materials produced by the media are largely de-
pendent on the prevailing system of ownership, more research is needed
in this area to determine the relationship between programming and
corporate goals. Specifically, the planning of program schedules and
the allocation of time and revenues to different types of programs re-
quire more intensive investigation. Concomitantly, researchers need to
ask questions concerning the influence of different forms of media fare
(e.g., news, race related issues, entertainment) on social behavior.
In context, the content of media programming should be examined for
values and omissions as well as comissions of fact. As such, in the
case of television research Adorno (1954) suggests that:
A depth-psychological approach to television has to be focus-
sed on its multi-layered structure. Mass media are not simply
the sum total of the actions they portray or of the messages
that radiate from these actions. Mass media also consist of
various layers of meanings superimposed on one another, all
of which contribute to the effect (p. 217).
Also necessary are sociological studies ("system-oriented research)
which locate the media within the larger social context rather than as
discrete institutions operating independent of other economic and pol-
itical forces in society. Specifically, as Smythe (1977) insists,
researchers from a Marxist standpoint, must examine "the commodity form
of mass communications under monopoly capitalism on which a host of
sub-markets dealing with the cultural industry, e.g., the markets of
"news", "entertainment", etc., exist parasitical ly" (p. 52).
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The organization of media research . Researchers, as I have suggested
in chapter two, must be aware of the inadequacies of piecemeal studies.
For example, researchers must design more sophisticated research de-
signs that link media use to trends in political attitudes and actions
CKraus and Davis, 1976). These research designs should provide plaus-
ible ways for understanding the relationship between behavior and
events which take place at different levels of the social order. Ac-
cordingly, methods must be applied to research in ways that probe
meaningfully the cultural context within which the media operate,
rather than be used to "package" and "market" popular beliefs concern-
ing the nature of the social world. In context, researchers must take
cognizance of the fact that the directions and scope of research is
grounded in a complex of value and ideological orientations as well as
external pressures. We must ask who has done the research? Why was it
done? And what are the sources of funding, types of research and poli-
tical factors that inform the research effort.
The media and race relations . If we are to understand critically how
the media contribute to the maintenance of racial divisions in American
culture, researchers will have to develop more sophisticated conceptual
frameworks and designs than presently exist. Future studies must seek
to develop designs that systematically integrate the audience (social
groups), culture industry, and the ruling order into a historical-
cultural perspective. Especially useful would be interdisciplinary
studies, comparing how the media functions in other multi-racial
societies.
REFERENCE NOTES
1. However, most studies of child viewing behaviors report that black
children watch more television than white children. A word of
caution, the studies reporting heavier viewing among black children
are not based on a random national sample.
2. The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders and the Kerner
Commission report the contrary. Blacks were found distrustful of
all media, believing that the media was biased and repressively
used by the social order. However, the date and regions in which
these studies were conducted are important to consider in the
evaluation of the findings.
3. The writer cautions the reader to interpret the findings in this
study in relation to the ratio used of ten whites to one black.
4. Dimensions of this profile are changing. Blacks are now cast in
certain roles formerly prescribed for whites (e.g., criminals,
violent, immoral). The power relationship that situates blacks
in inter-racial, mostly adult programming, however, is explicitly
apparent.
5. For a comprehensive review of the literature regarding the effects
of television content on social behaviors of viewers see, Leifer,
Gordon and Graves (1974).
6. Slavery as a system of forced labor required justification in the
Southern mind. The need to debase blacks, was essential, especial-
ly since the Southern white slavemaster was publicly affirming his
recognition of and support for the essential humanity of all men.
The psychological threat posed by this dilemma--the "dualism" of
how a man could be both a thing and a man at the same time--was
resolved, or, at best, rendered palatable by reducing blacks to
things. By ascribing false and inferior traits to the slave, the
Southern white could justify the status and treatment accorded the
property he owned. His relation, then, to the slave, was that of a
man to a thing. The slave's distinct physical characteristics were
easily singled out and ascribed with inferior qualities that facil-
itated for the debasement to occur. The phenomena reinforced the
mental stance the Southern white required to minimize the tension
caused by guilt within his private life, and publicly, it absolved
him of any moral wrongdoing.
7. Public concern over the influence of motion pictures on children
occurred as early as 1933. In one study, researchers Peterson and
Thurstone (1933), found that white children's attitude toward
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blacks changed less favorably after viewing the Birth of a Nation
a motion picture well known for its anti -black bias.
'
Stereotypic film images of other non-white groups in America par-
allel that of the black image in film. For further study see
Cripps C1977); Elkin (1950); Woll (1974); Chin (1973); Price
C1973); Doscher (1947/48); Wood (1971); Silet and Bataille (1977);
and Georgakas (1972).
The notion that social categories are "neutral" is problematic.
The very existence of the category which cannot be precisely
defined may indicate a lack of "neutrality". Any attempt at
definition is of necessity a form of stereotyping. In an age
when "Black", "Native American", etc., represent attempts at a
people's self-definition, stereotypes become unavoidable.
Television will have an even greater influence at legitimizing
old and new stereotypes.
I want to raise an important problematic concerning this phenomena.
The world exists in infinite variety. Our method of reducing un-
certainty requires categorization. Would such violence continue
to exist if the categories changed? Is it possible to eliminate
stereotypes? This problem demands further research.
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